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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DAVID LEE HEWITT, i 
Petitioner and Appellant, ! 
V . J 
STATE OF UTAH, i 
Respondent and Appellee. ; 
Case No. 930035-CA 
: Priority No. 3 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from the district court's denial of a 
petition for extraordinary writ brought under Rule 65B, Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure. This appeal is taken from a decision of the 
district court involving a challenge to petitioner's sentence for 
a second degree felony conviction; therefore, original appellate 
jurisdiction lies with the Utah Court of Appeals under Utah Code 
Ann. § 78-2a-3 (2)(g) (Supp. 1992). 
ISSUES PRESENTED UPON APPEAL 
1. Did the district court correctly conclude that petitioner 
waived his complaints when he failed to raise them at the 
sentencing hearing and on direct appeal? 
2. Does Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-31.1 (1992), the habeas 
corpus statute of limitations, unconstitutionally "suspend" the 
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus and, therefore, violate 
article I, section 5 of the Utah Constitution. 
1 
STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
On appeal from denial of a petition for post-conviction 
relief, the appellate court "'survey[s] the record in the light 
most favorable to the findings and judgment; and [it] will not 
reverse if there is a reasonable basis therein to support the trial 
court's refusal to be convinced that the writ should be granted,'" 
Bundv v. DeLand, 763 P. 2d 803, 805 (Utah 1988) (quoting Velasquez 
v. Pratt, 21 Utah 2d 229, 232, 443 P.2d 1020, 1022 (1967)). When 
the denial includes rulings on questions of law, the-trial court's 
legal conclusions are reviewed de novo. Stewart v. State, 830 P. 2d 
306, 308-09 (Utah App. 1992). A trial court's findings of fact 
will be disturbed only if clearly erroneous. Id. 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES, AND RULES 
The following provisions are included in Addendum A to this 
brief. Other relevant pleadings and documents, including the 
summary decision and order of the trial court, are also included in 
the Addenda. 
Utah Const, art. I, § 5. 
Utah Const, art. V. 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-31.1 
Utah R. Civ. P. 65B (1992). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case arises from petitioner's sentencing on February 4, 
1991 before Third District Court Judge Michael Murphy for the crime 
of retail theft, a second degree felony. Judge Murphy sentenced 
Petitioner to a term of imprisonment for not less than one nor more 
2 
than fifteen years. (Judgment, Sentence (Commitment), attached as 
Addendum B.) 
On February 19, 1992, more than one year after receiving his 
sentence, petitioner filed a petition for extraordinary relief with 
the Third District Court. (R. at 2-5; Attached as Addendum C, 
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus and Post Conviction Relief, Case 
No. 920900909, Third District Court.) In his petition, petitioner 
claimed that the sentencing court had received and acted upon 
erroneous and misleading information in the pre-sentence 
investigation report (PSI). (R. at 3; Addendum C.) 
Further, petitioner also alleged that the Adult Probation & 
Parole (AP&P) agent who had written the report was prejudiced and 
biased and that the court had failed to ask petitioner during 
sentencing if he and his counsel had reviewed and discussed the 
PSI. Petitioner later filed an amended petition, which did not 
substantively change the nature of his allegations. (R. at 58-61; 
Attached as Addendum D, Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus 
and Post Conviction Relief, Case No. 920900909, Third District 
Court, filed June 17, 1992.) 
The State was ordered to respond to the petition (R. at 18-19) 
and filed a motion to dismiss and memorandum in support. The 
motion to dismiss was based upon the argument that petitioner could 
and should have raised his complaints in regular appellate review; 
that the statute of limitations barred the petition; and that the 
petition did not comply with the procedural requirements of Rule 
65B. (R. at 21-29; Attached as Addendum E, Motion to Dismiss, 
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Memorandum in Support of Motion to Dismiss, Case No, 920900909, 
Third District Court, filed March 13, 1992.) Petitioner responded 
to the motion on March 30, 1992. (R. at 31-35; Attached as Addendum 
F, Response to Respondent's Motion to Dismiss and Memorandum in 
Support, Case No. 920900909.) 
After requesting the State to order a copy of the transcript 
of petitioner's sentencing hearing (R. at 56), the district court 
entered a Summary Decision and Order, which dismissed the petition 
on the grounds of waiver and statute of limitations. (R. at 81; 
Attached as Addendum G, Summary Decision and Order, Third District 
Court, Case No. 920900909, filed December 15, 1992.) Petitioner 
filed his notice of appeal on January 14, 1993. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The (acts pertinent to this case are set out in the Statement 
of the Case. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
In his petition for post-conviction relief, petitioner claimed 
that the sentencing court committed various procedural errors 
during his sentencing, primarily that it relied on biased and 
misleading information in the PSI. Petitioner admits that he never 
pursued his claims on direct appeal, nor did he state his concerns 
to the sentencing judge during the sentencing hearing. (R. at 3; 
Addendum C.) 
Extraordinary relief pursuant to Rule 65B is not a substitute 
for regular appellate review. Because petitioner's claims could 
and should have been raised on direct appeal, the court's judgment 
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is final and not subject to collateral attack by way of 
extraordinary relief. Therefore, the court's dismissal on the 
grounds of waiver was proper and should be affirmed. 
Petitioner does not provide any legal analysis challenging 
Judge Murphy's finding of waiver; therefore under previous 
decisions of the Utah appellate courts, any claims that he may have 
had on that issue should be considered abandoned. Thus, this Court 
should decide Petitioner's case solely on the issue of waiver and 
not reach petitioner's constitutional arguments regarding the 
habeas corpus statute of limitations. 
Nevertheless, although the State respectfully suggests that 
this Court can and should avoid the constitutional issues raised by 
Petitioner, the State submits that the statute of limitations as 
applied in this case does not violate the suspension clause of 
article I, section 5. Article I, section 5 of the Utah 
Constitution prohibits suspension of the privilege of the writ of 
habeas corpus unless required by the public safety, rebellion, or 
invasion. In determining the applicability of the suspension 
clause to Petitioner's case, it is necessary to look at the writ of 
habeas corpus as it existed when the Utah Constitution was drafted 
and ratified. At common law and at that time in the Utah courts, 
the writ of habeas corpus was available only to challenge a court's 
jurisdiction, not to collaterally attack a conviction. 
Utah appellate courts have greatly expanded the writ of habeas 
corpus and have by rule created a post-conviction relief procedure. 
However, as a limitation on legislative power, the suspension 
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clause can only properly be read as a prohibition on the 
legislative power to "suspend" the common law writ of habeas 
corpus. The framers of the constitution could not have known that 
in the future the appellate courts would transform the writ of 
habeas corpus into a remedy for constitutional violations• 
Therefore, the framers' anti-suspension language cannot fairly be 
applied to that transformed writ. Petitioner's petition also is 
not one that would have been granted habeas corpus relief at common 
law. It neither challenges the sentencing court's jurisdiction nor 
alleges that the sentence imposed was unlawful. Therefore, this 
case does not present a situation where the State is attempting to 
limit common law habeas corpus via Section 78-12-31.1.1 
Petitioner's claims are cognizable only through the post-
conviction relief procedure of Rule 65B, the codification of the 
judicial expansion of habeas corpus and the common law writ of 
error and error coram nobis. Article I, section 5 simply does not 
apply to that modern evolution of habeas corpus and, therefore, 
petitioner's suspension argument should be rejected. 
Additionally, petitioner's other claims in his brief before 
this Court, which include the reasonableness of the three month 
limitations period, a due process challenge, and the applicability 
of the "open courts" provision of the state constitution, Utah 
1
 Whether the state could appropriately enact any limitation 
period on the common law writ of habeas corpus is not presented in 
this case because Hewitt's petition does not raise claims that were 
cognizable in common law habeas proceedings. 
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Const, art. I, § 11, were not raised in the trial court and 
therefore should not now be reviewed on appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT CORRECTLY DENIED THE PETITION 
ON THE GROUNDS OF WAIVER AND FAILURE TO PURSUE 
A DIRECT APPEAL. 
Petitioner did not challenge his conviction, but the 
proceeding before the sentencing court that resulted in his 1 to 15 
year sentence. In his amended petition, petitioner claimed that 
the sentencing judge erred by relying on misleading and erroneous 
information, accepting a presentence investigation report (PSI) 
from an allegedly biased agent, and failing to ask petitioner if he 
had seen the PSI and discussed it with his counsel. (R. at 58-60; 
Amended Petition, Addendum D.) The district court dismissed the 
petition on two grounds: waiver and statute of limitations. From 
its review of the transcript of the sentencing proceeding, the 
court found that petitioner either knew or should have known of the 
issues raised in his post-conviction petition at the time of 
sentencing and that he could and should have raised those issues at 
the hearing and on a direct appeal. 
The district court ruled that petitioner waived his complaints 
by not raising them through regular procedures. "The other 
allegations [of the petition] share at least three characteristics: 
(1) they were not raised at the sentencing hearing; (2) had they 
been raised they could have and would have been addressed; and (3) 
they were not the subject of a direct appeal." (R. at 82; Summary 
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Decision and Order, Case No, 92090090, Third District Court, filed 
December 15f 1992 (Order, Addendum G.) 
As petitioner admitted in his amended petition, as well as in 
his original petition, he did not pursue a direct appeal from 
either his conviction or his sentence. (R. at 59; Amended Petition 
at 2, Addendum D.) The district court correctly dismissed the 
petition for those reasons. In Brown v. Turner, 21 Utah 2d 96, 440 
P.2d 968 (1968), the Utah Supreme Court recognized that a petition 
for post-conviction relief was an "extraordinary" remedy and not a 
substitute for regular appellate review. See also Codianna v. 
Morris/ 660 P.2d 1101 (Utah 1983). Contrary to the plain command 
of the lawf petitioner has attempted to use Rule 65B(b) to correct 
his failure to raise his complaints in the proper manner. 
Although a petitioner's failure to raise claims through 
regular appellate review is excused by showing that unusual 
circumstances prevented the use of a regular appeal, Codianna, 660 
P. 2d at 1105, petitioner did not show such unusual circumstances in 
his petition. His petition stated that he did not appeal the 
sentence because he "was never informed by counsel that the Court 
had errored [sic] during sentencing." (R. at 3.) This is likely 
because there was, in fact, no error in sentencing. The Sixth 
Amendment does not require defense counsel to file a meaningless or 
frivolous appeal or to tell a client that there are errors when 
there are none. 
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POINT II 
BECAUSE THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY DISMISSED 
THE PETITION DUE TO WAIVER AND FAILURE TO 
PURSUE A DIRECT APPEAL, THIS COURT DOES NOT 
NEED TO REACH PETITIONER'S CLAIMS ABOUT THE 
HABEAS CORPUS STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS. 
Petitioner's brief is primarily devoted to his claim that 
section 78-12-31.1 (1992) suspends the privilege of the writ of 
habeas corpus.2 Suspension of the privilege is prohibited by the 
Utah Constitution. Utah Const, art. I, § 5. It does not appear 
that Utah's appellate courts have ever directly analyzed this 
provision of the constitution, even though the general topic of 
habeas corpus has been extensively litigated. Only in a 
concurring opinion of Smith v. Cook, 803 P.2d 788, 796 (Utah 1990) 
(Zimmerman, J., concurring, joined in by Stewart, J.), have two 
justices of the Utah Supreme Court expressed their opinion that the 
legislature could not validly impose a limitation on habeas corpus. 
In State v. Anderson, 701 P.2d 1099, 1103 (Utah 1985), the 
court stated that it is a fundamental rule that courts should avoid 
addressing constitutional issues whenever possible. This 
fundamental rule seems especially pertinent when the constitutional 
issue is one of first impression. In this case, the Court can 
2
 Petitioner also raises several other issues in his brief, 
including an argument relating to the open courts provision of the 
Utah Constitution, a claim that section 78-12-31.1 violates due 
process, an allegation that imprisonment should toll the statute of 
limitations, and a challenge to the court's procedures in 
dismissing the petition. Also, petitioner seems to argue that the 
three month limitation period is unreasonable. As discussed in 
Point IV of this brief, these issues were not raised at the 
district court level and should not be reviewed on appeal. 
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sustain the district court's order solely on the basis of waiver. 
With such a procedural posture, any discussion regarding the 
constitutionality of section 78-12-31.1 would be an advisory 
opinion only. Thus, this Court should not reach the statute's 
constitutionality. 
However, in order to preserve its argument should this Court 
decide to reach the constitutional question, the State will in 
Point III discuss the merits. 
POINT III 
THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROHIBITION ON THE 
SUSPENSION OF HABEAS CORPUS APPLIES ONLY TO 
HABEAS CORPUS AS IT WAS UNDERSTOOD BY THE 
FRAMERS OF THE CONSTITUTION. 
Article I, section 5 of the Utah Constitution is a limitation 
on legislative power. In enacting that provision, the people of 
the State determined that habeas corpus was such an important facet 
of personal liberty that it could be suspended only in certain 
circumstances. However, when that provision was written and 
adopted, "habeas corpus" had a specific and very limited meaning. 
Therefore, the limitation imposed by the suspension clause was 
itself limited. 
As understood in the common law and by the Utah Supreme Court 
at the time of the writing of the Utah Constitution, the only 
question that a court reviewed on a petition for a writ of habeas 
corpus was whether the petitioner was being restrained of his 
liberty by authority of a governmental entity, usually a court, 
which had jurisdiction. Areson v. Pincock, 62 Utah 527, 530, 220 
P. 503 (1923); Winnovich v. Emery, 33 Utah 345, 93 P. 988, 993-994 
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(1908); In re Clark, 28 Utah 268, 78 P. 475 (1904); Ex Parte Hays, 
15 Utah 77, 47 P. 612, 613-614 (1897); In re Maughan, 6 Utah 167, 
21 P. 1088, 1089 (1889); (these cases are attached as Addendum H); 
see also. Oaks, Legal History in the High Court — Habeas Corpus, 
64 Mich. L. Rev. 451, 468 (1966); Story, Commentaries on the 
Constitution of the United States, at 212 (Little, Brown & Company 
1891). 
In a series of cases over the last approximately fifteen 
years, however, the Utah Supreme Court and this Court have greatly 
expanded the scope of habeas corpus3. While discussing the modern 
transformation of habeas corpus, the Supreme Court recognized that 
the original purposes of the writ were limited to challenging 
jurisdiction. Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029, 1034 (Utah 1989). It 
is this limited writ to which article I, section 5 refers, not to 
the greatly expanded constitutional remedy contained, in Rule 65B. 
As currently interpreted, "habeas corpus" or more properly Rule 
65B(b), which is directly at issue in this case, is an amalgamation 
of different common-law writs, including habeas corpus, the writ of 
3In Ziegler v. Milliken, 583 P.2d 1175 (Utah 1978), the Utah 
Supreme Court allowed the use of habeas corpus to show a violation 
of "basic rights." In Wickham v. Fisher, 629 P.2d 896 (Utah 1981), 
the court used a habeas corpus petition to examine conditions of 
confinement. This Court Hatch v. Deland, 790 P.2d 49 (Utah 1990), 
applied habeas corpus to review decisions of the Board of Pardons 
stating that habeas review was available to remedy "violations of 
substantial constitutional rights." 
The supreme court recognized the transformation of the common 
law writ of habeas corpus in Hurst v. Cook, 777 P.2d 1029, 1033-
1034 (Utah 1989), a case in which the court stated that the writ 
had "absorbed the post-conviction relief remedy" then contained in 
Rule 65B(i), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and that the writ was 
"one of the most important of all judicial tools for the protection 
of individual liberty." 
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error, and the writ of error coram nobis. See State v. Johnson, 
635 P. 2d 36, 38 (Utah 1981) ("The post-conviction hearing procedure 
is a successor to the common-law writ of error coram nobis."). 
Therefore, the suspension clause of article I, section 5, 
which dealt only with habeas corpus, should not be applied to Rule 
65B, which creates remedies that are far more powerful in scope and 
availability than the writ to which the delegates to the Utah 
Constitutional Convention could have been referring. Indeed, 
because the suspension clause is a limitation on legislative power, 
extension of the clause to remedies other than common law habeas 
corpus, would be a further limitation and unconstitutional 
encroachment on legislative power by the judicial branch of 
government. Such an extra-constitutional encroachment is neither 
envisioned nor allowed by the constitution itself. Utah Const. 
Art. V. 
Two other state courts have addressed similar challenges that 
a statute of limitation on the filing of a petition for post-
conviction relief unlawfully "suspended" the writ of habeas 
corpus/ In Potts v. State, 833 S.W.2d 60, 62 (Tenn. 1992) 
(attached as Addendum I), the Tennessee Supreme Court held that the 
suspension clause contained in article I, section 15 of the state 
constitution was not abridged by a limitation on filing petitions 
for post-conviction relief. 
*The State has not found any other cases in which this issue 
was precisely addressed. 
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The court ruled that the writ of habeas corpus could "issue 
only in the case of a void judgment or to free a prisoner held in 
custody after his term of imprisonment has expired," Potts, 833 
S.W.2d at 62. This statement reflects the meaning of common law 
habeas corpus in the Tennessee courts and as codified by that 
state's law. See State ex rel. Newsom v. Henderson, 221 Tenn. 24, 
424 S.W.2d 186, 189 (1968). 
The Colorado Court of Appeals reached the same conclusion and 
gave a more lengthy analysis to the constitutional claim. As 
stated in that opinion: 
The only claims cognizable in a 
constitutionally guaranteed habeas corpus 
proceeding are these: (1) the sentence was beyond 
jurisdictional limits, or (2) the conviction was 
invalid because the court lacked jurisdiction over 
the subject matter or the defendant. . . . Instead, 
the statute [enacting a limitation period on the 
filing of petitions for post-conviction relief] 
limits only those collateral attacks previously 
made available by legislative and judicial 
expansion of the scope of postconviction relief 
beyond that which is constitutionally mandated. 
People v. Robinson, 833 P.2d 832, 836 (Colo. App. 1992), cert. 
granted, August 17, 1992. (Attached as Addendum H.) The Robinson 
court's statement on the applicability of habeas corpus reflected 
the Colorado Supreme Court's view of the scope of common law habeas 
corpus. See Stillev v. Tinslev, 153 Colo. 66, 385 P.2d 677 (1963). 
This view similar to that held by Utah courts prior to the modern 
expansion of the writ. See Ex Parte Hays, 15 Utah 77, 47 P. 612, 
613-614 (1897); Winnovich v. Emery, 33 Utah 345, 93 P. 988, 993-994 
(1908). 
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Petitioner's claim that the suspension clause prohibits the 
application of section 78-12-31.1 to post-conviction relief 
proceedings is incorrect. The post-conviction relief procedure set 
forth in Rule 65B(b) is not the writ of habeas corpus that is 
guaranteed by the constitution. Therefore, the suspension clause 
applies only to habeas corpus proceedings as they were understood 
when the constitution was written. 
In a law review article discussing collateral attacks on 
criminal convictions, a former judge for the Second Circuit Court 
of Appeals said: "It can scarcely be doubted that the writ 
protected by the suspension clause is the writ as known to the 
framers, not as Congress may have chosen to expand it or, more 
pertinently, as the Supreme Court has interpreted what Congress 
did." Henry J. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral 
Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. Chi. L. Rev. 142, 170 (1970); 
See also Swain v. Presslev, 430 U.S. 372, 384-386 (Burger, C.J., 
concurring) ("The sweep of the suspension clause must be measured 
by reference to the intention of the Framers and their 
understanding of what the writ of habeas corpus meant at the time 
the Constitution was drafted."). 
POINT IV 
THE OTHER POINTS PETITIONER RAISES IN HIS 
BRIEF WERE NOT RAISED IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
AND THEREFORE NOT PRESERVED FOR APPEAL. 
As previously mentioned, petitioner raises numerous issues 
other than the suspension argument in his brief to this Court. 
However, those issues were not raised to the district court. The 
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only issues petitioner discussed in his response to the State's 
motion to dismiss in the district court were (1) the suspension 
clause; (2) the claim that he could and should have taken the 
issues on direct appeal; and (3) that he procedurally did not 
comply with Rule 65B. (R. at 45; Attached as Addendum H, 
Memorandum in Support of Petitioner [sic] Requests to Deny Motion 
to Dismiss, Case No. 920900909, Third District Court, filed March 
30, 1992.) 
Of the issues petitioner raised before the district court, he 
has properly preserved and argued only the suspension clause 
argument. Other issues raised in petitioner's brief — the 
applicability of article I, section 11, a due process claim, 
tolling, and the reasonableness of the three month period — were 
not raised below. Therefore, under the longstanding rule of this 
Court, those claims should not now be reviewed on appeal. Standard 
Federal Savings and Loan Assoc, v. Kirkbride, 821 P.2d 1136, 1138 
(Utah 1991); State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920 (Utah App. 1991); 
Drummond v. Union Pac. R.R. , 111 Utah 289, 177 P.2d 908, 909 
(1947). 
CONCLUSION 
The State respectfully requests that this Court affirm the 
district court's dismissal of the petition. The district court 
correctly concluded that petitioner waived his cTaims when he 
failed to raise them either at the sentencing hearing or in a 
direct appeal. Should this Court determine that petitioner's 
claims were not waived by failing to appeal, then the Court should 
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reject Petitioner's claim that the suspension clause of article I, 
section 5 prohibits the statute of limitations here at issue. 
Additionally, because petitioner's other claims are not 
properly before this Court either because they were not raised in 
the district court or they were abandoned or waived on appeal, the 
other issues contained in petitioner's brief should not be 
considered. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED THIS iflL day of May 1993. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Utah Attorney General 
James H. Beadles 
Assistant Attorney General 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I certify that on the P ^  day of May 1993, I caused to be 
mailed by U.S. Mail, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of 
the foregoing BRIEF OF RESPONDENT to: 
David Lee Hewitt 
P.O. Box 250 
Utah State Prison 




Sec. 5. [Habeas corpus.] 
The privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall not be 
suspended, unless, in case of rebellion or invasion, the public 
safety requires it. 
(c) 1953-1993 By The Michie Company 
78-12-31.1- Habeas corpus - Three months. 
Within three months: 
For relief pursuant to a writ of habeas corpus. This 
limitation shall apply not only as to grounds known to petitioner 
but also to grounds which in the exercise of reasonable diligence 
should have been known by petitioner or counsel for petitioner. 
(c) 1953-1993 By The Michie Company 
Rule 65B. Extraordinary relief. 
(a) Availability of remedy. Where no other plain, speedy and 
adequate remedy is available, a person may petition the court for 
extraordinary relief on any of the grounds set forth in paragraph 
(b) (involving wrongful imprisonment), paragraph (c) (involving 
other types of wrongful restraint on personal liberty), paragraph 
(d) (involving the wrongful use of public or corporate authority) 
or paragraph (e) (involving the wrongful use of judicial authority 
and the failure to exercise such authority). There shall be no 
special form of writ. The procedures in this rule shall govern 
proceedings on all petitions for extraordinary relief. To the 
extent that this rule does not provide special procedures, 
proceedings on petitions for extraordinary relief shall be governed 
by the procedures set forth elsewhere in these rules. 
(b) Wrongful imprisonment. 
(1) Scope. Any person committed by a court to imprisonment in 
a state prison, other correctional facility or county jail who 
asserts that the commitment resulted from a substantial denial of 
rights may petition the court for relief under this paragraph. This 
paragraph (b) shall govern proceedings based on claims relating to 
original commitments and commitments for violation of probation or 
parole. This paragraph (b) shall not govern proceedings based on 
claims relating to the terms or conditions of confinement. 
(2) Commencement. Except for challenges to parole violation 
proceedings, the proceeding shall be commenced by filing a 
petition, together with a copy thereof, with the clerk of the 
district court in the county in which the commitment leading to 
confinement was issued. The court may order a change of venue on 
motion of a party for the convenience of the parties or witnesses. 
Petitions challenging parole violation proceedings shall be 
commenced by filing a petition together with a copy thereof, with 
the clerk of the district court in the county in which the 
petitioner is located. 
(3) Contents of the petition. The petition shall set forth 
all claims that the petitioner has in relation to the legality of 
the commitment. Additional claims relating to the legality of the 
commitment may not be raised in subsequent proceedings except for 
good cause shown. The petition shall state; 
(A) the place where the petitioner is restrained; 
(B) the name of the court by which the petitioner was 
convicted and sentenced and the dates of proceedings in which the 
conviction was entered, together with the court's case number for 
those proceedings, if known by the petitioner; 
(C) in plain and concise terms, all of the facts on the 
basis of which the petitioner claims a substantial violation of 
rights as the result of the commitment; 
(D) whether or not the judgment of conviction or the 
commitment for violation of probation or parole has been reviewed 
on appeal, and, if so, the number and caption or title of the 
appellate proceeding and the results of the review; 
(E) whether the legality of the commitment has already 
been adjudicated in any prior post-conviction or other civil 
proceeding, and if so the reasons for the denial of relief in the 
prior proceeding. 
(4) Attachments to the petition. The petitioner shall attach 
to the petition affidavits, copies of records or other evidence 
available to the petitioner in support of the allegations. The 
petitioner shall also attach to the petition a copy of the 
pleadings filed by the petitioner in any prior post-conviction or 
other civil proceeding that adjudicated the legality of the 
commitment, and a copy of all orders and memoranda of the court. If 
copies of pertinent pleadings, orders, and memoranda are not 
attached, the petition shall state why they are not attached. 
(5) Memorandum of authorities. The petitioner shall not set 
forth argument or citations or discuss authorities in the petition, 
but these may be set out in a separate memorandum, two copies of 
which shall be filed with the petition. 
(6) Assignment by the presiding judge. On the filing of the 
petition, the clerk shall promptly deliver it to the assigned judge 
of the court in which it is filed. Except for challenges to parole 
violation proceedings, the presiding judge shall if possible assign 
the proceeding to the judge who issued the commitment. 
(7) Dismissal of frivolous claims. On review of the petition, 
if it is apparent to the court that the issues presented in the 
petition have already been adjudicated in a prior proceeding, or if 
for any other reason any claim in the petition shall appear 
frivolous on its face, the court shall forthwith issue an order 
dismissing the claim, stating that the claim is frivolous on its 
face. The order shall be sent by mail to the petitioner. 
Proceedings on the claim shall terminate with the entry of the 
order of dismissal. The order of dismissal need not recite findings 
of fact or conclusions of law. 
(8) Service of petitions. If, on review of the petition, the 
court concludes that all or part of the petition is not frivolous 
on its face, the court shall designate the portions of the petition 
that are not frivolous and direct the clerk to serve a copy of the 
petition and a copy of any memorandum by mail upon the attorney 
general and the county attorney. 
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(9) Responsive pleading. Within twenty days (plus time 
allowed under these rules for service by mail) after service of a 
copy of the petition upon the attorney general and county attorney, 
or within such other period of time as the court may allow, the 
attorney general or county attorney shall answer or otherwise 
respond to the portions of the petition that have not been 
dismissed and shall serve the answer or other response upon the 
petitioner in accordance with Rule 5(b). Within twenty days (plus 
time allowed for service by mail) after service of any motion to 
dismiss or for summary judgment, the petitioner may respond by 
memorandum to the motion. No further pleadings or amendments will 
be permitted unless ordered by the court. 
(10) Hearings. After pleadings are closed, the court shall 
promptly set the proceeding for a hearing or otherwise dispose of 
the case. Upon motion for good cause, the court may grant leave to 
either party to take discovery or to extend the date for the 
hearing. Prior to the hearing, the court may order either the 
petitioner or the state or county to obtain any relevant transcript 
or court records. The court may also order a prehearing conference, 
but the conference shall not be set so as to delay unreasonably the 
hearing on the merits of the petition. The petitioner shall be 
present before the court at hearings on dispositive issues but need 
not otherwise be present in court during the proceeding. 
(11) Orders. If the court rules in favor of the petitioner, 
it shall enter an appropriate order with respect to the validity of 
the challenged commitment and with respect to rearraignment, 
retrial, resentencing, custody, bail or discharge. The court shall 
enter findings of fact and conclusions of law, as appropriate, 
following any evidentiary hearing or any hearing on a dispositive 
motion. Upon application of the attorney general or the county 
attorney, or upon its own motion, the court may stay release of the 
petitioner pending appeal of its order. 
(12) Costs. The court may assign the costs of the proceeding, 
as allowed under Rule 54(d), to any party as it deems appropriate. 
If the petitioner is unable to pay the costs of the proceeding, the 
petitioner may proceed upon an affidavit of impecuniosity, in which 
event the court may direct that the costs be paid by .the county in 
which the complainant was originally charged. 
(13) Appeal. Any final judgment or order entered upon the 
petition may be appealed to and reviewed by the Court of Appeals or 
the Supreme Court of Utah in accord with the statutes governing 
appeals to those courts. 
(c) Other wrongful restraints on personal liberty. 
(1) Scope. Except for instances governed by paragraph (b) of 
this rule, this paragraph (c) shall govern all petitions claiming 
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that a person has been wrongfully restrained of personal liberty, 
and the court may grant relief appropriate under this paragraph. 
(2) Commencement. The proceeding shall be commenced by filing 
a petition with the clerk of the court in the district in which the 
petitioner is restrained or the respondent resides or in which the 
alleged restraint is occurring^ 
(3) Contents of the petition and attachments. The petition 
shall contain a short, plain statement of the facts on the basis of 
which the petitioner seeks relief. It shall identify the respondent 
and the place where the person is restrained. It shall state the 
cause or pretense of the restraint, if known by the petitioner. It 
shall state whether the legality of the restraint has already been 
adjudicated in a prior proceeding and, if so, the reasons for the 
denial of relief in the prior proceeding. The petitioner shall 
attach to the petition any legal process available to the 
petitioner that resulted in restraint. The petitioner shall also 
attach to the petition a copy of the pleadings filed by the 
petitioner in any prior proceeding that adjudicated the legality of 
the restraint. 
(4) Memorandum of authorities. The petitioner shall not set 
forth argument or citations or discuss authorities in the petition, 
but these may be set out in a separate memorandum, two copies of 
which shall be filed with the petition. 
(5) Dismissal of frivolous claims. On review of the petition, 
if it is apparent to the court that the legality of the restraint 
has already been adjudicated in a prior proceeding, or if for any 
other reason any claim in the petition shall appear frivolous on 
its face, the court shall forthwith issue an order dismissing the 
claim, stating that the claim is frivolous on its face and the 
reasons for this conclusion. The order need not state findings of 
fact or conclusions of law. The order shall be sent by mail to the 
petitioner. Proceedings on the claim shall terminate with the entry 
of the order of dismissal. 
(6) Responsive pleadings. If the petition is not dismissed as 
being frivolous on its face, the court shall direct the clerk of 
the court to serve a copy of the petition and a copy of any 
memorandum upon the respondent by mail. At the same time, the court 
may issue an order directing the respondent to answer or otherwise 
respond to the petition, specifying a time within which the 
respondent must comply. If the circumstances require, the court may 
also issue an order directing the respondent to appear before the 
court for a hearing on the legality of the restraint. An answer to 
a petition shall state plainly whether the respondent has 
restrained the person alleged to have been restrained, whether the 
person so restrained has been transferred to any other person, and 
if so, the identity of the transferee, the date of the transfer, 
and the reason or authority for the transfer. Nothing in paragraph 
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(c) shall be construed to prohibit the court from ruling upon the 
petition based upon a dispositive motion. 
(7) Temporary relief. If it appears that the person alleged 
to be restrained will be removed from the court's jurisdiction or 
will suffer irreparable injury before compliance with the hearing 
order can be enforced, the court shall issue a warrant directing 
the sheriff to bring the respondent before the court to be dealt 
with according to law. Pending a determination of the petition, the 
court may place the person alleged to have been restrained in the 
custody of such other persons as may be appropriate. 
(8) Alternative service of the hearing order. If the 
respondent cannot be found, or if it appears that a person other 
than the respondent has custody of the person alleged to be 
restrained, the hearing order and any other process issued by the 
court may be served on the person having custody in the manner and 
with the same effect as if that person had been named as respondent 
in the action. 
(9) Avoidance of service by respondent. If anyone having 
custody of the person alleged to be restrained avoids service of 
the hearing order or attempts wrongfully to remove the person from 
the court's jurisdiction, the sheriff shall immediately arrest the 
responsible person. The sheriff shall forthwith bring the person 
arrested before the court to be dealt with according to law. 
(10) Hearing or other proceedings. In the event that the 
court orders a hearing, the court shall hear the matter in a 
summary fashion and shall render judgment accordingly. The 
respondent or other person having custody shall appear with the 
person alleged to be restrained or shall state the reasons for 
failing to do so. The court may nevertheless direct the respondent 
to bring before it the person alleged to be restrained. If the 
petitioner waives the right to be present at the hearing, the court 
shall modify the hearing order accordingly. The hearing order shall 
not be disobeyed for any defect of form or any misdescription in 
the order or the petition, if enough is stated to impart the 
meaning and intent of the proceeding to the respondent. 
(d) Wrongful use of or failure to exercise public authority. 
(1) Who may petition the court; security. The attorney 
general may, and when directed to do so by the governor shall, 
petition the court for relief on the grounds enumerated in this 
paragraph (d). Any person who is not required to be represented by 
the attorney general and who is aggrieved or threatened by one of 
the acts enumerated in subparagraph (2) of this paragraph (d) may 
petition the court under this paragraph (d) if (A) the person 
claims to be entitled to an office unlawfully held by another or 
(B) if the attorney general fails to file a petition under this 
paragraph after receiving notice of the person's claim. A petition 
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filed by a person other than the attorney general under this 
paragraph shall be brought in the name of the petitioner, and the 
petition shall be accompanied by an undertaking with sufficient 
sureties to pay any judgment for costs and damages that may be 
recovered against the petitioner in the proceeding. The sureties 
shall be in the form for bonds on appeal provided for in Rule 73. 
(2) Grounds for relief. Appropriate relief may be granted: 
(A) where a person usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or 
exercises a public office, whether civil or military, a franchise, 
or an office in a corporation created by the authority of the state 
of Utah; (B) where a public officer does or permits any act that 
results in a forfeiture of the office; (C) where persons act as a 
corporation in the state of Utah without being legally 
incorporated; (D) where any corporation has violated the laws of 
the state of Utah relating to the creation, alteration or renewal 
of corporations; or (E) where any corporation has forfeited or 
misused its corporate rights, privileges or franchises. 
(3) Proceedings on the petition. On the filing of a petition, 
the court may require that notice be given to adverse parties 
before issuing a hearing order, or may issue a hearing order 
requiring the adverse party to appear at the hearing on the merits. 
The court may also grant temporary relief in accordance with the 
terms of Rule 65A. 
(e) Wrongful use of judicial authority or failure to comply with 
duty. 
(1) Who may petition. A person aggrieved or whose interests 
are threatened by any of the acts enumerated in this paragraph (e) 
may petition the court for relief. 
(2) Grounds for relief. Appropriate relief may be granted: 
(A) where an inferior court, administrative agency, or officer 
exercising judicial functions has exceeded its jurisdiction or 
abused its discretion; (B) where an inferior court, administrative 
agency, corporation or person has failed to perform an act required 
by law as a duty of office, trust or station; or (C) where an 
inferior court, administrative agency, corporation or person has 
refused the petitioner the use or enjoyment of a right or office to 
which the petitioner is entitled. 
(3) Proceedings on the petition. On the filing of a petition, 
the court may require that notice be given to adverse parties 
before issuing a hearing order, or may issue a hearing order 
requiring the adverse party to appear at the hearing on the merits. 
The court may direct the inferior court, administrative agency, 
officer, corporation or other person named as respondent to deliver 
to the court a transcript or other record of the proceedings. The 
court may also grant temporary relief in accordance with the terms 
of Rule 65A. 
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(4) Scope of review. Where the challenged proceedings are 
judicial in nature, the court's review shall not extend further 
than to determine whether the respondent has regularly pursued its 
authority. 
(c) 1953-1993 By The Michie Company 
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ADDENDUM B 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTA|I 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 














D The motion of to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and 
impose sentence accordingly is D granted D denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence 
should not be imposed, and defendant havmg^beon convicted by D a jury; D the court;Tl plea of guilty; 
D plea of nOi6ontest; of the offense of ffi? Uld/ k i / 6 u / / , a felony 
of the # * o e g r e e t D a class misdemeanor, being *row present in court and ready for sentence and 
'Z represented by^r^Jh _ and the State being represented by Tfi KexJmf^ , is now adjudged guilty 
of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison: L/ 
D to a maximum mandatory term of. years and which may be for life; 
D not to exceed five years; 
« of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years; 
D of not less than five years and which may be for life; 
D not to exceed years; 
D and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $ 






such sentence is to run concurrently with 
such sentence is to run consecutively with 
upon motion of D State, D Defense, D Court, Count(s) are hereby dismissed. 
Defendant is granted a stay of the above (G prison) sentence and placed on probation in the 
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult 
Parole for the period of , pursuant to the attached conditions of probation. 
D Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County D for delivery to the Utah State 
Prison, Draper, Utah, or D for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be confined 
and imprisoned in accordance^ with^this Ju/lflment and Commitment. 
V Commitment shall issue _ 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
DATED this i^clay ofS^fM^A^19 3jL 
DISTRICT COU 
Defense Counsel 
Deputy County Attorney Page of. 




* « Attorney Pro Se L/ 
Utah State Prison 
f Q. ^ SfrX ^ C ) (address) 
fts^frfcJK, U * * ^CftP> (address) 
IN THE"W^__ DISTRICT COURT, S«V;I W S _ COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
W v ^ \.,U , Yft.\oVA (name), * 
Petitioner, * PETITION FOR WRIT OF 
* HABEAS CORPUS AND POST 
vs. * CONVICTION RELIEF 
STATE OF UTAH, * Case No. QimmQm ACL 
Respondent. * Judge r ..-- ~ — - ?---»• • > - r. » — •*...^ 
COMES NOW the Petitioner, Wv.fr, VJE* Nhfr y*vT (name), 
pursuant to the following Rule of Civil Procedure (check only one): 
X Rule 65B(b) since claim is based on original commitment, or 
Rule 65B(b) since claim is based on parole violation, or 
Rule 65B(b) since claim is based on probation violation, or 
Rule 65B(c) since claim is based on parole grant hearing, 
and for cause of action alleges as follows: 
1. Petitioner is being illegally restrained at the following 
location (list your address): V Q . ^o>x ^ C S Wvst^yWv. 
2. Petitioner was convicted and sentenced at the following 
Court: (list the district and county of the court or indicate that 
it is a Board of Pardons hearing that you are challenging): 
The dates of the proceedings in which the conviction (or Board of 
Pardons decision) was entered are as follows: ^ y A ^ Q 
000002 
PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND POST CONVICTION RELIEF 
The case number for these proceedings is: not known; X known 
and is case number 
3. In plain and concise terms, all of the facts on the basis 
of which the Petitioner claims a substantial violation of rights as 
the result of the commitment (or terms of parole) are as follows: 
CflfrftWlafek \V> TU*. hLfrCtts* V . ^ v AtvVSL Ett»k t C M M * P . U ^ l \ * t t Cfffc*^ STCREK 
4. The judgment of conviction or the commitment for 
violation of probation or parole has been reviewed on appeal. 
Yes The number and caption or title of the appellate 
proceeding and the results of the review are as follows: 
X No It was not appealed because foTTVgxftaSJv ^-^^ *;**•* *» thagnwrtc^  
Question not applicable since this claim concerns a parole grant 
2 
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PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND POST CONVICTION RELIEF 
hearing for which there is no appeal or administrative remedy. 
5. The legality of the commitment for violation of probation 
or parole or the legality of the parole grant hearing has been 
reviewed on appeal. Yes No If so, the reasons for the 
denial of relief in the prior proceeding are as follows: 
6. Petitioner requests that he be appointed legal counsel 
based on the attached motion and affidavit of impecuniosity. 
7. The following documents are attached hereto and 
incorporated herein by reference (check all that apply): 
Affidavits that support Petitioner's allegations 
X Copies of records that support Petitioner's allegations, 
X Other evidence that supports Petitioner's allegations 
X Copies of pleadings, orders and memoranda of the Court in 
any other post-conviction or civil proceeding that 
adjudicated the legality of Petitioner's commitment 
8. Petitioner was unable to obtain and attach the following 
documents because (list the efforts you made to obtain the 
documents and the results of your efforts): f^c_fr fo\\\iC V»S^ v 
9. That pursuant to DRCP Rules 65B(b)(12) and 54(d), 
Petitioner requests that this Court order the Respondent to obtain 
such transcripts of proceedings or court records which are relevant 
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PETITION FOR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND POST CONVICTION RELIEF 
and material to this case and requests that the county in which he 
was originally charged be directed to pay the costs of the 
proceeding. (See attached motion and affidavit of impecuniosity). 
10. Due to the continuing nature of the illegal restraint, 
the statute of limitations set forth in Utah Code Ann. §78-12-31.1 
does not bar this action. 
WHEREFORE, Petitioner prays that this Court: 
1. Schedule an evidentiary hearing at which time Petitioner 
may be present and represented by counsel. 
2. Permit Petitioner, who remains indigent, to proceed 
without prepayment of costs, fees or other assessments. 
3. Grant Petitioner the authority to obtain subpoenas in 
Forma Pauperis, for witnesses and documents necessary to assist in 
the proof of the facts alleged in the petition as stated above. 
4. Issue an Order for Post Conviction Relief to have the 
Petitioner brought before it, to the end that he may be discharged 
from the illegal and unconstitutional confinement and restraint. 
5. (other relief) \fryft \UL^CKIII% * W K v^tn^sftiAi^^^ 
Dated this \fr* day of ^JKKl^Jks^ 199.JL. 
TOVMA $Ao NkAwJLhk fsion name) 
x W ^ K W * Vfti^ CTK (print name! 
Attorney Pro Se 
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November 25, 1991 
3rd District Court 
c/o Judge Michael Murphy 
2^0 East ^00 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Dear Sir: 
I appeared in your court room for sentencing on February *l, 19^1 on the 
charge of Retail Theft. 
I respectfully request a printed transcript of my sentencing hear inn:. Also 
at this time I would like to request a copy of my Judgement, Sentence, and 
Committment, as soon as possible. 
Please advise if there is a charge for this service, what that amount will 
be, and approximately how long it will tu\:e to receive these documents after 
receipt of the requested funds. 
Respectfully, 
David Hewitt, #13051 
Oquirrh One 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, Utah 8*1020 
0000C8 
Cfjirtr district Court 
December 2, 1991 
David Hewitt, #13051 
Utah State Prison 
Oquirrh One 
P. 0. Box 250 
Draper, Utah 84020 
Dear Mr. Hewitt: 
Enclosed please find a copy of your Judgment, Sentence 
and Commitment dated February 4, 1991. 
I have conferred with the court reporter regarding the 
transcript you have requested and this is her reply: The 
Statutory transcript rate is $2.50 per page, which includes 
an original filed with the Court and a copy to you. Upon 
a deposit of $50.00, she will transcribe the hearing you 
requested and notify you of the number of pages and amount 
due. Make check or money order to Gayle Campbell. 
Sincerely, 
Alice 
Front Office Clerk 
for Judge Murphy 
240 East 400 South / Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 / 801-535-5581 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTA|I 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 










D The motion of. . to enter a judgment of conviction for the next lower category of offense and 
impose sentence accordingly is D granted D denied. There being no legal or other reason why sentence 
should not be imposed, and defendant havmg^eon conyicted by D a jury; D the court;** plea of guilty; 
D plea of no;6ontest; of the offense of *fct»Id// wwy/l , a felony 
of the ^ " r teg r f t f i , D a class misdemeanor, being w w present i ir court and ready for sentence and 
represented by£s{Jh T. „ and the State being represented by < 
of the above offense, is now sentenced to a term in the Utah State Prison 
UJC4U ., is now adjudged guilty 
D to a maximum mandatory term of years and which may be for life; 
D not to exceed five years; 
K of not less than one year nor more than fifteen years; 
D of not less than five years and which may be for life; 
D not to exceed years; 
D and ordered to pay a fine in the amount of $ 






such sentence is to run concurrently with 
such sentence is to run consecutively with 
upon motion of D State, D Defense, D Court, Count(s) are hereby dismissed. 
Defendant is granted a stay of the above (D prison) sentence and placed on probation in the 
custody of this Court and under the supervision of the Chief Agent, Utah State Department of Adult 
Parole for the period of , pursuant to the attached conditions of probation. 
D Defendant is remanded into the custody of the Sheriff of Salt Lake County D for delivery to the Utah State 
Prison, Draper, Utah, or D for delivery to the Salt Lake County Jail, where defendant shall be confined 
and imprisoned in accordance with this Judgment and Commitment. 
Sf Commitment shall issue - ^ / ^ ( ! < J A 9 i A ^ » 7— 
J ^ _ dav of\!Ze^t€M4^\9 3±-DATED this 
APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
Defense Counsel 
Deputy County Attorney Page. of. 
(White—Court) (Green—Judge) (Yellow—Jai»/Prison/AP4P) (Pink—Defense) (GokJenrod—State) 000003 
November 30, 1991 
?rd District Court 
c/o Judge Michael Murphy 
P.no East ^00 South 
Salt Lake City, Utah R4111 
Dear Sir: 
I aoDeared in your court room for sentencing on Februarv ^. 1-Q1 on the 
charge of Retail Theft. 
It has been brought to mv attention that an AP*P Resentencing p*?oort ^ s 
preDared and presented to the court concerning my sentencing on this charge. 
As of this date I have not had the opoortunity to review this resort and I 
have r*ood reason to believe that this renort contains both erroneous and 
misleading facts. 
At this time I would like to request a copv of the APJ-^  ^ resentencing Peport 
2o that Z can review it for any misinformation that it may contain, and ret it 
corrected by the Courts. 




P.O. Pox 250 
draper, Utah B14020 
000003 
CJjirir ©istrict Court 
December 5, 1991 
Dave Hewitt 
Utah State Prison 
Oquirrh One 
P. 0. Box 250 
Draper, Utah 84020 
Dear Mr. Hewitt: 
This letter is to inxorm you that after a person is 
sentenced, the Presentence Report is destroyed. Therefore, 




Front Office Clerk 
for Judge Murphy 
240 East 400 South / Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 / 801-535-5581 
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\\\V , ^ Vs * W w ^ (name) 
Attorney Pro Se 
Utah State Prison 
KY¥TYM ' ^ T i ( a d d r e s s 1 
^k^fetK W SftCVACV a d d r e s s ) 
IN THE ~\WM> DISTRICT COURT, S^g Lfrvs- COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
W u K l » Wuxrrr (name!. * 
* MOTION FOR PREPARATION OF 
Petitioner, * TRANSCRIPTS AND COURT RECORDS 
VS. * AND ORDER 
* 
STATE OF UTAH, * Case No. ^CAVyWsx 
* 
Respondent. * Judge VVguftfv. \*W>fr>U\, 
Petitioner, W ^ v ^ VAP \\fr\^ Tt fname). attorney pro se, 
does hereby move the Court, pursuant to Rule 65(B)(b)(12) and Rule 
54(d) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and based on the 
accompanying Affidavit of Impecuniosity, to order Respondent to 
obtain the transcript of the following proceedings or court records 
which are relevant and material to this case (here list the records 
you need): ftK^ S t ^ a m * * ^ ^frc*q. li^ v..*,cag\* -y*^-**^ OV 
and to direct the costs of the proceedings to the county in which 
Petitioner was originally charged. 
The transcripts/court records are relevant and material 
to this case because (here give the reason that you need them): 
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(continue explanation) taf m-AEiv ?M3t\ ^ ^ f e ^ ^ ^ "VQ \^\* C<M^«X 
DATED this TftF* day of YSt^t^^K, 199_\_. 
(sion name) 
^>v\m\ Vj-j Utv^TvT f p r i n t name) 
Attorney Pro Se 
ORDER 
Petitioner having filed herein his motion for preparation 
of transcripts and court records, and good cause appearing: 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Respondent shall obtain such 
transcript of proceedings or court records which are relevant and 
material to the case. 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the county in which Petitioner 
was charged shall pay the costs of the proceedings. 
DATED this day of , 199 . 
BY THE COURT: 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
2 
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BLEff DISTRICT COim! 
Third Judicial District 
JAN 2 2 1932 
SALT LAKE COUNTY 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 




STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent. 
ORDER 
CIVIL NO. 901900931 
Defendant has filed a motion requesting a copy of his 
presentence report and transcripts of four hearings. The 
request is denied and the denial is appropriate when 
considering the following chronology: 
1. Defendant was sentenced on February 4, 1991 and 
did not prosecute an appeal therefrom. 
2. On November 25, 1991, he requested various court 
papers and transcripts. The papers requested were referred 
on December 2, 1991, along with an explanation of the 
manner in which to acquire transcripts. 
2. On November 30, 1991 defendant requested a copy 
of his presentence report. On December 5, 1991, the court 
replied and explained that presentence reports are 
destroyed upon referral of a defendant to the State for 
incarceration. 
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4. On December 11, 1991 defendant requested a docket 
sheet and on December 17, 1991 the Court sent the requested 
docket sheet. 
The Court has been completely responsive to all of 
defendant's requests. There is no pending matter to which 
defendant's request for transcripts relates and the Court has 
complied with all other requests to the extent it has custody 
of the requested items. 
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's motion is denied. 
Dated this £?<* day of January, 1992. 
/ M/PU: MltHAEL R. MURPHY 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct .copy 
of the foregoing Order, to the following, this




P.O. Box 250 
Draper, Utah 84020 
Walter R. Ellett 
Deputy County Attorney 
Attorney for Respondent 
231 East 400 South, Third Floor 




DAVID LEE HEWITT 
ATTORNEY PRO SE 
UTAH STATE PRISON 
P.O. BOX 250 
DRAPER, UTAH 84020 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID LEE HEWITT, 
VS. 










AMENDED PETITION FOR WRIT OF 
HABEAS CORPUS AND POST 
CONVICTION RELIEF 
CASE NO. 920900909 
JUDGE MICHEAL R. MURPHY 
COMES NOW TOE PETITIONER, DAVID LEE HEWITT PURSUANT TO THE FOLLOWING RULE 
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE RULE 65(b) SINCE TOE CLAIM IS BASED ON ORIGINAL COMMITMENT 
AND FOR CAUSE OF ACTION ALLEGES AS FOLLOW: 
1. PETITIONER IS BEING ILLEGALLY RESTRAINED AT THE FOLLOWING LOCATION: 
UTAH STATE PRISON, P.O. BOX 250, DRAPER, UTAH 84020. 
2. PETITIONER WAS CONVICTED SENTENCED AT THE FOLLOWING COURT: THIRD 
DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY. THE DATE OF THE PROCEEDINGS IN WHICH THE 
CONVICnON WAS ENTERED ARE AS FOLLOWS: 11/19/90 2/4/90 
THE CASE NUMBER FOR THESE PROCEEDINGS IS CASE NUMBER 901900931 
3. THE FACTS ON THE BASIS OF WHICH THE PETITIONER CLAIMS A SUBSTANTIAL 
VIOLATION OF RIGHTS AS RESULT OF THE COMMITMENT ARE AS FOLLOWS: 
A. THAT THE COURT RULED ON BOTH ERRONEOUS AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
INFORMATION IN DETERMINING THE PETITIONER'S SENTENCE. SUCH AS A 
MISLEADING AP&P PRESENTENCING REPORT AND UNCOUNSELED CRIMINAL 
CONVICTIONS. 
B. THAT THE COURTS ACCEPTED A PRESENTENCING REPORT FROM AN AP&P AGENT 
WHOM NOT ONLY HAD A CONFLICT OF INTEREST IN THIS CASE BUT ALSO WAS 
PREJUDICIAL AND BIAS BEFORE PREPARING THE REPORT FOR THE COURT. 
C. THAT THE COURT FAILED TO ASK PETITIONER IF HE HAD ACCESS TO REPORT 
AND DID NOT EXPRESSLY INQUIRE WHETHER PETITIONER AND COUNSEL READ 
AND DISCUSSED PRESENTENCE REPORT. 
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D. THAT THE COURT FAILED TO ASK PETITIONER IF EVERYTHING CONTAINED 
IN THE REPORT WAS TRUE AND CORRECT. 
E. THAT BOTH THE COUNTY ATTORNEY AND THE SALT LAKE COUNTY SHERIFF'S 
OFFICE CONSPIRED TO PRESENT BOTH ERRONEOUS AND MISLEADING INFORMATION 
TO THE COURT AT THE TIME OF THE PETITIONER'S SENTENCING. THAT THE 
COUNTY ATTORNEY DTD ATTACK THE PETITIONER'S CHARACTER AND CREDIBILrrY 
WITH VINDICTIVE MALICE IN FACT. 
F. THAT THE COURT STATED WHILE ON THE RECORD AND IN THE COURTROOM 
ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS THAT THERE WOULD NOT BE ANY RESTITUTION IN THIS 
CASE AND THEN AFTERWARDS ORDERING SUCH IN THE JUDGMENT AND SENTENCING 
DOCUMENT. 
4. THE JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION OR COMMITMENT HAS NOT BEEN REVIEWED ON 
APPEAL BECAUSE OF THE PETITIONER LACK OF RESOURCES AND KNOWLEDGE OF LAW 
PROCEDURES, LACK OF ACCESS TO LAW MATERIAL, AND INFORMATION, MISUNDERSTANDING 
OF COURT INFORMATION, AND THE INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL. 
5. PETITIONER REQUESTS THAT HE BE APPOINTED LEGAL COUNSEL BASED ON THE 
ATTACHED MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT OF IMPECUNIOSITY. 
6. THE PETITIONER DID ATTACH SEVERAL LETTERS, ORDERS, AND MOTION TO THE 
ORIGINAL PETITION AND HEREBY REQUEST THAT THEY ALL BE INCORPORATED INTO THE 
AMENDED PETITION. 
7. THAT PURSUANT TO URCP RULES 65(b)(12) AND 54(d), PETITIONER REQUESTS 
THAT THIS COURT ORDER THE RESPONDENT TO OBTAIN SUCH TRANSCRIPTS OF PRCEEDINGS 
OR COURT RECORDS WHICH ARE RELEVANT AND MATERIAL TO THIS CASE AND REQUESTS 
THAT THE COUNTY IN WHICH HE WAS ORIGINALLY CHARGED BE DIRECTED TO PAY THE COSTS 
OF THE PROCEEDING. 
8. DUE TO THE CONTINUING NATURE OF THE ILLEGAL RESTRAINT, THE STATUTE 
OF LIMITATIONS SET FORTH IN UTAH CODE ANN. §78-12-31.1 DOES NOT BAR THIS ACTION. 
WHEREFORE, PETITIONER PRAYS THAT THIS COURT: 
1. SCHEDULE AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING AT WHICH TIME THE PETITIONER MAY BE 
PRESENT AND REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL. 
2. PERMIT PETITIONER, WHO REMAINS INDIGENT, TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYMENT 
OF COST, FEES OF OTHER ASSESSMENTS. 
3. GRANT PETITIONER THE AUTHORITY TO OBTAIN SUBPOENAS IN FORMA PAUPERIS, 
FOR WITNESSES AND DOCUMENTS NECESSARY TO ASSIST IN PROOF OF THE FACTS ALLEGED 
IN THE PETITION AS STATED ABOVE. 
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4. THAT ILLEGALLY AND UNCONSITUTIONAL SENTENCE BE VACATED AND SET ASIDE. 
5. ISSUE AN ORDER FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF TO HAVE THE PETITIONER 
BROUGHT BEFORE IT, TO THE END THAT HE MAY BE DISCHARGED FROM THE ILLEGAL AND 
UN CONSTITUTIONAL CONFINEMENT AND RESTRAINT. 
DATED THIS j^DAY OF "AINV^ , 1992. 
DAVID LEE HEWITT 
ATTORNEY POR SE 
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>-• -t :c , ;, 
R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312) 
Attorney General 
DAVID F. BRYANT (5672) 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
300 East 6100 South, Suite 204 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Telephone; (801) 265-5638 
BY Gf_ 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID LEE HEWITT, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent. 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Case No. 920900909 HC 
Judge Leslie A. Lewis 
Respondent, by and through David F. Bryant, hereby moves 
this court to dismiss Petitioner's petition for writ of habeas 
corpus because it is time-barred; raises claim which could and 
should have been raised on appeal; fails to state a claim on which 
relief can be granted, and fails to comply with the requirements of 
Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(b). 
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DATED t h i s n£* lay of March, 1992. 
ttttD F. BRYAUT" 




I hereby certify that on the ID day of March, 1992, I 
caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, a copy of the foregoing to 
David Lee Hewitt, pro se, P.O.Box 250, Draper, Utah 84020. 
•AiMhaW 
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R. PAUL VAN DAM (3312) 
Attorney General 
DAVID F. BRYANT (5672) 
Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
300 East 6100 South, Suite 204 
Murray, Utah 84107 
Telephone: (801) 265-5638 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID LEE HEWITT, 
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT 
Petitioner, : OF MOTION TO DISMISS 
v. : 
STATE OF UTAH, : Case No. 920900909 HC 
Respondent. : Judge Leslie A. Lewis 
Respondent, by and through David F. Bryant, hereby 
submits this memorandum in support of its motion to dismiss 
Petitioner's petition for writ of habeas corpus. 
ARGUMENT 
Petitioner claims in his petition that he has suffered a 
substantial denial of his rights in four areas. He claims the 
Adult parole and Probation agent who prepared his presentence 
report was "prejudicial." He further claims he suffered a 




him if he had access to the presentence report or whether he had 
discussed it with his counsel. Additionally, Petitioner claims a 
substantial violation of his rights in that the court failed to ask 
him if everything in the report was true and correct. Finally, 
Petitioner claims a substantial denial of his rights in that the 
court allegedly stated from the bench that no restitution would be 
required, yet it was ordered in the written order sentencing 
Petitioner. 
POINT I 
ALL OF PETITIONER'S CLAIMS ARE TIME-BARRED. 
Although Petitioner's petition provides only scant 
information, it appears he was convicted on February 4, 1990. The 
petition further states that there was no appeal of the conviction. 
Petitioner did not file his post-conviction writ until February 11, 
1992 — some 24 months later. Such a delay is well beyond the 
three months allowed under Utah Code Ann. § 78-12-31.1. It states 
in pertinent part: 
Within three months: 
For relief pursuant to a writ of habeas 
corpus. This limitation shall apply not only 
as to grounds known to petitioner but also to 
grounds which in the exercise of reasonable 
diligence should have been known by petitioner 
or counsel for petitioner. 
Petitioner's petition is approximately 21 months late. He should 
have known, through the "exercise of reasonable diligence" of any 
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claims to be raided through post-conviction avenues. Therefore, 
even if this coutft were to decline to dismiss the petition on the 
bases raised below, it must be dismissed because it is time-barred. 
POINT II 
PETITIONER'S PETITION SHOULD BE DISMISSED 
BECAUSE HE COULD AND SHOULD HAVE RAISED 
AliL HIS CLAIMS ON DIRECT APPEAL. 
It is well-established that the post-conviction writ of 
habeas corpus, "is not a substitute for and cannot be used to 
perform the function of regular appellate review." Codianna v. 
Morris, 660 P.2d 1101 (Utah 1983). See also, Andrews v. Morris: 
Rammel v. Smith, 560 P.2d 1108 (Utah 1979). 
Consequently, Petitioner cannot raise issues in a habeas 
proceeding that could or should have been raised on direct appeal. 
In this case, Petitioner obviously knew after sentencing that the 
alleged violations of his rights had occurred and he should have 
appealed. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Brown v. Turner, 440 P.2d 968 
(Utah 1968), stated: 
If the contention of error is something which 
ig known or should have been known to the party at 
tfte time the judgment was entered, it must be 
reviewed in the manner and within the time permitted 
by regular prescribed procedure, or the judgment 
becomes final and is not subject to further attack, 
except in some unusual circumstance. . . . [W]ere 
it otherwise, the regular rules of procedure 
governing appeals and the limitations of time 
specified therein would be rendered impotent. 
3 
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Id- at 969. 
Petitioner states in his petition that he did not appeal 
because his counsel did not inform him the court had erred. This 
is likely because the court did not err, however, if Petitioner 
desired an appeal, he should have requested his counsel pursue it. 
Simply because Petitioner's counsel did not tell him the court had 
erred when it did not, does not rise to the level of an "unusual 
circumstance" contemplated by the Utah Supreme Court in Brown v. 
Turner. 
Because Petitioner cannot attack his conviction in the 
absence of regular appellate review, this claim is barred and 
should be dismissed. 
POINT III 
THE PETITION SHOULD BE DISMISSED BECAUSE 
IT FAILS TO COMPLY WITH THE REQUIREMENTS 
OF UTAH R. CIV P. 65B(b). 
Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(b)(3)(iii) requires Petitioner to 
state "all of the facts on the basis of which the petitioner claims 
a substantial violation of rightsf.]" Furthermore, Utah R. Civ. P. 
65B(b)(4) mandates that a petition for post-conviction relief 
include "affidavits, copies of the records, or other evidence" to 
support the allegations. Petitioner has failed to do so. 
Petitioner claims, for example, that his presentence 
report was prepared by a prejudicial agent. Yet Petitioner does 
4 
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not support either his claim by explaining how the agent was 
prejudiced. Petitioner also claims, as enumerated above, that the 
court committed other errors relating to asking Petitioner what 
Petitioner believes to be required questions concerning the 
presentence report. Petitioner fails to explain how or why the 
court would be required to ask the questions he addresses in his 
claims, or how the failure to ask them constitutes a substantial 
violation of his rights. 
Additionally, Petitioner claims the court at some point 
stated from the bench that there would be no restitution ordered, 
yet the court ordered restitution in the final written order. 
However, Petitioner supports his claim with no documentation of any 
kind.1 So, again there is failure to comply with the requirements 
of Rule 65B(b). Furthermore, even if Petitioner supported his 
allegation, it is a well settled principle that "oral statements of 
the trial court are superseded by written findings, judgment, or 
verdict." State v. Wade, 572 P.2d 398, 399 n.3 (Utah 1977), 
overruled on other grounds, State v. Chavez, 605 P.2d 1226, 1227 
(Utah 1979). See also McCollum v. Clothier, 241 P.2d 468 (1952); 
Park v. Jameson, 364 P.2d 1 (1961), and Drurv v. Lunceford, 415 
P.2d 662, 662 (1966). Therefore, that claim must also be 
Petitioner's petition states there are documents attached to 
the petition to support his allegations, however, there were no 




Petitioner has made bare unsupported allegations and 
provides absolutely no evidence to substantiate his claim. This 
being the case, pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P 12(b)(1) and (6), the 
petition should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon 
which relief can be granted. The Utah Supreme Court has repeatedly 
held that failure to follow the procedural requirements of Rule 
65B(i) should result in dismissal of the case. See e.g., Andrews 
v. Morris, 607 P.2d 816 (Utah 1980). mandates that a petition for 
post-conviction relief include "factual data constituting each and 
every manner in which the complainant claims that any 
constitutional rights were violated" and, additionally, mandates 
that the complainant attach affidavits, copies of the records, or 
other evidence to support the allegations. 
CONCLUSION 
In light of the fact that the statute of limitations has 
expired; that Petitioner's petition raises claims which could and 
should have been raised on appeal; fails to state claims on which 
relief can be granted, and fails to comply with Rule 65B(b), 
Respondent respectfully requests this court dismiss the Petition 
for writ of habeas corpus. 
6 
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DATED this / * 
ik 
day of March, 1992. 
WTD F. BRYANT 
Assistant Attorney 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that on the YSr^ day of March, 1992, I 
caused to be mailed, postage prepaid, a copy of the foregoing to 




David Lee Hewitt 
Attorney Pro Se 
Utah State Prison 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, Utah 84020 
& • : ! • : . 
Tiv 
MAR 3 0 1S32 
IK THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUPT, SALT LA^E COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID LEE HEWITT, 
vs. 










RESPONSE TO RESPONDENT'S 
MOTION TO DISMISS 
Case No. 920900009 
Jud^e Leslie A. Lewis 
Petitioner, by and through himself, Pro Se, hereby moves this 
the Court to deny Respondent's Motion to Dismiss. This request is based and 
made because the Petitioner is within his ripht to file and have the courts 
hear a petition for habeas corpus. The Petitioner has brought forth several 
claims which are meritorious and has complied to the best of his ability with 
the requirements of Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(b). 
Dated this 19th day of March, 1992. 
W>A'&^^VV^L 
David Lee Hewitt 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I do hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the fore^oin^ was 
nailed, postage pre-paid to the Attorney General's Office, at 6100 South 300 
East, Ste. 204, Salt Lake City, Utah 84107 on this 19th day of March, 199?. 
WSl d^.Vv&s 
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David Lee Hewitt 
Attorney Pro Se 
Utah State Prison 
P.O. Box 250 
Draper, Utah R4020 
T 
MAR 3 0 1392 
Zy-CA 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID LEE HEWITT, 
vs. 









MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF 
PETITIONER REOUESTS TO 
DENY MOTION TO DISMISS 
Case No. 920900909 
Judre Leslie A. Lewis 
Petitioner, by and through himself, hereby submits this 
memorandum in support of Petitioner request to deny Respondent's Motion to 
Dismiss. 
ARGUMENT 
Respondent claims that Petitioner's Writ of Habeas Corpus 
should be dismissed on three different points. Respondent claims that all of 
Petitioner's claims are time-barred. Respondent further claims that 
Petitioner's petition should be dismissed because Petitioner could and should 
have raised all his claims on direct appeal. Additional, Respondent claims that 
the petition should be dismissed because it fails to comply with the 
requirements of Utah R. Civ. P. 65B(b). 
POINT I 
ALL OF PETITIONER'S CLAIMS ARE TIME-BARRED. 
Petitioner answers "nay" 
In this point the Respondent uses and states Utah Code Ann. S 7R-1P-31.1. 
Petitioner is completely uneducated in law procedures. The Petitioner does not 
have the money nor the resources to properly research, attack, nor properly 
file his grievance with the courts. 
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Petitioner did not know of the existence of a presentencing report, or the 
right to review such until brought to Petitioner attention in Nov. 1991. 
Petitioner would state that Utah Judicial Code 7*-12-31.1. Is constitutionally 
incorrect when comparing it to the Constitution of The United States, Article I 
Section 9(2), STre prlvtlegeTof' the writ of habeas corpus shall not be 
suspended,..., Constitution of the United States (Pill of Rights), Amendment I 
the right to petition the government for a redress of grievances. Also the 
Constitution of Utah (Declaration of Rights). Article I Section I - (Inherent 
and Inalienable rights), protest against wrongs, and petition for redress of 
grievances. Article I Section 5(Habeas Corpus), the privilege (of writ of 
habeas corpus) shall not be suspended, unless in case of rebellion or invasion, 
the public safety requires it. (emphasis added) In none of these, Article I 
Section I and 5 or in the Constitution of the United States, Article I Section 
9(2), and the first amendment of the Bill of Rights is there any mention of any 
time limit in which these rights do and can apply. Petitioner also notes that 
the Constitution of the United States and all Federal Laws are the supreme law 
of the land. Additionally, because of the continuing violation of the 
Petitioner rights, he should not be bound by the original three month time 
limit in which to file. 
POINT II 
PETITIONER'S PETITION SHOULD BE DISMISSED BECAUSE HE COULD 
AND SHOULD HAVE RAISED ALL HIS CLAIMS ON DIRECT APPEAL. 
Petitioner answers "nay" 
In this point Respondent mainly cites Brown v. Turner, M O P.2d 968(Utah 
1968). Because of Petitioner lack of understanding law procedures, he relied in 
-2-
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rood faith in his court appointed Public Defender. When the petitioner entered 
a guilty plea to this charge and was told by the court that he was giving up 
the right to an appeal. He presumed this to mean any and all appeals, 
Petitioner did not have effective assistance of counsel during the procedures 
of this court litigation or during the 
sentencing phase of this process. Also if Petitioner would have knovm, which he 
did not, he could have appealed the sentence, and then would have, but would 
not have the appeal been a sham in lidnt of the defense Petitioner had already 
received from his court aopointed attorney. Cites Dunn v. Cook 791 P.2d 
B?3(Utah 199^). Had the attorney gone over the presentence report with 
Petitioner and then discussed the consequences of the judgement against hin and 
informed him of any meritorious grounds for an appeal or the right to an 
appeal, this claim would not be in front of the Honorable Court right now. 
However even with the Petitioner claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
during trial and then the sentencing, should not have the court shared some of 
the resposibility to make sure that the Petitioner did have and was given at 
least due process of his rights and of the law. Petitioner further cites in 
part, Bryant v. Turner, 19 Utah 2d 2B4, 431 P.2d 121(1967); Oallegos v. Turner, 
17 Utah 2d 273, ^ 09 P,2d 386(1965). 
POINT III 
THE PETITION SHOULD BE DISMISSED BECAUSE IT FAILS TO COMPLY 
WITH THE REQUIREMENTS OF UTAH R. CIV. P.65B(b). 
Petitioner answer wnayff 
In this last point the Respondent primarily cites Utah R. Civ. P. 
65B(b)(3)(iii). Prior to having this petition filed with the court, the 
Petitioner did attach letters, a motion and order to and from the Third 
-3-
000033 
Tistrict Court, to the petition. Petitioner then gave everythinr to the 
Contract Attorneys for then to make three copies of. Two for the court and one 
for the Petitioner's filef then requested that they file the two complete 
copies with the court. Petitioner received back his copy for his file and did 
assume that his request had been completely followed through with. 
Once arain Petitioner states that he is completely uneducated 
in law procedures. The Petitioner does not have the money nor the resources to 
pronerly research, attack nor file his grievances with the courts. Petitioner 
has asked both the courts and the Dept of Corrections for copies of records, 
documents, and affidavits so that he may fully address the courts with his 
grievances, but so far has been turned down at both ends. 
To address the issue that the Respondent brought up 
concerning questions that should have been asked during the sentencing phase of 
the court proceedings, Petitioner cites both U.S. v. Miller, and U.S. v. Pone. 
In this case, as was the case of U.S. v. Miller, P49 F.2d 895, fW*th Cir. 
19BB), the opinion that the court stated was to remand for resentencing when 
the court did not expressly inquire whether defendant and counsel read and 
discussed presentence report and no evidence sunnorting inference that read 
likewise in the case of U.S. v. Rone, 7^3 F. 2d 1159, 1173-74(7th Cir. 19p4), 
the opinion of the court was to remand for resentencing when not clear that 
defendant had access to report and court failed to ask defendant if he had read 
report. Accordingly Fed* F. Crim. P. 32(a)(1)(A) and Utah Rules of Judicial 
Administration Rule 4-203(2) both state Petitioner was entitled to the 
presentencing report. 
Additional the Respondent has stated on the claim of 
restitution that "oral statements of the trial court are superseded by written 
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findings, judgement, or verdicts.ff However the Petitioner did not take nor does 
he believe the court intended the statement made by the trial judge that there 
would be no restitution in this case, as an opinion or as an assurance but 
rather as a ruling in this case, which would be constant with Utah Rules of 
Judicial Administration Rule 6-302(2). 
CONCLUSION 
Vfherefore the Petitioner prays that the Honorable Court 
allows the Petitioner to proceed and that the Court set a date for an 
Evidentiary Kezrin? pursuant to Arcicle I Section 11 of the Utah Constitution. 
DATED this 19th day of March. 1992. 
m\m^\^^ 
David Lee Hewitt 
CERTIFICATE OF SFPVICE 
I do hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing was 
mailed, postage pre-paid, to the Attorney Generalfs Office, at 6100. South 300 
East, Ste. 204, Salt Lake City, Utah S4107 on this 19th day of March, 1992. 
SES&A^&QL \ f t V ^ 
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ADDENDUM G 
FUB* DISTRICT C9U 1ST 
"Tb'-vJ Judical D'ss*^ct 
DEC 1 6 1992 
Srki-l LAfvd ooy.n i Y 
Deputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DAVID L. HEWITT, 
Petitioner, 
vs. 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Respondent. 
SUMMARY DECISION AND ORDER 
CASE NO. 920900909 
Petitioner makes these allegations of error at his 
sentencing hearing: (1) that the court allowed a biased agent 
of AP&P to prepare the presentence report; (2) that the court 
failed to ask petitioner if he had access to the report and 
discussed the report with his counsel; (3) that the court 
failed to ask petitioner whether the presentence report was 
accurate; and (4) that the court failed to orally order 
restitution but included a restitution requirement in the 
subsequent written judgment. While petitioner has filed an 
amended petition, the amended allegations do not alter the 
thrust of his claims. 
The fourth of these allegations is easily resolved. The 
petitioner is clearly and unequivocally wrong in his factual 
000081 
HEWITT V. STATE PAGE TWO SUMMARY DECISION 
allegation. A transcript of the sentencing hearing indicates 
the court expressly ordered restitution as part of its sentence. 
The other allegations share at least three 
characteristics: (1) they were not raised at the sentencing 
hearing; (2) had they been raised they could have and would 
have been addressed; and (3) they were not the subject of a 
direct appeal. As a consequence, respondent's waiver and 
statute of limitations arguments are persuasive. 
The Court is now cognizant of a separate petition, No. 
920900797, which the petitioner has filed. This Summary 
Decision and Order is not intended to resolve that petition. 
The clerk has communicated to the respondent in that case that 
it must respond to the petition as earlier ordered or risk 
default. 
For the foregoing reasons, the petition is dismissed. 
Dated this / "> day of December, 1992. 
MICHAEL R. MURPHY / 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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of the court. The action originally was upon promissory 
notes. It is so alleged in the complaint under considerationv 
A promissory note carries with it the presumption of a con-
sideration. The defendant in the law action, appellant here, 
filed a motion to strike certain parts of the complaint. The 
court granted the motion. In the order it authorized the filing 
of an amended complaint. Thereafter, without any new or 
amended complaint being filed, the court entered judgment in 
favor of the plaintiff and against the defendant in that ac-
tion. Every presumption is in favor of a judgment entered 
by a court of general jurisdiction. This court is unable to 
see any fallacy in the statement in the opinion that, in the 
absence of any showing to the contrary, it must be presumed 
that the complaint, after certain parts were stricken, con-
tained the necessary allegation to constitute a cause of action. 
The presumption indulged in favor of judgments carries with 
it that implication. 
The appellant invokes the aid of a court of equity to re-
strain the enforcement of that judgment without alleging any 
facts showing that appellant had any defense, either equita-
ble or legal, to the cause of action stated in the complaint in 
the law action. The authorities are uniform that any one 
asking the assistance of a court of equity to enjoin the en-
forcement of a judgment entered in a law action must, in the 
complaint, state some fact or facts from which it can be rea-
sonably inferred that to permit the enforcement of the judg-
ment would be against good conscience and result in an in-
justice to the complaining party. This court attempted to 
point out in its opinion that the complaint in the instant case 
fails to state any such facts. 
Rehearing denied. 
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ARESON v. PINCOCK, Sheriff. 
No. 4082. Decided December 1, 1923. #(220 Pac. 503.) 
1. BREACH OF THE PEACE—ELEMENT or FEAB NOT REQUIRED BY STAT-
UTE TO BE STATED IN COMPLAINT. Under Comp. Laws 1917, §f 
8567-8570, 8575, providing for arrest and placing under security 
to keep the peace, the element of fear that threats will be car-
ried out is not required to be specifically stated in the com-
plaint, but is to be concluded from facts laid before the magis-
trate as a prerequisite to issuance of the warrant. 
2. BREACH OF THE PEACE—PROOF OF THREATENED OFFENSE AND BE-
LIEF OF COMPLAINANT NOT AS MATTER OF LAW INSUFFICIENT TO 
AUTHORIZE WARRANT. It cannot be said as a matter of law that 
sworn proof of a threatened offense and the belief of complain-
ant that it will be carried into execution is insufficient to au-
thorize a magistrate, to conclude that there is Just reason to 
fear the commission of the offense for the purpose of issuing a 
warrant to require security to keep the peace. 
3. HABEA8 CORPUS—DEFECTS OF JURISDICTIONAL CHARACTER TAKEN 
COGNIZANCE OF BY HABEAS CORPUS. Habeas corpus takes cog-
nizance only of jurisdictional defects which render a proceed-
ing not merely voidable, but absolutely void. 
4. HABEAS CORPUS—QUESTION OF SUFFICIENCY OF COMPLAINT IN PRO-
CEEDING FOB SECURITY TO KEEP PEACE NOT ONE OF JURISDICTION. 
The question whether the complaint in a proceeding to require 
security to keep the peace was sufficient to state a cause of 
action where it omitted to state that there was reason to fear 
the commission of the offense threatened was not one of juris-
diction, and cannot be inquired into in habeas corpus proceed-
ings. 
5. BREACH OF THE PEACE:—JUDGMENT IN PRESENT TENSE INSTEAD OF 
AS TO TIME COMPLAINT FILED HELD SUFFICIENT. In proceeding 
to require security to keep the peace, a judgment finding that 
there is just reason to fear that defendant will carry into execu-
tion the threat made is not fatally defective because in the 
present tense instead of aB of the time when complaint was 
filed. 
Original application by Nels Areson for writ of habeas 
corpus against R. D. Pincoek, as sheriff of Weber County. 
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WRIT DENIED. 
John G. Willis, of Ogden, for plaintiff. 
D. J. Wilson, Co. Atty., of Ogden, for defendant. 
CHERRY, J. 
Upon the petition of Nels Areson, alleging that he was 
illegally restrained of his liberty by the sheriff of Weber 
county, a writ of habeas corpus was issued, to which the 
sheriff made his return according to law. 
The facts necessary to be considered are alleged in the 
petition, and are not disputed. On June IS, 1923, Geo. F . 
Fullmer filed a complaint before Hon. George S. Barker, 
judge of the Second judicial district court, sitting as a 
magistrate, charging Nels Areson, defendant (the petitioner 
herein), with having made a series of specific threats of per-
sonal violence against him, on divers dates on and between 
January 21, 1922, and June 6, 1923, and "that complainant 
verily believes that unless said defendant is arrested and 
placed under security to keep the peace that he will carry 
out his threats against this complainant and others, for said 
defendant is prepared to execute his threats unless re-
strained. " 
A hearing was had before the magistrate on November 
14, 1923, at the conclusion of which he found that "the 
defendant has frequently tlireatened to inflict great bodily 
harm upon the complainant, even to kill the complainant, 
and it further appearing that there is just reason to fear 
that said defendant will carry into execution the threats so 
made," and ordered the defendant to enter into an under-
taking in the sum of $2,000 to keep the peace, etc., or in 
default thereof to be committed to the custody of the sheriff 
to be by Mm imprisoned in the county jail until he give such 
undertaking or is legally discharged. 
The defendant failed to give the undertaking, whereupon 
a commitment was issued pursuant to the order, and he was 
imprisoned in the county jail of Weber county. 
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The particular respects wherein it is claimed the restraint 
is illegal are: (1) That the complaint is insufficient to state 
a cause of action or to confer jurisdiction upon the court, 
because it omits to state ' * that there is just reason to fear 
the commission of the offense threatened"; that the state-
ment in the complaint "that the complainant verily believes 
that unless said defendant is arrested and placed under se-
curity to keep the peace he will carry out his threats," etc., 
is insufficient; and (2) that the finding of the magistrate 
"that there is just reason to fear that defendant will carry 
into execution the threats so made" is fatally defective be-
cause it is in the present tense, and relates to the time of 
hearing, and fails to find that such fear existed at the time 
complaint was made. 
The proceedings had before the magistrate are authorized 
by Comp. Laws Utah 1917, §§ 8567-8583, and the particular 
matters here involved are governed by the following pro-
visions : 
Section 8567. "A complaint may be made before any magis-
trate that a person has threatened to commit an offense against the 
person or property of another." 
Section 8568. "The magistrate must examine on oath the com-
plainant and any witnesses he may produce, and may take their 
depositions in writing." 
Section 8569. "A complaint within the meaning of this chapter 
Is a statement in writing of the jurisdictional facts, clearly specify-
ing the threatened offense, and subscribed and sworn to by the com-
plainant." 
Section 8570. "If it appears that there is just reason to fear 
the commission of the offense threatened, the magistrate may issue 
a warrant directed generally to any peace officer, reciting the sub-
stance of the complaint and commanding the officer forthwith to 
arrest the person complained of and bring him before such magis-
trate, or, in case of his absence or inability to act, before the near-
est and most accessible magistrate of the county." 
Section 8575. "If, however, there is just reason to fear the com-
mission of the offense, the person complained of may be required to 
enter into an undertaking in such sum, not exceeding $3,000, as 
the magistrate may direct, with one or more sufficient sureties, to 
keep the peace toward the people of this state, and particularly 
toward the complainant. * * •" 
It is thus seen that the element of fear is not required 
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by the statute to be specifically stated in the com-
plaint, but is to be concluded by the magistrate from * 1 
the facts laid before him, as a prerequisite to the issu-
ance of the warrant. The whole matter is reduced to the 
question of whether the showing made to the magistrate 
was sufficient to authorize him to conclude that there was 
just reason to fear the commission of the threatened offense. 
We are not prepared to say as a matter of law that sworn 
proof of a threatened offense, and the belief of com-
plainant that it will be carried into execution, is in- 2 
sufficient to authorize a magistrate to conclude that 
there is just reason to fear the commission of the offense 
threatened for the purpose of issuing a warrant of arrest. 
But the question is not one of jurisdiction, and may not 
be inquired into in habeas corpus proceedings. It cannot be 
denied that the court had jurisdiction generally to try the 
issues and make the order complained of. Habeas corpus 
takes cognizance only of defects of a jurisdictional char-
acter, which render the proceedings not merely void-
able, but absolutely void. Bruce v. East, 43 Utah, 3,4 
327, 134 Pac. 1175. The rule is well settled and is 
supported by many cases. See annotation to Ex parte Rob-
inson, L. R. A. 1918B, 1148. The following excerpt from 
the annotation above referred to indicates the extent to 
which the rule is applied: 
"It has been said that, if from the accusation the court can de-
duce that the prosecutor intended to charge an act which is a crime, 
habeas corpus will not lie, however defectively the act is described; 
also that if the indictment or information purports or attempts to 
state an offense, and the court has jurisdiction to pass upon the 
sufficiency of those statements, the defendants after conviction will 
not be released on habeas corpus; and that, 'if a criminal charge 
is colorable, or "sufficient to set the judicial mind in motion" or 
to call upon it to act, or makes some approach towards charging a 
criminal offense, or intimates the facts necessary to constitute the 
offense and a purpose to declare thereon, or tends to show a crim-
inal offense, no matter how informal or defective, or has a legal 
tendency to prove each requirement of the statute, it will shield 
the proceedings from collateral attack. In a word, no errors or 
irregularities not going to the question of jurisdiction are review-
able on habeas corpus.' The rule has been laid down in several 
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cases involving the sufficiency of complaints to charge misdemean-
ors, although probably the doctrine was not intended to be limited 
to this class of cases, that after trial and conviction for an alleged 
misdemeanor a prisoner will not be liberated on a writ of habeas 
corpus because of the Insufficiency of the complaint, if, by any 
possible construction of the language employed therein, an offense 
against the law is thereby even defectively stated." 
In re Gregory, 219 U. S. 210, 31 Sup. Ct. 143, 55 L. Ed. 
184, Mr. Justice Hughes, speaking for the court, in a case 
where colorable questions were presented by the information 
and evidence, stated the rule as follows: 
"A habeas corpus proceeding cannot be made to perform the 
function of a writ of error and we are not concerned with the ques-
tion whether the information was sufficient or whether the acts set 
forth in the agreed statement constituted a crime, that is to say, 
whether the court properly applied the law, if it be found that the 
court had jurisdiction to try the issues and to render the judgment." 
The petitioner's objection to the complaint considered as 
the basis of mere error is most hypercritical, and it is so^  
unrelated to the subject of jurisdiction that it cannot be 
considered at all in a habeas corpus case. 
The second objection to the proceedings is even less meri-
torious. Counsel for petitioner has cited cases to the effect 
that it is not a defense, or a ground for imposing costs upon 
the complaining witness, to show that, notwithstanding there 
were just grounds for fearing a breach of the peace 
when the complaint was filed, the grounds for such 5 
fear did not exist at the time of trial. State v. Sayer, 
35 Ind. 379; State v. Steward, 48 Ind. 146; Stone v. State, 
97 Ind. 345. No such questions arose in the proceedings 
now under consideration, nor is it seen how these proceedings 
give any support to the proposition that a judgment is void 
because it is expressed in the present tense, instead of as 
of the time when the complaint was filed. The objection is 
groundless, and not worthy of further comment 
The petition is denied, and the prisoner remanded to the 
custody of the sheriff. 
WEBER, C. J., and GIDEON, THURMAN, and PRICK, 
JJ., concur. 
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clerk of the district court of any county, and 
there docketed, an execution may Issue there-
on, and a Hen on the real property of the 
judgment debtor Is created. When such an 
abstract of a judgment is filed and docketed, 
the district court of the county where filed 
and docketed cannot, on motion, vacate the 
judgment so transferred and docketed, and 
strike the abstract from the record, unless it 
appears on the face ot the abstract that the 
Judgment is void. The docketing of the Judg-
ment In the office ot the c/erk of Utah county 
did not give the district court of that county 
jurisdiction of the action in which such judg-
ment was rendered. The docketing of the 
Judgment was for the purpose of creating a 
lien upon the jea l estate of the judgment 
debtor, and enforcing the same by execution. 
If an execution is issued which does not fol-
tow the judgment as docketed, the court un-
doubtedly has power, on motion, to recall or 
quash it. But such motion would not reach 
any defect in the judgment not shown upon 
the face of the record. The court, however, 
was not authorized to go behind the face of 
the abstract and to determine whether the 
justice rendering the judgment had jurisdic-
tion of the person of the defendant, or to in-
quire into the merits of the cause. If the 
judgment rendered in the justice court is 
erroneous or void for want of jurisdiction, 
not appearing on the face of the abstract, re-
lief therefrom must be obtained in some oth-
er manner authorized by law or equity. 
We are therefore of the opinion that the 
district court was not authorized, on motion, 
to inquire into the matters presented to it, 
or to strike the abstract from the record. 
The following cases fully support the views 
herein expressed and the conclusion reached 
by us: 23 Cyc. p. 893; Garlock v. Calkins, 14 
S. D. 90, 84 N. W. 393; Btrdsey v. Harris, 68 
N. C. 92; Whitehurst v. Transportation Co., 
109 N. C. 342, 13 S. E. 937; Lacock v. White, 
19 Pa. 495; Llttster v. Littster, 151 Pa. 474, 
25 Atl. 117. 
The order of the district court canceling 
and vacating the docketing of the abstract 
of judgment is therefore annulled, and the 
docketing of the abstract restored. No costs 
are allowed against the district judge; but 
inasmuch as the defendant, Ellen Ivers, ap-
plied for the order canceling the docketing 
of the abstract, maintained and prosecuted 
her motion therefor before the district court, 
and defended the same in this court, the 
plaintiff is entitled to costs of this proceed-
ing to be taxed against her. 
McCARTY, C. J., and FRICK, J., concur. 
WINNOVICH v. EMERY. 
(Supreme Court of Utah. Feb. 3, 1908.) 
t. HABEAS CORPUS—NATURE OF PBOCEEDINO 
—CIVIL OB CRIMINAL. 
Habeas corpus proceedings are civil, and 
not criminal. 
(l>tuh. 
2. SAME—SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS. 
Habeas corpus belongs to what, under IfcJ 
Code, are termed "special proceedings." • V?3 
3. SAME—APPEAL.
 W-M 
Rev. St. 1898, $ 3G27, provides that a paS 
ty prosecuting a special proceeding may ba 
known as plaintiff, and the adverse party as dV 
fendant. Section 3303 provides that any party 
to a judgment muy appeal therefrom, and that 
the party appealing shall be known as appef-
lant, and the adverse party as respondent 
Held, that a proceeding in habeas corpus being 
civil, the applicant is the plaintiff and the party 
who restrains the applicant is the defendant; 
and therefore an appeal by defendant m not ah. 
attempted appeal by the state. , .. ^ 
4. APPEAL AND EBEOB—DECISIONS R E V I E W * ! 
BLE— "FINALITY OP JUDGMENT."
 fc«i 
The test of finality for the purpose of an 
appeal is not necessarily whether the whole 
matter involved in the action is concluded, but 
whether the particular proceeding or action is 
terminated by the judgment i ^ 
[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see Cent Dir.1 
vol. 2, Appeal and Error, §§ 426-443. '*M 
For other definitions, see Words and Phrase*! 
vol. 3, p. 2777; vol. 8, p. 76C3.J ^ 
5. HABEAS CORPUS—APPEAJL—DECISIONS R*-j 
VIEWABLE—FINALITY. . *$ 
In a habeas corpus proceeding, the jndg? 
ment of the court which either remands or dUt-i 
churges the petitioner is a final judgment, not-
withstanding the fact that another similar pro-
ceeding may be commenced by the petitioner if 
he elects to do so.i -A« 
6. SABrs—EFFECT—STAY OF PROCEEDING. ?Jj 
Without an express statutory provision to! 
that effect, an appeal does not of its own fores 
suspend the judgment in a habeas corpus pro-
ceeding.
 N i£ 
7. SAME—GBOUNDS FOB RELIEF. ' "}ty 
Where the common law is in force or un-
der statutes which are in effect merely declara-
tory of the common law, courts, on habeas cor-, 
pus, may not extend the investigation beyond jurisdictional matters. , i.^ jj 
[Ed. Note.—For cases in point, see Cent Dig.) 
vol. 25, Habeas Corpus, f 23.] 
8. SAME—REVIEW OB EVIDENCE. ,.>.*! 
There is no statutory authority in this state 
whereby a court or judge on habeas corpus may' 
review the evidence adduced before a magistrate 
in support of a criminal charge for the purpose 
of determining whether the evidence was either 
competent or sufficient to warrant the magis-
trate in holding the accused for trial to the' 
district court and in committing him for that 
purpose. ...J 
9. SAME. ' ,? 
If the accused should allege and offer to 
prove that the magistrate did not in fact hear 
any evidence in support ot the charge, and the 
accused did not waive examination, and that the 
record showing the proceedings of the magis-' 
trate is false, then the court or judge in habeas 
corpus proceedings should hear the evidence in 
that regard; and, if it is found that there was 
no preliminary examination by the magistrate, 
the accused should be discharged. 
Appeal from District Court, Third District; 
Geo. G. Armstrong, Judge. 
Habeas corpus by Emil Winnovich against 
C. Frank Emery. From a judgment discharg-
ing petitioner, defendant appeals. Reversed. 
Willard Hanson and Thos. Marioneaux, for 
appellant. P. P. Christensen, for respondent 
» Mead •. Metcalf, 7 Utah. 103. 26 Pac 729; In r« Clasby, 3 Utah, 183. 1 Pac. 852; Honerfne M. & AC. Co. v. Tallerday Steel P. ft T. Co., 80 Utah, 449, 86 Pac. 626. 
_.TRICK, J. On th<2 loth day of June, 1907, j 
& complaint in due form was filed before Jo-
seph J. Williams, a justice of the peace of 
Sgalt Lake county, charging Emil Winnovich, 
Khe respondent In this appeal, with the crime I 
lof murder. He was duly arrested upon a I 
Warrant, and taken before said justice, who I 
^regularly proceeded to examine Into the I 
febarge, and on the 18th day of June, 1907, I 
F*fter hearing the evidence adduced thereon, I 
Ifoond that there was probable cause to be-
jlleve that the accused, Emil Winnovich, had 
Committed the crime of murder, and entered I 
ian order .or judgment requiring the accused I 
rtn appear before the district court of Salt 
}Lake county, and to that end issued a mit- I 
^tlmus or commitment directed to the sheriff 
gof Salt Lake county, the appellant herein, to 
•safely keep said accused and bring him be-
fore the district court of Salt Lake county to 
the dealt with according to law. The appel-
lant accordingly held the respondent In cus-
tody In the common jail of Salt Lake county 
t>y virtue of said commitment On the 26th 
liiay ot June, 1907, the respondent presented 
.bis petition to George G. Armstrong, one of 
the district judges of Salt Lake county, 
wherein be alleged that be was unlawfully 
restrained of his liberty, and prayed that a 
writ of habeas corpus issue requiring appel-
lant to show cause why he detained the re-
spondent and restrained him of his liberty. 
Appellant duly produced the respondent in 
court as directed by said writ, and for cause 
ot detention produced the commitment issued 
as aforesaid. On the 29th day of June fol- I 
lowing the petition was submitted to Said I 
-district judge, sitting as a court, without ar~ I 
.-gument The evidence adduced at the hear-
ing before the justice, duly certified to by 
him, was submitted to the court, together 
with the return of appellant as aforesaid. 
On the 9th day of July, 1907, the court gtant-
•ed the petition of respondent, upon the sole 
ground, as appears from the record, that °it 
does not appear to the court that there la 
sufficient evidence in the record to warrant 
the holding of defendant" The court accord-
ingly entered an order or judgment discharg-
ing the respondent from the custody of ap-
pellant, and restored respondent to liberty. 
From the order or judgment, Emery appeals. 
A motion to dismiss the appeal is inter-
posed by respondent upon the grounds (1) 
that this Is in effect an appeal by the state, 
and that the state has not the right to appeal 
1n such a proceeding; (2) that, in any event, 
no appeal lies from habeas corpus proceedings 
In this state because the order or judgment 
•of discharge Is not a final judgment 
We will first examine into the first ground 
urged why this appeal should be dismissed, 
namely, that an appeal in this case is an ap-
peal by the state. This brings op the ques-
tion whether the proceedings are civil or 
criminal. We think there is little, If any, 
room for doubt) In view of the authorities, 
that the proceedings are civil, and not crlm- | 
lual. The purpose is to protect ui viuujiu.., 
a civil right The person is restrained of bis 
liberty, and the purpose of the whole proceed-
ing Is to have that liberty restored to him at 
the earliest possible moment When liberty 
is restored, the proceeding has accomplished 
Its purpose, and no other or further conse-
quences follow. That habeas corpus proceed-
ings are civil, and the reasons why they are 
so, are well stated by Mr. Chief Justice 
Walte in Ex parte Tom Tong, 108 U. S. 359, 
2 Sup. C t 872, 27 L. Ed. 826, where he says : 
**The writ of habeas corpus is the remedy 
which the law gives for the enforcement of 
the civil right of personal liberty. Resort 
to it sometimes becomes necessary, because 
ot what is done to enforce laws for the pun-
ishment of crimes, but the judicial proceed-
ing under it is not to inquire into the crim-
inal act which is complained of, but Into the 
right to liberty notwithstanding the act Pro-
ceedings to enforce civil rights are civil pro-
ceedings, and proceedings for the punishment 
of crimes are criminal proceedings. In the 
present case the petitioner is held under 
criminal process. The prosecution against 
him is a criminal prosecution, but the writ 
of habeas corpus which be has obtained is 
not a proceeding in that prosecution. On the 
contrary, it is a new suit brought by him to 
enforce a civil right which he claims, as 
against those who are holding him in custody 
under the criminal process. If be tails to 
establish his right to his liberty, he may be 
detained for trial for the offense; but, if he 
succeeds, he must be discharged from cus-
tody. The proceeding is one Instituted by 
himself for his liberty, not by the government 
to punish him for his crime." In Cross v. 
Burke, 146 U. 8. 88, 13 Sup. Ct 24, 36 L. Ed. 
896, Mr. Chief Justice Fuller, In passing up-
on the question, says: "It is well settled 
that a proceeding In habeas corpus is a civil, 
and not a criminal, proceeding." In support 
of this, he cites Farnsworth v. Montana, 129 
U. S. 104, 9 Sup. Ct. 253, 32 L. Ed. 616; 
Kurtz v. Moffltt, 115 U. S. 487, 6 Sup. Ct. 148, 
29 L. Ed. 458, and the Tong Case, above 
quoted from. We desire also to call special 
attention to the case of Ex rel. Durner v. 
Huegin, 110 Wis. 189, 85 N. W. 1046. In the 
case last referred to, as In this, the sheriff 
took the proceedings to the Supreme Court 
for review from an order or judgment by the 
lower court discharging the prisoner. That 
case Is one of the best considered cases we 
can find upon the subject, and, as it so com-
pletely covers the whole ground with regard 
to habeas corpus proceedings, we refer the 
reader to that case. In re Foye, 21 Wash. 
250, 57 Pac. 825, In re Baker, 21 Wash. 259, 
57 Pac. 827, and In re Sylvester, 21 Wash. 263, 
57 Pac. 829, are also cases In which the 
nature of the proceedings, the right of ap-
peal, and kindred questions are discussed. 
Moreover, section 4510, Rev. S t 1898, de-
fines a criminal action thus: "The proceed-
ings by which a person charged with a public 
990 93 PACIFIC BBPORTEB. (UfaJH 
offense la accused and brought to trial and 
punishment, la known as a criminal action." 
The section following provides that such ac-
tions shall be prosecuted In the name of the 
state of Utah as a party against the person 
charged with the offense, who, the next sec-
tion provides, shall be designated as defend-
ant. The person charged, therefore, is pros-
ecuted by and in the name of the state. 
While in Borne proceedings. In their nature 
civil, the name of the state may also be used, 
this in habeas corpus proceedings, as we hope 
to make clear, is wholly unnecessary and of 
no importance. 
Having thus established that a proceeding 
in habeas corpus is civil, what is Its char-
acter under our system of procedure? Is i t a 
s u i t an action, or may it be classed as a 
special proceeding? It seems to us that 
there can be no doubt that it belongs to what, 
under the Code, are termed "special proceed-
ings.'* This Is also the conclusion reached 
by the courts who decided the cases above 
cited, as well as the conclusion reached by 
many other courts. The conclusion is rein-
forced by the fact that the writ of habeas 
corpus, well known to the common law, did 
not receive the respect from the common-law 
courts Its importance merited, and for that 
reason It was made more effective in the 
reign of Charles II by what Is known as the 
"Habeas Corpus A c t " Since then, to a 
large extent, It has been and now Is regu-
lated by statute. 21 Cyc. 283. In modern 
times habeas corpus may, therefore, be con-
sidered as a statutory proceeding, although it 
had its origin in the common law. Under 
the statute it may well be classed as a spe-
cial proceeding. If it is, who are the par-
ties to such a proceeding? In referring to 
our Code we find that section 3627, Rev. St. 
1898, provides as follows: "The party pros-
ecuting a special proceeding may be known as 
the plaintiff, and the adverse party as the de-
fendant" Who prosecutes in a habeas corpus 
proceeding? It is either the person restrain-
ed of his liberty, or some one In his behalf. 
He Institutes the proceeding the same as he 
does any other, without leave from any one. 
Against whom is i t directed? Against the 
person alone who deprives the applicant of 
his liberty. We thus have one who com-
plains of some illegal act or acts attributed 
to another. We thus have a plaintiff. The 
person agains't whom the illegal acts are al- I 
leged Is the defendant The terms "plain-
tiff" and "defendant," therefore, are as prop-
er and as applicable In a habeas corpus pro-
ceeding as they are In any other special pro-
ceeding. The plaintiff seeks to vindicate a 
legal right. The defendant opposes plain-
tiff's claims. That both claim under a spe-
cial law cannot affect the matter one way or 
another. By section 3303, Rev. St. 1898, It 
i s provided that any party to a judgment 
may appeal therefrom; that on appeal the 
party appealing shall be known as appellant I 
| and the adverse party ae respondent I t alsU 
provides that the title of the action or pro? 
ceedlng is not changed by an appeal. FronJ 
all this It seems clear to us that a proceed-
ing in habeas corpus is civil, that the appui 
cant is the plaintiff and the party who re-* 
strains the applicant i s the defendant, and 
t h a t on appeal, the one who appeals is the 
appellant, and the other the respondent!! 
From this it follows that in this case no ap5 
peal Is attempted by the state, but the ap-* 
peal is taken and prosecuted by the sheriff^ 
C. Frank Emery, the appel lant who, it was1 
claimed in the petition for a writ of habeas1 
corpus, unlawfully restrained the respondent 
of his liberty. The appeal, therefore, should 
not be dismissed upon the first ground. r , • 
Can the appeal stand as against the second 
ground urged? It is asserted that the de-
cisions of this court in Mead v. Metcalfe 7 
Utah, 103, 25 Pac. 729, and In re Clasby, 8 
Utah, 183, 1 Pac. 852, are decisive of this 
question. It Is true that In Mead v. Met-
calf this court held that an order or judg-
ment discharging a prisoner upon habeas cor-
pus is not a final judgment from which an 
appeal will He; and it was further held in 
both cases referred to that no appeal is per-
missible In any event In habeas corpus pro-
ceedings. Since those cases were decided the" 
territorial government has been merged into 
a state government, and the right of an ap-
peal is fixed in the Constitution of the state, 
which, so far as material here, Is found in 
section 9 of article 8, which provides: "From 
all final judgments of the district courts, 
there shall be a right of appeal to the Su-
preme Court The appeal shall be upon the 
record made In the court below, and under 
such regulations as may be provided by law." 
The right of appeal, therefore. Is a constitu-
tional r ight which cannot be interfered with 
by the Legislature. Under the law In force 
when the two Utah cases above referred to> 
were decided the statute l ikewise permitted 
an appeal from final judgments. Iff there-
fore, a judgment in a certain proceeding was 
not final under the territorial statute, it 
would seem that, for the same reasons, it 
will not be final under the Constitution. In 
view that the territorial court has directly 
passed upon the question, and for the reason 
that the authorities are in hopeless conflict 
I upon the question, we should n o t under or-
dinary circumstances, be inclined to recon-
sider the question, but would feel constrained 
to abide by the decisions of the territorial 
Supreme Court of which this court is the 
successor. The ruling, however, that a judg-
ment In a habeas corpus proceeding Is not 
final Is based In those cases upon the ground 
that such a judgment Is not res adjudlcata, 
and hence does not prevent a further pro-
ceeding of the same character In the same 
court or before the same judge, or In another 
court, or before another judge having juris-
diction of the subject-matter. This may alt 
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oe granted; and yet tt does not follow that I 
a judgment which does not finally estop a 
party to it from proceeding again in the same 
manner Is not, for the purpose of an appeal, 
"a final judgment This has been decided so 
often that It has become elementary. This 
'court, in a later decision entitled Honerine 
jf. & M. Co. v. Tallerday Steel P. & T. Co., 
SO Utah, 449, 85 Pac. 626, has so held. Mr. 
justice Straup, at page 451 of 30 Utah, page 
62G of 85 P a c , states the rule in this regard 
tersely and correctly in the following lan-
guage: "It is the termination of the particu-
lar action which marks the finality of .the 
judgment A decision which terminates the 
guit, or puts the case out of court without 
an adjudication on . the merits, is neverthe-
less a final judgment." This doctrine is sup-
ported by many cases, some of which are 
cited by Mr. Justice Straup and need not 
again be cited here. If this were not so, It 
would not be permitted to appeal from a j 
judgment granting an involuntary nonsuit, 
because the judgment in such a case does 
not estop the plaintiff from prosecuting an-
other action for the same cause of action. 
The test of finality for the purpose of an ap-
peal, therefore, is not necessarily whether 
the whole matter Involved in the action Is 
concluded, but whether the particular pro-
ceeding or action Is terminated by the judg-
ment. If it is, and, in order to proceed far-
ther with regard to the same subject-matter, 
a new action or proceeding must be com-
menced, then, as a general rule, the judg-
ment which ends the particular action or 
proceeding is final for the purposes of an ap-
peal, If an appeal Is permissible at all. Both 
of the Utah cases referred to have thus been 
greatly weakened with regard to the doc-
trine of finality of judgments by what is 
said In the Honerine Case. Nor can the doc-
trine, as It is stated to be in the Honerine 
Case, be successfully assailed. We are con-
strained to hold therefore that In a habeas 
corpus proceeding the judgment of the court 
which either remands or discharges the pe-
titioner is a final judgment, notwithstanding 
the fact that another similar proceeding may 
be commenced by the petitioner if he elects 
to do so. If this conclusion be sound, then 
it would seem logically to follow that, under 
our Constitution, where the right of appeal 
Is given from all final judgments, this court 
has no power to deny the right, but must per-
mit the exercise thereof In all cases and pro-
ceedings. 
It Is argued that, although the language of 
a constitutional provision or a statute be 
such as would authorize or confer the right 
of appeal generally, in view that the policy 
of the law with regard to appeals in habeas 
corpus proceedings is opposed to the exercise 
of the right, therefore appeals in such pro-
ceedings should not be permitted by the 
courts under general provisions, but only 
when the right to an appeal Is given by a 
special statute or by constitutional provision. 
This argument is based upon the theory that 
to permit appeals In habeas corpus proceed-
ings destroys the effectiveness of the remedy; 
that it may delay the party In obtaining his 
liberty, the very thing that by habeas corpus 
was intended to be speedily restored to him. 
It is urged that, if appeals are permitted, 
then the judgment of the court discharging 
the prisoner must be suspended, and the 
very purpose of the writ Is defeased. This 
argument or conclusion, to our minds, as-
sumes that to follow which does not follow. 
Without an express statutory provision to 
that effect an appeal does not of its own 
force suspend the judgment in a habeas cor-
pus proceeding. 21 Cyc. pp. 338-341. Even 
in those states where an express right of an 
appeal is given by statute, the courts have 
held that the taking of an appeal does not 
suspend the judgment State v. Kirkpatrick, 
54 Iowa, 373, 6 N. W. 588. 
But this question is not Involved in this 
case, and we therefore express no opinion 
upon i t except to suggest that such a result 
does not necessarily follow from the allow-
ance of an appeal, and therefore that it is 
not a conclusive reason or argument against 
the allowance of appeals In such proceedings. 
Nor is the further reason that a habeas cor-
pus proceeding may be commenced in this 
court and thus make an appeal unnecessary 
of much force. If this reason applies to 
habeas corpus proceedings, It should also ap-
ply to proceedings of mandamus, prohibition, 
certiorari, and quo warranto, all of which 
may be originally commenced In this court 
We think no one would seriously contend that 
for that reason no appeal should be permitted 
j to this court from the judgment of the dis-
trict court entered in any one of the special 
proceedings referred to. But let us examine 
a l itt le farther into the assumption that an 
appeal in effect would destroy the effective-
ness of the writ of habeas corpus under our 
law as it is now in force. For this purpose, 
i t must be conceded that, if a judgment of 
discharge Is not final, then a judgment re-
fusing a discharge and remanding the prison-
er cannot be so. What, then, would be the 
result In view of our present law upon the 
subject of habeas corpus proceedings? This 
law has been materially changed since the 
decisions of Mead v. Metcalf and In re Clas-
by were announced. Section 1009, Rev. St. 
1898, which took effect on January 1, 1898, 
with regard to what the petition In a habeas 
corpus proceeding must contain, in substance 
provides that It must state the name of the 
person who detains the petitioner and the 
place where detained; the cause of restraint, 
and that It is i l legal; that the legality of the 
Imprisonment has not already been adjudged 
upon a prior proceeding of the same char-
acter, and whether the application for the 
writ has been before made to and refused hy 
I any court or judge, and, if so, to attach a 
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copy of the petition and the reasons of the 
refusal to the petition. Section 1077 provides 
that any court or Judge disallowing a writ 
must append bis reasons therefor to the pe-
tition, and return both to the applicant. The 
petition must be verified. The statements 
that the legality of the petition has not been 
already adjudicated and the refusal of a 
former application are both essential, and 
without them the petition does not contain 
the necessary statements authorizing the is-
suance of the writ If this be so, what is the 
natural effect of such statements? As it 
seems to us,- it naturally must result in im-
posing restrictions upon petitioner in making 
successive applications. Is it not manifest 
that, if a petition is presented to one court 
or Judge which shows upon its face that 
another court or Judge of the same or higher 
grade has already passed upon the Identical 
questions involved, In nine out of ten cases 
the court or Judge would therefore decline 
to issue a new writ, or, if he did, would like-
ly follow the Judgment In the prior case un-
less something new was made to appear? 
This in its practical effect, In most cases, 
would result in but one application. If no 
right of appeal is given, we would thus have 
the very thing which, in the minds of some 
of the courts, has been In the way of an ap-
peal also stand in the way of successive ap-
plications. But there are still other reasons. 
Suppose a person applies for a writ which is 
allowed, and a hearing bad upon it. Upon 
the hearing the court refuses a discharge 
from the restraint, regardless of what the 
cause of such restraint may be. To this the 
court in the case of Mead v. Metcalf and some 
of the other courts make answer that the 
applicant for the writ can apply again; that 
he may even come to this court and make a 
new application, and he may continue this 
until he finds some court or judge who feels 
more favorably Inclined to grant his request 
But such an applicant and all of his witnesses 
may be hundreds of miles distant from this 
court, and, In view of our judicial districts 
being large, may be a great distance from 
any other judge or court. Moreover, he may 
have presented his whole case In which the 
facts are entirely undisputed, and the whole 
question may be one of law merely. Must 
be, then, In order to obtain the judgment of 
this court upon the law, institute a new 
proceeding somewhere, and produce all of 
his witnesses or take their testimony by the 
expensive and often unsatisfactory method of 
depositions, when he already has it In another 
form. May not the inconvenience and costs 
thus entailed upon him result in preventing 
another application upon the same state of 
facts when by a simple appeal with a bill of 
exceptions containing the evidence and ruling 
of the court he can obtain the Judgment of 
this court with respect to the legality of his 
detention? This, it seems to us, Is strictly 
in furtherance of the policy of the law which 
alms to make the writ effective, and the final 
result to be gained by it as speedy as pogJ 
sible. Upon the other band, let us assume a 
case where the person charged with a crime 
makes the application and is given a hear* 
Ing on which the district court discharge! 
him upon a point of law. The officer having 
him in charge may have In his custody a 
number of persons charged or contemplated 
to be charged with the same or some other 
crime, but ail involving the same question of 
law. He thinks the district court erred in his 
decision in discharging the first applicant If 
there is no appeal, the judgment of the dis-
trict court granting the discharge certainly Is 
final so far as that charge is concerned, and 
the officer of the law cannot proceed farther 
with that or any other case involving the 
same legal questions, unless he could have the 
law distinctly and authoritatively settled by 
the highest court If this court agrees with 
the district court, no one Is or can be harmed. 
If, upon the other hand, it does not so agree, 
and holds that, under the law, the detention 
was just and proper, then, again, no one is 
legally injured. It needs no argument that it 
is just as important to enforce the laws 
against criminals as it is to enforce them In 
favor of liberty and against illegal restraint 
It is by a strict enforcement of all the laws 
that liberty Is best protected. In view of the 
foregoing, is it not reasonably certain that 
the exercise of the right of appeal is not 
against the policy of the law which alms at 
making the writ of habeas corpus effective? 
And it In no way retards the speedy deter-
mination of the application. The argument 
or reason, therefore, fails that an appeal 
should not be allowed in such proceedings. 
If an appeal is in harmony with the ultimate 
object and purpose of the writ, and tends 
to facilitate, rather than hinder, both the 
applicant and the officers of the law in es-
tablishing legal rights, is there any reason 
left why a court should resort to nice dis-
tinctions and strained constructions to avoid 
appeals in such proceedings? In what we 
have said we do not wish to be understood as 
holding that an appeal lies from a mere re-
fusal to grant the wr i t Many courts where 
the right of appeal Is expressly given by stat-
ute deny the right of an appeal from a mere 
refusal to issue a wri t But upon this ques-
tion, like upon nearly all others In habeas 
corpus proceedings, the courts differ. 21 Cyc. 
340, notes 31, 33. As the question is not in-
volved in this case, however, we express no 
opinion upon It. We think the question with 
regard to appeals in habeas corpus proceed-
ings, in view of the provisions of law In force 
in this state, should be treated precisely as 
such a question would be treated with re-
spect to all other actions or proceedings. In 
view of what we have said, and for the rea-
sons that a departure from the doctrine an-
nounced in Mead v. Metcalf and In re Clasby 
will in no way interfere with, or In any 
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iway involve, property rights, nor disturb any 
rights that could have beea acquired there-
under, we have less hesitancy in overruling 
•those cases In so far as the conclusions herein 
.reached are in conflict with them. It fol-
lows, therefore, that the motion to dismiss 
must be denied. 
This brings us to the merits of the case. 
It appears from the record and judgment of 
the district court that the respondent was 
discharged upon the sole ground that, in the 
opinion of the court, the evidence adduced at 
the preliminary hearing was insufficient to 
show probable cause to believe that respond-
ent was guilty of the crime charged. It is 
clear, therefore that the district court under-
took to determine from the evidence wheth-
er there was probable cause or not Did the 
court have the legal right to do this in a 
habeas corpus proceeding? Upon this ques-
tion, again, the courts are not in harmony. 
As a general rule, the courts hold that on 
habeas corpus, In the absence of a statute 
conferring the right, the courts cannot go in-
to the evidence adduced before the magis-
trate, but must confine the inquiry to ques-
tions of jurisdiction, and, if it be found that 
the magistrate had jurisdiction of the sub-
ject-matter and the person of the defendant, 
that the complaint stated an offense and a 
hearing was had upon the charge and the mit-
timus under which the accused Is held Is reg-
ular, and that the magistrate acted within bis 
jurisdiction, then the court may not discharge 
the prisoner. Some courts, under statutory 
provisions, have held that the court may, on 
habeas corpus, determine whether the accused 
•hould be held upon the evidence, and may 
even hear additional evidence. A distinction 
Is also made with regard to the time an ap-
plication for the writ of habeas corpus Is 
made. If made before an indictment is re-
turned, the powers of the court to examine 
Into the evidence are greater than after in-
dictment found. 21 Cyc. pp. 324-527, where 
the authorities are collected, and the differ-
ent views of the courts stated In the notes. 
The diversity of opinion is, however, more 
apparent than real. It arises out of the dif-
ferent statutory provisions applicable to ha-
beas corpus proceedings. In habeas corpus 
proceedings instituted for the purpose of void-
ing a commitment Issued by an examining 
magistrate many states have enacted statutes 
which enlarge the powers of the judges or 
courts In passing upon the legality of the 
commitment It Is under such statutes that 
courts sometimes examine Into the facts ad-
duced before the magistrate and the • pre-
liminary examination held by him for the 
purpose of determining whether the evidence 
Is sufficient to warrant the holding of the ac-
cused who has been committed by the magis-
trate Into the custody of the officer. In the 
absence of such special statutes, however, the 
courts on habeas corpus have not the power 
to review the evidence heard by the magis-
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crate, and pass upon its sufficiency to author-
ize the holding of the accused. The control-
ling principles are well stated by Judge Cool-
ey In his excellent work on Constitutional 
Limitations (7th Ed.) p. 495, where he says: 
"In the great anxiety on the part of our Leg-
islatures to make the most ample provisions 
for speedy relief from unlawful confinement 
authority to issue the writ of habeas corpus 
has been conferred upon inferior judicial 
officers, who make use of It sometimes as if it 
were a writ of error, under which they might 
correct the errors and irregularities of other 
judges and courts, whatever their relative 
jurisdiction and dignity. Any such employ-
ment of the writ is an abuse. Where a party 
who is in confinement under judicial process 
is brought up on habeas corpus, the court or 
judge before whom he is returned will in-
quire: (1) Whether the court or officer is-
suing the process under which he is detained 
had jurisdiction of the case, and has acted 
within that jurisdiction In Issuing such pro-
cess. If so, mere irregularities or errors of 
judgment In the exercise of that jurisdiction 
must be disregarded on this writ, and must be 
corrected either by the court issuing the pro-
cess, or on regular appellate proceedings. (2) 
If the process is not void for want of Juris-
diction, the further inquiry will be made, 
whether, by law, the case is bailable, and, if 
so, bail will be taken if the party offers it; 
otherwise he will be remanded to the proper 
custody." The writ of habeas corpus cannot be 
made to serve the purpose of an appeal or writ 
of review, unless some statute specially author-
izes this to be done. But, even when author-
ized by statute, such review must be strictly 
limited to the special proceeding to which the 
statute applies. This is well illustrated by 
the decisions emanating from the same courts 
In habeas corpus proceedings. In California, 
where there is a special statute authorizing 
the courts on habeas corpus to determine 
whether or not there is probable cause to com-
mit the accused on preliminary hearing by 
the magistrate, the Supreme Court of Califor-
nia hold that the courts on habeas corpus 
may examine into the facts to determine 
whether there- is any evidence that Justifies 
the findings of probable cause by the magis-
trate. People • . Smith, 1 Cal. 9. Similar 
holdings based upon similar statutes are 
found in State v. Hayden, 35 Minn. 283, 28 
N. W. 6*59, and other cases; but the author-
ity to do this comes from the statute, and, 
where .there is no statutory provision, the 
courts do not extend the scope of the investi-
gation on habeas corpus so as to make the 
proceeding in effect one of review. This is 
again illustrated by the decisions of the same 
courts, to which we have already referred. 
In the following cases: State v. Kinmore, 54 
Minn. 135, 55 N. W. 830, 40 Am. S t Rep. 
309; Ex parte Miller, 82 Cal. 454. 22 Pac. 
1113. Where the common law is In force," 
or under statutes which are in effect merely 
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ieclaratory of the common law, the courts, 
m habeas corpus, may not extend the in-
vestigation beyond jurisdictional matters. 
The following cases, among a large number 
that might be cited, clearly state the rule: 
Turner v. Conkey, 132 Ind. 248, 31 N. E. 777, 
17 L R. A. r,09. 32 Am. St. Rep. 251 ; State v. 
Klnmorc, 54 Minn 135. 55 N. W. 830. 40 Am. 
St. Rep. 305; Smith v. Clausmeier, 136 Ind. 
105, 35 N. E. 904, 43 Am. St. Rep. 311; Horn-
er v. United States, 143 D. S. 570-578, 12 Sup. 
Ct 522, 36 L. Ed. 2GG; Young v. Fain. 121 Ga. 
737, 49 S. E. 731; Ex parte Perdue, 58 Ark. 
285. 24 S. W. 423; Merriman v. Morgan, 7 
Or. GO. There is no statutory authority in 
this state whereby a court or judge, on ha-
beas corpus, may review the evidence ad-
duced before a magistrate in support of a 
criminal charge for the purpose of determin-
ing whether the evidence was either compe-
tent or sufficient to warrant the magistrate in 
holding the accused for trial to the district 
court and in committing him for that purpose. 
The proceedings had betore the magistrate in 
this cai=e are not attacked upon jurisdiction-
al grounds. There was a proper complaint 
which charged an offense. The magistrate 
had jurisdiction of the subject-matter and of 
the person of the accused. A hearing was 
had. Witnesses were sworn, and testified 
both for the state and the accused, and their 
testimony was reduced to writing. All this 
was in compliance with the law of this state. 
The commitment papers are not attacked. In 
addition to the foregoing, the transcript of 
all the proceedings had before the magistrate 
discloses that the law had been complied 
with In every particular. This being so, the 
district court who heard the habeas corpus 
proceeding had no authority to review the evi-
dence heard by the magistrate for the pur-
pose of determining its sufficiency to support 
the judgment or order entered by him in hold-
ing the accused to answer to the district 
court In order to justify the district court 
to so review the evidence would require that 
the writ of habeas corpus be transformed to 
a writ of review, which, as Judge Cooley well 
says, would be an abuse of the writ. It is not 
the province of a court or judge, on habeas 
corpus, to determine whether in his judgment 
the evidence is sufficient to warrant the bind-
ing over of the accused or not. The ouly 
question in such a proceeding i s : Is the ac-
cused illegally restrained of his liberty? The 
magistrate may err in his judgment both 
with regard to the competency aud the suffi-
ciency of the evidence, but this alone does 
not make the restraint illegal. It would at 
most make it erroneous. Errors must be 
cured by an appeal or in proceedings provid-
ed by law and Instituted for that purpose. 
But the district court in this proceeding 
went beyond what the authorities justify 
even In those states where there are special 
statutes permitting courts on habeas corpus 
to review the findings of the magistrate made 
on preliminary examinations. In those states 
the general rule is that the court or judge on 
habeas corpus may examine Into the evidence 
for the purpose only of determining whether 
there Is any legal evidence which fairly tends 
to support the findings and order of the mag-
istrate. State • . Hayden, supra; United 
States v. Greene (D. C) 108 Fed. 816; In re 
Henry, 13 Misc. Rep. 734, 35 N. Y. Supp. 210; 
State v. Beaverstad, 12 N. D. 527, 97 N. W. 
548; Ex parte Becker, 86 Cal. 402, 25 Pac. 0. 
The evidence in the record directly and posi-
tively connects the respondent with the shoot-
ing which it is claimed resulted in the death 
ot the person named In the complaint filled 
with the magistrate. This being so, the dis-
trict court was not authorized to pas3 upon 
the competency of the evidence In a habeas 
corpus proceeding. In view of the statutes 
of this state governing preliminary examina-
tions and the fundamental principles under-
lying proceedings in habeas corpus, we are 
constrained to hold that where the record; 
certified to by the magistrate, affirmatively 
shows what we have stated the record in this 
case discloses, and there Is no attack upon the 
truthfulness of the facts recited in the rec-
ord, the court Is powerless to go behind the 
judgment of the magistrate. If, however, the 
accused should allege and offer to prove that 
the magistrate did not In fact hear any evl 
dence in support of the charge, and the ac-
cused did not, with the consent of the state, 
waive an examination, and that the record 
showing the proceedings of the magistrate la 
false, then the court or judge, on habeas cor-
pus proceeding, should hear the evidence In 
that regard; and, If he finds that there was 
no preliminary examination or hearing by 
the magistrate, the accused should be dis-
charged. 
The order or judgment of the district court 
discharging the respondent therefore should 
be, and accordingly Is, reversed. 
McCARTY, C. J., and STRAUP, J., concur. 
JONES v- BLYTHE. 
(Supreme Court of Utah. Jan. 30, 1908.) 
1. ANnr-Axs— RUNNING AT LABGE — FENC* 
LAWS. 
Though under Rev. St. 1S98, § 20, provid-
ing that if sheep, etc., shall trespass on the 
premises of any person, except where such prem-
ises are not inclosed by a lawful fence in coun-
ties in which a fence is required by law, the 
party aggrieved may recover damages by action 
or by distraining1, as therein provided, an owner 
of sheep is not liable for damages resulting from 
an unintentional trespass on uuinclosed lands in 
a county in which a fence law is in force, yet 
he is liable where he intentionally drives ni? 
sheep on sach land.
 <A 
2. SAME—TRESPASSING ANIMALS — EVIDENCE 
—SfFFtClENCY. 
Exidence in an action for damages caused 
by sheep trespassing on premises held to show 
that the owner of the sheep, after bein? notified 
to keep them off the premises, willfully drove 
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them thceon and kept them there till they had 
eaten and destroyed much of the grass.* 
Appeal from District Court, Box Elder 
County; W. W. Maughan, Judge. 
Action by William Jones against John 
Blythe. Judgment for plaintiff, and defend-
ant appeals. Affirmed. 
Maginnls & Corn, tor appellant. J. D. 
Call, for respondent. 
McCARTY, J. This Is an appeal by the 
defendant from a judgment rendered In the 
district court of Box Elder county In favor 
of plaintiff for damages alleged to have been 
caused by defendant's sheep trespassing up-
on and eating off and destroying the grass 
and herbage upon certain lands of plaintiff 
situated in the northwestern part of Box 
BUler county, this state. The land is de-
scribed In the complaint as follows: "All of 
sections 29. 30, 31, and 32, township 14 N., 
of range 17 W„ Salt Lake Meridian"—and 
Is situated in what is known as "Cotton 
Thomas Basin." This basin has an area of 
about 25 or CO square miles, and is surround-
ed by mountains. At the time of the alleged 
trespass the land was partly Inclosed by a 
fence, which extended along the eastern and 
northern boundary thereof. A few rods 
south of the southern boundary there was a 
line of fence posts extending east and west 
along the south side of the premises. There 
was no fence along the western line or bound-
ary of the land. The premises were covered 
with different kinds of grass, brush, and 
herbage, upon which cattle and other ani-
mals fed and browsed. This land was used 
by plaintiff for grazing purposes, and during 
the summer season of each year he pastured 
thereon several hundred head of cattle. The 
complaint contains two causes of action. In 
the first cause of action It Is alleged that the 
damage was cauced between the 1st day of 
June and the 11th day of July, 190ft; and 
In the second cause of action It Is alleged 
that the trespass complained of was com-
mitted between the 1st day of June and the 
15th day of July, 1905. The particular acts 
of trespass relied on for recovery In the first 
cause of action are alleged In the complaint 
as follows: "That at divers times and upon 
each and every day between the dates here-
in alleged, the defendant, his agents, and 
employes, willfully trespassed upon said land 
by driving In and upon said land a large 
number of sheep, to wit, about 6.000 head, 
and maintained camps and sheep beds, and 
herded said sheep thereon for and durlrg all I 
of «afd period of time, * * * and fcs a 
result thereof the said sheep ate, browsed, 
killed, and "destroyed the grass, verdure, un-
derbrush, and a large number of small treos 
growing on said land." It Is further alleged 
that "plaintiff warned said defendant against 
driving and herding his said sheep upon said 
real estate, or permitting them to go thereon, 
•Buford T. Houtz, f Utah. 691, 18 Pac. 633. • I 
I and that defendant has threatened and still 
threatens to and will use force and violence 
against plaintiff if he attempts to keep said 
sheep from said premises." The allegations 
describing the alleged trespass are substan-
tially the same In both causes of action. De-
fendant answered, and specifically denied 
each and every material allegation of the 
complaint, and as a further defense pleaded 
an ordinance entitled "An ordinance defining 
a lawful fence In Box Elder county, state of 
Utah," which ordinance, the record shows, 
was duly and regularly passed by the board 
I of county commissioners ot Box Elder coun-
ty, and was at the time of the alleged tres-
pass In full force and effect 
The evidence, without conflict, shows that 
plaintiff, long prior to the alleged trespass, 
notified defendant to keep off the land In 
question, and not to herd or bed his sheep 
thereon. On this point defendant testlQed 
In part as follows: "I remember a conversa-
tion with Mr. Jones rpiaintiff and respond-
ent herein]. It was about five or six years ago. 
He came and told me the sheep were on his 
land, and wanted me to keep them off. 
I • * • He asked me If I would keep them 
off. I said, 'No;' that I would not; that he 
was trying to control too much country; that 
I did not believe he could take up the land 
in the shape he said he was doing.* And 
again the defendant testified: "At the time 
charged that my sheep were upon this land 
I. had no means of knowing where the sections 
were, except by the posts and what fencing 
there was there." That the trespass was 
willful and intentional is shown by the tes-
timony of defendant's witness R. C. Reid, 
who testified in part as follows: "I have 
been Mr. BIyrbe's (defendant's) foreman for 
two years. Mr. Rice, Mr. Bronson, and Jess 
Jones came to the camp and asked me If I 
Intended to run on those four sections of 
Jones'. * * * I told them that I Intended 
to run upon the basin there. They asked me 
if I did not know what Jones claimed, and 
I said I knew he claimed Inside of the posts, 
and that I was going to run in there, leaving 
a place for his horses. • • • Mr. Blythe 
told me to run in the basin there; • • * 
that he didn't think Jones had any land In 
there; and that he intended to feed In there." 
On cross-examination the witness stated that 
he was on the four sections of land in ques-
tion with defendant's sheep in June, July, and 
August of 1905; that on one occasion two 
camps or beds were maintained there contin-
uously for six days; and that the sheep could 
"go over in two days and take aif the feed 
off pretty close." To the question, "You went 
on Intentionally, did you?" he answered, "I 
undoubtedly did, because I told the men to 
let the sheep feed up through there." As to 
the effect the hording and bedding of the 
sheep on the premises bad on the grass and 
other vegetation growing thereon, Mr. Rice, 
who had charge of plaintiffs cattle and the 
land in question at the time of the trespasses 
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as a saddle bor.-e, nnd liked the looks of a 
saddle horse with split ears; that, although 
he had been the owner of horses before, this 
was the first time that he had ever slit th* 
ears of a horse; that he bad always under-
stood that when a horse's ears were split It 
was to signify that the animal was mean or 
vicious; and that he bad never heard of such 
a thing being done for the purpose of identi-
fying an animal, or as a mark of ownership. 
There was evidence that the defendant had 
admitted that at the time he slit the ears of 
the animal he knew that it belonged to 
Thomas Beasore. It was admitted that the 
defendant branded the colt and slit its ears, 
and afterwards burned out the brand and 
turned the colt loose. The testimony was 
without conflict to the effect that it has been 
a custom for many years to split the ears of 
vicious or unmanageable horses, that a spilt 
in a horse's ear was intended to signify that 
the horse was vicious, and that such splits 
are never used as marks of ownership. 
The foregoing Is substantially all the evi-
dence shown by the record'. /The defendant 
acknowledging that be slit the ears of the 
colt, and there being evidence sufficient to 
sustain a finding by the jury that at the 
time he so did he knew that the animal be-
longed to and was the property of Thomas 
Beasore, the question remained as to wheth-
er the slitting was done for the purpose of 
preventing identification of the animal by 
Boasore. Upon this question we cannot say 
that the finding of the jury is not sustained 
by the evidence. Where some particular 1D-
tent is a necessary element to constitute an 
act a crime, such intent may be sufficiently 
shown by the circumstances surrounding the 
commission of the act. Here, in support of 
the verdict, it must be assumed that the de-
fendant knew that the colt was the property 
of Beasore, and that he did not think.it was 
an estray.. Under these circumstances he, 
having taken the animal from the range 
where it was grazing, placed a brand upon it 
and slit its ears. The evidence as to the 
placing of the brand on the animal was, of 
course, material and competent upon the 
question as to what the intention of the de-
fendant was In the slitting of the ears. 
Both things were done by the defendant at 
the same time, and apparently, despite de-
fondant's statement to the contrary, for the 
same purpose. The nature of the act, the 
thus double marking of the animal by brand 
aud mark, and the circumstances attending 
the doing thereof. Including statements made 
hj" defendant which the jury found to be un-
true, were sufficient to sustain the finding 
that the slitting was done for the purpose of 
preventing identification of the animal. 
That it might reasonably assist in accom-
plishing that purpose is very <lear, even if 
such slits are not ordinarily used as marks 
of ownership, and are generally used simply 
to indicate a vicious animal. The statement 
of the defendant as to his reason for thus 
r marking the animal was, of course, not con-
clusive upon the jury. The most that can be 
said for defendant is that there was a con-
flict In the evidence as to the intent with 
which the act was done, and the well-settled 
j rule that the appellate court will not, under 
such circumstances, disturb the finding of the 
Jury, prohibits us from interfering therewith. 
The case of Fossett v. State, 11 Tex. App. 
40, 45, relied on by defendant, fully recog-
nizes the rule that "the surrounding facts— 
the facts and circumstances which hover 
around and give character to the act"—are 
to be taken into consideration in determining 
as to the intent with which such an act as is 
! here Involved Is done. 
I 3. Complaint Is made that the court re-
fused to give certain instructions requested 
by the defendant We have examined these 
requested instructions, and find no error la 
the action of the court. The,court did in-
struct the Jury that before they could convict 
the defendant, they must be convinced by the 
evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, that the 
I slitting of the horse's ears was such a mark-
| ing of an animal as might prevent the iden-
tification thereof by the true owner; and this 
was certainly as liberal an Instruction in re-
I gard to the character of the mark as the de-
! fendant was entitled to. As has been said 
| before, it Is the placing of any mark upon the 
| animal, with the intent thereby to prevent 
identification by the owner, that is de-
; nounced by the statute here involved 
i Whether the mark adopted by the offendei 
) for that purpose is such that it will accom-
I plish the result desired is not material. 
I What the statute really makes an offense l& 
' an attempt to prevent the identification ol 
! the animal by the true owner, by the placing 
of a mark thereon. As in the case of an at 
tempt to commit a crime, it is not essential 
' that the means used should In fact be capa 
1
 ble of accomplishing the result designed 
; The jury were very fully instructed that tbej 
j could not convict the defendant unless thej 
| were satisfied beyond a reasonable doubt thai 
! the defendant slit the animal's ears for tb< 
!' purpose of preventing its identification bj 
the true owner. 
The judgment and order are affirmed. 
We concur: SHAW, J. ; VAN DYKE, J. 
MAZOR r. SPRINGER et ai. (S. P. 8,054.) 
(Supreme Court of California, Oct 8, 1904.) 
N E W TRIA.L—NEWLY OISCOVERED EVIDENCE—* 
TIME OF DISCOVEBT. 
1. In an action against two defendants tor 
work and labor, one defendant admitted that the 
work was performed at his request, and plain-
tiff and another witness testified that the other 
defendant also requested the performance of the 
work. On motion for a new trial on the ground 
of newly discovered evidence it was claimed 
that the defendant last mentioned was not at 
the pface where this request was claimed to 
have been made on the date at which it *'** 
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claimed to have been made; but no witnesses 
other than those present at the trial were men-
tioned as able to testify to thia effect No ex-
cuse for not calling these witnesses was pro-
duced, except the statement in the affidavit ol 
the defendant who requested the services that 
the fact of the other defendant's absence at the 
time of the alleged Interview had not occurred 
to defendants until after the trial. Held, that 
as the new evidence would not affect the lia-
bility of affiant and as he was not qualified to 
apeak for the other defendant, a new trial was 
properly refused. 
Department 1. Appeal from Superior 
Court, Santa Clara County; M. H. Hyland, 
Judge. 
Action by Stanislaus Mazor against Mary 
Springer and another. From a judgment for 
plaintiff, and from an order denying a motion 
'or a new trial, defendants appeal. Affirmed. 
J. H. Campbell, for appellants. B. A. Her-
rlngton, tor respondent 
SHAW, J. This is an action to recover 
wages for labor performed. Defendants ap-
peal from the Judgment, and from an order 
denying their motion for a new tr ial 
There was sufficient evidence to prove the 
allegation that the plaintiff performed the 
work in question at the request of the defend-
ant Mary Springer. The plaintiff testifies 
positively to that effect, and he was corrob-
orated by the witness Gil man. The answer 
does not deny the request so far as the de-
fendant Sage Is concerned. The plaintiff also 
testified, In effect, that the agreement was 
that he was to receive $15 for the first month 
and $25 per month thereafter, and that he 
forked the entire time for which he Claims, 
except 17 days. This was sufficient to sup-
port the verdict We cannot say, from the 
Evidence, that the jury did not deduct the 
wages for the time be was absent, nor can 
we disturb the verdict, where the evidence 
i» conflicting, although the preponderance 
inay now seem to be for the defendants. 
£ T h e court did not err In denying the motion 
«>r a new trial on the ground of surprise at 
the testimony of Gllman concerning the con-
t a c t made in his presence between the plain-
tiff and the defendant Springer, and of the 
discovery of new evidence relating thereto. 
Th« new evidence was to the effect that on 
•he afternoon on which Gilman said the con-
versation took place at the bouse of Mary 
Springer she was "many miles distant*' from 
*be house. It Is not alleged that there was 
a n 7 witness, other than those present at the 
trial, by whom her absence at that time 
could have been proven; nor Is her where-
abouts at that time stated. The only excuse 
*°r not calling the witnesses present at the 
Wal to testify to her absence was that con-
tacted in the affidavit of the defendant Sage, 
*hat the "fact of the absence of Mary Sprin-
ger from the said Springer farm did not oe-
^ to their (defendants') minds until several 
days after the trial was concluded." Her ab-
sence, if proven, would not nSect the }iablh 
" * of Sage, who admits making the request 
He was not qualified to speak concerning the 
mind and memory of Mrs. Springer, and she 
made no affidavit Under these circumstan-
ces the court did not abase its dlscretlazi'ln 
refusing a new trial upon these grounds. 
The Judgment and the order denying the 
defendants' motion for a new trial are affirm-
ed. 
We concur: 
DYKE, J. ANGELLOTTl, J.; VAN 
In re CLARK. 
(Supreme Court of Utah, $OT. 16, 1904.) 
H A B E A S COBPUS—COHVICTION—REVIEW. 
1. Where relator was convicted and sentenced 
for grand larceny by a court of competent juris-
diction, be was not entitled to a writ of habeas 
corpus for the purpose of reviewing a judgment 
based on such conviction. 
Appeal from District Court, Salt I>ake 
County; C. W. Morse, Judge. 
Application of J. H. Clark for a writ of 
habeas corpus to review a conviction of 
grand larceny. Prom an order denying the 
writ, relator appeals. Affirmed. 
D. S. Truman, for appellant M. A. Bree-
den, Arty. Gen., and W. R, White, Dep. Atty. 
Gen., for the State. 
B A SKIN, C. J. The petitioner appeals to 
this court from an order of the district court 
denying his application for a writ of habeas 
corpus. It appears from the allegations of 
the petitioner that he and Z. Graham and 
Albert Clark were Jointly charged by infor-
mation with the crime of larceny, and in a 
separate count they were also jointly char-
ged with the crime of receiving stolen prop-
erty, knowing the same to have been stolen; 
that the property alleged in the first count 
of the information to have been stolen was 
the same as that alleged in the second count 
as having been received, and was the per-
sonal property of one C. F. Johnson. The 
said Graham and the petitioner were grant-
ed separate trials, and each found guilty of 
grand larceny and sentenced to imprison-
ment in the penitentiary, and at present are 
serving that sentence. Afterwards the said 
Albert Clark was, upon a separate trial, 
found guilty of the crime charged In the sec-
ond count of the information, and sentenced 
to imprisonment in the county jail and to 
pay a fine of $250. The petitioner appealed 
from the judgment against him, and it was 
affirmed by this court In State v. Clark, 74 
Pac. 119. ^ 
. Habeas corpus cannot operate as an ap-
peal or writ of error. It la well settled that 
"the examination into the imprisonment of 
a party under the sentence or order of a 
court is to extend only to the jurisdiction 
and authority to render the judgment, and 
f 1. Ex parte Hays. 47 Pac. fa2 IS Utah. 77. 
See Habeas Corpus, vol. 25, Cent. Dig. -| i. 
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where the custody Is In pursuance of the or-
der or judgment of a court of competent jur -
isdiction, such order is final until It is re-
versed, and precludes inquiry on the wri t ." 
9 Enc. PI. & Pr . 10G1, and cases there cited. 
In Ex par te Hays. 15 Utah, 77, 47 Pac. 612, 
this court. In an opinion delivered by Mr. 
Justice Bartch, held tha t "in a criminal case, 
where the district court has jurisdiction of 
the person and cause, its judgment is bind-
ing on oil the world, until reversed in a reg-
ular way by appeal. A fortiori is this so 
after the judgment has been affirmed by the 
Supreme Court. Such a judgment is final, 
and pronounces the law of the case; and the 
Supreme Court will not, upon habeas corpus, 
look beyond it, and review the proceedings 
upon which the Judgment was pronounced." 
In the case of State v. Clark, supra, the dis-
trict court had jurisdiction-'of the petitioner 
and the subject-matter of the Information 
upon which he was convicted and sentenced. 
The writ of habeas corpus applied for by the 
petitioner was therefore properly denied. 
The order denying the writ is affirmed. 
BAUTCH and McCARTY, JJ . , concur. 
ENGLISH v. OPENSHAW. 
(Supreme Court of Utah. Nov. 11, 1904.) 
QUIETING TITLE—AD VERSE POSSESSION—BUB-
DEN OF PBOOF—EVIDENCE—DEEDS—LETTERS. 
1. Where a warranty deed in favor of defend-
ant was regular on its face, it was admissible 
in an action to quiet title without evidence be-
ing first introduced showing possession there-
under. 
2. Evidence reviewed, and held insufficient to 
establish that plaintiff's possession of certain 
land in controversy was adverse to defendant. 
3. Under Rev. St. $ 2861, providing that in 
every action for the recovery of real property 
or the possession thereof the person establishing 
a legal title shall be presumed to have been 
f jossessed thereof within the time required by aw, etc., the burden is on one, olniminfl title 
by adverse possession to prove the same, and 
not on the defendant to establish that he was 
in possession under his legal title for the statu-
tory period. 
4. Where, in an action to quiet title, plaintiff 
claimed title by adverse possession, a letter writ-
ten by her to defendant, in which plaintiff rec-
ognized his interest in the land, was admissible. 
Appeal from District Court, Salt Lake 
County; W. C. Hall, Judge. 
Action by Eliza English against Joseph H. 
Openshaw. From a judgment in favor of 
defendant, plaintiff appeals. Affirmed. 
This action was brought against the de-
fendant to quiet plaintiff's title to certain 
real estate si tuate in Salt Lake City. The 
complaint alleged ownership and possession 
for many years in the plaintiff, and adverse 
claim without right in the defendant. The 
defendant answered, denying plaintiff's pos-
% 3. Funk v. Anderson, 22 Utah. 238, 61 Pac. 1006; 
Center Creek Irrigation Co. v. Lindsay, 21 Ulab, 392, 
60 Pac. 559. Smith v. North Canyon Water Co., 16 
Utah, 194, 62 Pac. 283. 
session, except as a co-tenant with himself, 
and alleged alfirmatively, by way of counter-
claim, that he .was the owner In fee of an 
undivided one-third interest in the property 
by virtue of a deed from Andrew English, 
and demanded judgment accordingly. By 
way of reply plaintiff denied the tenancy in 
common and the execution and delivery of 
the deed from Andrew English to the defend-
ant, and further alleged that , if such deed 
was ever executed, it was intended as a 
mortgage to secure money advanced by the 
defendant to the two sous of Andrew Eng-
lish, who were also grantees in the deed. 
The plaintiff also pleaded the s ta tu te of lim-
itations. From the evidence i t appears t ha t 
the plaintiff is a daughter of Andrew and 
Nancy English, husband and wife; t h a t the 
defendant was married to plaintiff's sister, 
who died before thi9 litigation was com-
menced; that the defendant and.George W. 
and Jesse R. English, two brothers of the 
plaintiff, in 1881 concluded to advance some 
money to buy a home for their father and 
mother, aud thereafter the two sons and the 
defendant jointly contributed $1,325, the 
amount for which the property in contro-
versy was purchased on August 2, 1881; tha t 
the defendant contributed $500 of the pur-
chase money and the sons the remainder; 
tha t , according to previous arrangement be-
tween the parties, the property was con-
veyed by warranty deed to Andrew English, 
who acted as agent for the contributors; 
t h a t in addition to bis contribution, the de-
fendant also purchased shingles and lumber, 
and the three contributors then repaired the 
house upon the premises; tha t it was un-
derstood between the part ies t ha t the pur-
chase was made to provide a home for the 
aged father and mother, who should occupy 
the premises as long as they lived, the de-
fendant insisting tha t so long as they occu-
pied the property they should pay the taxes 
thereon; tha t in September, 1881, the father, 
with bis family, entered into possession of 
the property, and continued so in possession 
until his death in March, 1892; tha t the 
plaintiff continued in possession with her 
mother until the latter 's death in June, 1903; 
, t h a t about 10 years previous to his death, on 
! September 26, 18S2, the grantee conveyed the 
j same property to George W. and Jesse R-
English and the defendant by warranty deed; 
t ha t by virtue of this last-mentioned deed, 
which was made a t the request of the gran-
tees therein, who had furnished the money 
for the purchase, the defendant claims an un-
divided one-third interest in the property; 
and tha t in 1895 the widow of Andrew Eng-
lish conveyed, by quitclaim deed, the same 
property to the plaintiff. I t also appears 
from the evidence tha t in June, 1894, the 
plaintiff, referring to the same property, 
wrote the defendant in par t as follows: 
"We know we can't do anything without 
your consent. Wha t do you think would be 
| best to do? Would you sell your interest 
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outright to us? If so, how much would you 
take? Or would you ra ther sign a mortgage 
and still hold your interest? I don't know 
what property is worth for there is none sold 
around us for a long time. If we bought 
your interest we would have to get the money 
on the place for you. We have a friend who 
would loan us the money provided all the 
part ies signed the mortgage." At the trial 
the court made findings in favor of the de-
fendant, and entered a decree adjudging the 
defendant to be the owner of an undivided 
one-third interest in the property and quiet-
ing his title thereto. This appeal is from 
the judgment. 
F rank H. Clark, for appellant. Suther-
land, Van Cott & Allison, Ben Johnson, and 
8. H. Lewis, for responden t 
Upon a s ta tement of the case, a s above, 
BARTOH, J., delivered the opinion of the 
court. • 
At the trial the defendant offered in evi-
dence the war ran ty deed dated September 
26, 1882, from Andrew English to George 
W. English, Jesse R. English, and the de-
fendant, conveying to the grantees the prop-
erty in controversy herein. To this offer the 
plaintiff objected upon the ground t h a t from 
September, 1881, until his death, in 1892, 
the grantee was in possession of the prem-
ises, and thereafter until the present time 
his heirs were in possession, and t h a t such 
being the case, even if he made the deed, 
his title could not be disturbed by i t This 
objection was overruled, and the action of 
the court has been assigned as error. 
• The appellant insists t h a t the court erred 
In admitt ing the deed in evidence without 
first requiring a showing of possession by 
the defendant under i t especially as actual 
and adverse possession had been shown in 
plaintiff's ancestors and herself for a period 
beyond tbe t ime prescribed in the s tatute of 
limitations. Under the facts and circum-
stances disclosed by the record this conten-
tion is not well taken. The first point made 
refers simply to the oAier of proof, a matter 
which was within the sound discretion of 
the court; and no abuse of discretion has 
been shown. Tha t a war ran ty deed regular 
upon its face cannot be admitted in evidence 
without first showing possession under i t 
to not the law. Possession may be shown 
afterwards, a s w a s done in this case. Re-
ferring to the second point made—the ad-
verse possession of plaintiff and ancestors 
and the bar of the s ta tu te—the proof seems 
wholly inadequate to render the bar com-
plete. The circumstances under which the 
property was purchased, the purpose for 
Jfhich and the manner in which tbe.purchase 
*»8 made, the homeless and financial con-
at ion of plaintiff's parents in their old days, 
the understanding between the contributors 
?f the purchase money that the parents 
laould enjoy the proDertv as a home -as Ion* 
as they lived, the fact tha t they did so en-
joy i t the evidence tending to show tha t the 
father acted as agent for the contributor* 
and received the deed to tbe property as 
such, the conveyance by him to tbe con-
tributors a year after he had taken posses-
sion of the property, the recognition in writ-
ing by the plaintiff of the defendant 's inter-
est in the property after the death of the 
grantor who executed the deed in contro-
versy, the deed itself—all these things 
strongly tend to show tha t the possession 
of the plaintiff and her ancestors, as to the 
interest of the defendant in the property, 
wag permissive, and not hostile. The proof 
fails to show that there was ever any overt 
act, or anything said or done by those in 
actual possession, tha t could be construed 
as a notice to the defendant tha t they were 
claiming or holding possession adversely to 
him. The mere fact tha t the grantor and 
his family remained in possession after he 
executed the deed to the defendaut and oth-
ers does not render their possession ad-
verse to the grantees. By his deed the gran-
tor passed the legal title to a one-third in-
terest in the property to the defendant a s 
grantee, and his covenants in the deed raised 
the presumption tha t his occupation of the 
property thereafter was under and in sub-
ordination to the legal title. To overthrow 
this presumption, the par ty claiming adverse-
ly bad the burden to establish the f a c t by 
competent evidence, tha t an adverse posses-
sion continued for the s ta tutory period of 
limitation. This is so under our s ta tu te . 
Section 2861, Rev. S t The same principle 
has been announced by this cour t Funk v. 
Anderson, 22 Utah, 238, 61 Pac. 1006; Cen-
ter Creek Irr. Co. v. Lindsay, 21 Utah, 192, 
60 Pac. 559; Smith v. North Canyon Wate r 
Co., 16 Utah, 194, 52 Pac. 283. And such is 
the law in other jurisdictions. Schwallback 
v. O., M. & St. P. R. Co., 69 Wis. 292, 34 N. 
W. 128, 2 Am. S t Rep. 740; McNeil v. Jor-
dan, 28 Kan. 7; Dawson v. Bank, 15 Mich. 
489; Jeffery v. Hursb, 45 Mich. 59, 7 N. W. 
221; Catlin v. Decker, 38 Conn. 202; Whit-
ing v. Edmunds, 94 N. Y. 309. The proof in 
this case is wholly inadequate to establish 
title by adverse possession. We are of the 
opinion that the deed was properly admitted 
in evidence; tha t it was not a mortgage, but 
an absolute conveyance; and that the plea 
of adverse possession and of the bar by vir-
tue of the s ta tute of limitations cannot avail 
the appel lant 
It is also contended by the appellant t h a t 
the court erred in admitt ing in evidence the 
portion of the letter written by the plaintiff 
to the defendant in June, 1894, but we per-
ceive nothing to warrant this contention. 
The writing shows a recognition of the in-
terest of the defendant in the property by 
the person who is now claiming to have 
held adverse possession at the very time she 
wrote the letter. The foundation for its 
admission was nronerlv Inirl Tt wna fhora. 
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ty, and his unrestricted right of disposition, 
which; he contended, a corporation did not 
possess.' These vjews, however, were after-
wards overruled, in the case of Arthur v. 
Bank, supra, by the high court of errors and 
appeals, and the doctrine settled in that state 
that a corporation may prefer one creditor 
over another. The Washington cases appear 
to sustain appellant's contention that an in-
solvent corporation, even in the absence of 
statutory provision on the subject, cannot 
prefer creditors, and that its assets are a 
trust fund for the equal benefit of its cred-
itors; but they are so manifestly against the 
weight of authority that we must decline to 
follow them. Other cases in other states 
have denied preferences when made for the 
benefit of officers or agents of the corpora-
tion, to give them, by reason of their posi-
tions, an advantage over creditors, and where, 
by statutory enactment, preferences were 
prohibited; but such cases cannot be con-
sidered as authority in this case, where the 
assignment was made under no such objec-
tion or prohibition. With these cases must 
be classed that of the Noble Mercantile Co. 
v. ML Pleasant Equitable Co-operative Inst., 
12 Utah, 213, 42 Pac. 809, where the court 
properly held that the directors of an insol-
vent corporation, which had abandoned the 
objects for which it was created, could not 
prefer themselves, by voluntary deed of as-
signment, over other creditors, whose claims 
were equally meritorious. While the same 
question here discussed was there argued by 
counsel, the court expressly declined to pass 
upon it, because it was not necessary to a 
decision in that case. Such cases are not in 
point here. 
Upon careful examination of adjudged 
cases, as well as upon principle and analo-
gy, and in the absence of insolvent laws and 
statutory restrictions, we feel ourselves 
bound to hold that a corporation, in this 
state, has the same power to prefer creditors, 
by deed of assignment or otherwise, as a pri-
vate debtor has, so long as its assets have 
not been taken into possession by a court of 
equity, in a proper proceeding, at the in-
stance of a proper party. The rule in the 
case of a corporation, the same as in that of 
an individual, is impregnable, except by leg-
islative enactmenL This also appears to be 
in harmony with the English rule, for there 
the power of a corporation to prefer creditors 
seems to be fully established, except as re-
stricted by statute. In re Wincham Ship 
Building, Boiler & Salt Co., 9 Ch. Div. 322; 
Willmott v. Celluloid Co., 34 Ch. Div. 147. 
While we are not disposed to enlarge the rule 
so as to include cases not strictly within its 
terms, yet where it is applicable, as in the 
case at bar, it must be regarded and upheld 
as a law of this state no longer open to ques-
tion. Whelher, if we were free from the au-
thority of judicial decisions, we would enter-
tain different views from those heroin ex-
pressed, is now a matter of no concern. It 
Is but for us to declare what is the law, and, 
if such law is not in consonance with reason 
and justice, it is within the power of the 
legislature to make it s o / A court ought 
not, for light reasons, to assume to declare 
that not to be the law which has been ac-
cepted and treated as the law, by courts as 
well as the populace, for a long period of 
time,—not even though such court may feel 
impelled to inveigh against the rule as not 
founded in the soundest reason and policy. 
Especially is this so when such law has be-
come the rule of practice in the business 
world, and when the business interests of the 
state have grown up under IL 
The contention of the appellant that the as-
signment dissolved the corporation is not ten-
able. The law is well settled that a mere 
transfer of the corporate property of a cor-
poration to a trustee, for the purpose of pay-
ing its debts, does not per se work a dissolu-
tion, and there Is nothing in the deed of as-
signment in this case which would produce 
such a result. Manufactory v. Langdon, 24 
Pick. 49; Town v. Bank, 2 Doug. 530; Bruf-
fett v. Railroad Co., 25 111. 310; Pyles T. Fur-
niture Co. (W. Va.) 2 S. E. 909, 921; Reich-
wald v. Hotel Co., 10G 111. 439; B u e l l V 
Buckingham, 16 Iowa, 284. 
We do not deem it necessary to discuss any 
other question presented in this case. The 
judgment of the court below is affirmed. 
MINER, J., concurs. ZANE, C. J.,*concurs 
in the affirmance of the judgment appealed 
from, but not in all the propositions of law 
held in the opinion. 
(15 Utah, 77) 
Ex parte HAYS. 
(Supreme Court of Utah. Jan. 15, 1897.) 
HABEAS COKPOS—JURISDICTION—CIUMIKTAX LAW— 
JUDGMENT—VALIDITT. 
1. Where a prisoner convicted of the crime 
of murder is in the custody of the proper officer, 
who detains him under a warrant, fair and reg-
ular on its face, issued after conviction and judgment by a court of record, which had juris-
diction of the person and subject-matter, he 
will not be discharged on habeas corpus.* 
2. In a criminal case, where the district court 
has jurisdiction of the person and cause, it* judgment is binding on all the world, until re-
versed in a regular way by appeal. A fortiori 
is this so after the judgment has been affirmed 
by the supreme court. Such a judgment is 
final, and pronounces the law of the case; and 
the supreme court will not, upon habeas corpus, 
look beyond it, and review the proceedings up-
on which the judgment was pronounced. 
3. A prisoner's detention under a judgment, 
the commitment being regular on its face, can-
not be unlawful unless the judgment is an ab-
solute nullity, and irregularities and mere er-
rors in proceedings will not render it an abso-
lute nullity, although they may render it void-
able; and, when voidable only, it is conclusive-, 
ly presumed to be valid until reversed, and it 
cannot be reversed by habeas corpus. 
4. Where a case has been tried in a district--
court, and the judgment rendered at the trial 
has been affirmed by the supreme court, such 
trial and judgment will be presumed to be legal. 
Utah.) JEX PARI 
and cannot be questioned upon habeas corpus 
for anything except a want of jurisdiction, 
shown^upon the face of the record or proceed-
ings, as ruled upon in the supreme court. 
^Syllabus by the Court.) 
Application by Harry Hays for a writ of 
habeas corpus. Denied. 
Powers, Straup & Llppinan, for petitioner. 
A. C. Bishop, Atty. Gen., and F. B. Stephens, 
for respondent. 
BARTCH, J. The petitioner in this case 
on the 1st day of April, 1896, was convicted 
of the crime of murder in the first degree, 
and thereafter judgment of death by bang* 
ing was pronounced against him; and since 
then he has been in the custody of the sheriff 
of Utah county, who justifies his detention 
of the petitioner by virtue of the death war-
rant and commitment issued to him by the 
district court of said county. The warrant 
and commitment, a copy of which is attach-
ed to the petition, appear to be regular and 
In proper form. He complains that the sen-
tence or judgment by virtue of which he is 
in confinement is void, because, as he main-
tains, his trial was not conducted in pursu-
ance of law, and that, therefore, his deten-
tion Is illegal. The contention of the peti-
tioner is that the jurors who sat in the trial 
of the case were not drawn pursuant to any 
valid law of the state; that the act under 
which they were drawn to serve as jurors 
was unconstitutional, and was repealed by a 
later law, .which took effect prior to the com-
mencement of the trial; and that as jurors 
who sat in the trial of the case were sum-
moned under the repealed law, and as the 
trial was conducted under the later law, an 
error which is fatal to the judgment and sen-
tence was committed. This case was appeal-
ed to this court, but none of these points 
were presented in that appeal, and the judg-
ment was affirmed. 46 Pac. 752. 
The important and decisive question, which 
confronts us at the outset, is, can this court, 
In a collateral proceeding by habeas corpus, 
look beyond the judgment, and determine 
questions which arose during the trial of the 
case, and which, if they had been presented 
In the record on appeal, might have resulted 
in a reversal of the judgment? We think 
not The warrant appears rair and regular 
on Its face, and that the district court In 
which the case was tried had jurisdiction of 
the person and subject-matter is not, and 
cannot be successfully, questioned. This be-
ing so, and that court being a court of rec-
ord, its judgment is binding upon all the 
world until reversed in a regular way by ap-
peal. A fortiori Is this so after the judg-
ment has been affirmed by this court. Such 
a judgment is final, and pronounces the law 
of the case. With what propriety, then, can 
this court, by means of habeas corpus, sub-
stantially reverse a judgment which the law 
has placed be'yond our control? The prison-
er's detention under the judgment, the eom-
E-HAYS. 613 
mitment being regular on its face, cannot be 
unlawful unless that judgment is absolutely 
null and void; and it cannot be null and 
void, when the court had general jurisdiction 
of the person and subject-matter, even 
though it may have erred in its proceedings, 
during the trial. Irregularities and mere er-
rors in proceedings will not render a judg-
ment an absolute nullity, although they may 
render It voidable, and when voidable only 
it is conclusively presumed to be valid until 
reversed, and it cannot be reversed by ha-
beas corpus, because habeas corpus does not 
authorize the exercise of appellate jurisdic-
tion; and "no inquiry," says Chancellor Kent, 
"is to be made into the legality of any pro-
cess, judgment, or decree, • * * where 
the party is detained under the final decree 
or judgment of a' competent court" 2 Kent, 
Comm. 30. The district court being a court 
of general jurisdictionr the offense charged 
against the prisoner was cognizable in that 
court, and it was competent to inflict the pun-
ishment provided by law for the offense of 
which the prisoner was convicted; and its 
judgment, not being reversed, has all the ob-
ligation which the judgment of any tribunal 
can have. 
If the judgment be voidable only, and 
hence obligatory, because not reversed, we 
cannot look beyond it on habeas corpus. If 
it be absolutely void, the officer who de-
tains the prisoner and obeys the judgment is 
guilty of false imprisonment Would coun-
sel for the prisoner in this case undertake to 
maintain the position that the officer is guilty 
of false Imprisonment? Clearly, the deten-
tion is authorized by the judgment and war-
rant, and the imprisonment Is not illegal. 
"The habeas corpus is undoubtedly an im-
mediate remedy for every illegal imprison-
ment But no imprisonment is illegal where 
the process is a justification of the officer; 
and process, whether by writ or warrant! is 
legal whenever it is not defective in the 
frame of it, and has issued, in the ordinary 
course of justice, from a court or magistrate 
having jurisdiction of the subject-matter, 
though there have been error in the proceed-
ings previous to the issaing of i t" Com. v. 
Lecky, 1 Watts, 66. In Ex parte Watkins, 3 
P e t 193, the petitioner was imprisoned by 
virtue of a judgment of a circuit court of 
the United States. The motion to discharge 
was founded on the aDegation that the in-
dictment charged no offense for which the 
prisoner was punishable in that court and 
that consequently, the proceedings were 
coram non judice, and totally void. A copy 
of the indictment was annexed to the peti-
tion. The supreme court of the United 
States declined to look into the indictment 
to ascertain whether the circuit court hail 
misconstrued the law, maintaining that they 
had no power to look beyond the judgment 
in that case upon habeas corpus. Mr. Chief 
Justice Marshall, in the course of his opin-
ion, said: "An imprisonment under a judg-
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merit cannot be unlawful unless that judg-
ment be an absolute nullity; and it la not a 
nullity, if the court has general jurisdiction 
of the subject, although It should be er-
roneous." In the case of In re Callieot, 8 
Blntchf. 89, Fed. Cas. No. 2,323, the peti-
tioner alleged that he was Imprisoned under 
a sentence of the circuit court of the United 
States, and charged that his Imprisonment 
was illegal, "for the reason that the law un-
der which such sentence was imposed had 
been changed and repealed before said sen-
tence was passed." The court refused to ex-
amiue the question thus presented, and de-
nied the motion for the wr i t So, in Ex 
parte Parks, 93 U. S. 18, Mr. Justice Brad-
ley, delivering the opinion of the court, said: 
"When a person Is convict or In execution by 
legal process issued by a court of competent 
jurisdiction, no relief can be had. Of course, 
a superior court will Interfere if the inferior 
court had exceeded its jurisdiction, or was 
not competent to act" So, in Ex parte Win-
ston, 9 Nev. 71, the court, by Mr. Justice 
Hawley, said: "On a habeas corpus the 
judgment of an Inferior court cannot be "dis-
regarded. We can only look at the record to 
see whether a judgment exists, and have no 
power to say whether it is right or wrong. 
It is conclusively presumed to be right until 
reversed; and, when the imprisonment Is 
under process valid on its face, It will be 
deemed prima facie legal, and, if the peti-
tioner fails to show a want of jurisdiction 
in the magistrate or court whence it em-
anated, his body must be remanded to cus-
tody." 2 Kent, Comm. pp. 29, 30; Church, 
Hab. Corp. { 363; Hurd, Hab. Corp. 8 333; 
Ex parte Gibson, 31 Cal. G19; Passmore Wil-
liamson's Case, 26 Pa. S t 9; Ex parte Sie-
bold, 100 U. S. 371; Ex parte Scwartz, 2 
Tex. App. 74; Ex parte Twohig, 13 Nev. 302; 
Com. v. Lecky, 26 Am. Dec. 37, 40; 9 Am. & 
Eng. Enc. Law, 224. 
If, in the case at bar, the jurors were not 
selected and summoned in pursuance of law, 
and the petitioner was not satisfied with 
those drawn, he was not without a remedy; 
for he could have interposed his objections 
by a challenge to the panel, as provided by 
statute. Comp. Laws Utah 1888, §S 5004, 
5009. The district court was. competent to 
determine whether or not the jurors had 
been erroneously selected. That court had 
undoubted power to determine all the ques-
tions of which the petitioner now complains, 
and if its determination as to any one of 
them was erroneous, or if it failed to rule 
on any one of them when it ought to have 
done so, the petitioner had an opportunity 
to bring the matter up in his record on ap-
peal. If he failed to bring up his whole 
case, It is his own misfortune. He cannot 
be allowed to bring up part of it, and, after 
this court has affirmed the judgment, have 
the balance considered upon habeas corpus. 
Whore a case has been tried in a district 
court, and the judgment rendered at the 
trial has been affirmed by the supreme court, 
such trial and judgment will be presumed 
to be legal, and cannot be questioned upon 
habeas corpus for anything except a want of 
jurisdiction, shown upon the face of the rec-
order proceedings, as ruled upon In this court. 
Daniels v. Towers, 79 Ga. 785, 7 S. E. 120. 
We are of the opinion that the officer In this 
case lawfully detained the prisoner la cus-
tody. Having reached this conclusion, It is 
unnecessary to determine whether or not the 
act In question is unconstitutional, or was.re-
pealed. The writ is denied, and the prisoner 
is remanded. 
ZANE, C. J., and MINER, J., concur. 
(30 Or. a o 
FIRST NAT. BANK OF PORTLAND T. 
LINN COUNTY NAT. BANK. 
(Supreme Court of Oregon. Jan. 18, 1897.) 
BANK RECEIVERS — DECLARATIONS — PRESENTMENT 
or CHECK—PRESUMPTIONS. 
1. Even if a receiver of a national bank is its 
agent, so that his admissions may be used 
against it, his declarations as to receipt by it 
of a draft prior to his appointment»and of which 
he had no personal knowledge, are*not admissi-
ble to charge it with negligence in reference 
thereto. 
2. In support of a judgment, an instrument 
alleged to be a sight draft, drawn by an individ-
ual on a bank, will be presumed to be an ordi-
nary bank check. 
3. The holder's laches in presenting a check 
for payment will not discharge the drawer if 
he had no funds in the bank applicable to its' 
payment. 
4. AH the evidence not being shown by the 
record, it cannot be held that the verdict wag 
not supported thereby. 
Appeal from circuit court, Linn county, 
George H. Burnett, Judge. 
Action by the First National Bank of Port : 
land against the Linn County National Banlti 
Judgment for defendant Plaintiff appeals. 
Affirmed. 
J. N. Teal, for appellant J. K. Weather-
ford, for respondent 
BEAN, J. This is an action to recover for 
a loss suffered by the plaintiff on account of 
an alleged negligent omission of duty on the 
part of the defendant The substance of thei 
complaint Is that on the 16th day of Juni^j 
1893, the plaintiff bank forwarded by mailj 
to the defendant bank, its regular agent and: 
correspondent at Albany, Or., for collection; 
and payment, a sight draft for $1,000, drawflj 
by one J. L. Cowan on the defendant bank^ 
In favor of Fleischner, Mayer & Co., and byj 
them indorsed to the plaintiff for deposit oBj 
account; that the draft was received by thfj 
defendant on the day it was mailed, but ro 
did not collect or pay the same, and ueglls] 
gently failed to notify the plaintiff of i t* 
noncollection or nonpayment, and no actiom 
was taken thereon until the 24th of Jun^j 
when the defendant having in the meantimel 
closed its doors, and passed into the hand^ 
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ot a national bank examiner, such examiner,
 { 
at the request of the plaintiff, presented the 
draft for payment, which, being refused, the 
draft was duly protested; that In the regular 
course of business notice of Its nonpayment j 
could and ought to have been communicated 
by the defendant to the plaintiff on June 
17th, and that then and thereafter until the I 
19th Cowan was possessed of ample prop-
erty out of which plaintiff could have enfor-
ced payment thereof if it had been notified 
that the same had not been paid; but that 
on the last-named date he became, and has 
ever since been, utterly Insolvent, and the 
plaintiff has wholly lost the sum of money 
for which the draft was drawn, to its dam-
age In the sum of $1,000. The defendant de-
nies the imputed negligence, and sets up In 
Its answer that the draft was not received 
by it until the 21th of June, and was imme-
diately protested for nonpayment, and plain-
tiff duly notified, and this presents the con-
trolling question In the case. The trial re-
sulting in favor of defendant, plaintiff ap-
peals. -
;tt As already suggested, the Important, and 
Indeed the only, question of fact in Issue on 
the trial was the date of the receipt of the 
draft by the defendant bank. As evidence 
tending to support the Issue on its part, the 
plaintiff offered a letter written by the re-
ceiver of the defendant bank to the plain-
t iffs attorneys on July 28, 1883, in which It 
fe stated that the draft in question was taki 
en out of the post office at Albany "by Ex-
aminer Jennings on his arrival, June 21st, 
-and not received by the bank before suspen-
i ion." The court refused to admit the letter 
in evidence, and this ruling is assigned as 
'error. The contention for the plaintiff, as 
jwe understand It, is that the receiver of a 
national bank Is the statutory agent of the 
bank, and that his admissions are competent 
Evidence against the association. Conceding 
£-but without deciding—this to be the law, 
jthe letter in question was clearly incompe-
tent It is at most but the narrative of a 
%ast event, and does not appear to have been 
fmade by the receiver as a part of some 
^transaction then pending within the scope of 
jtils authority. Whenever what an agent did 
Ht,admissible In evidence against his princl-
¥ « V it is competent to prove what he said 
Jabout the act while doing It, because his 
declarations or statements, made at the time, 
£&re part of the res gestae. It is for this rea-
s o n that they are admissible at all. As stat-
*NT by Mr. Story, the rule Is "that, where the 
pe t s of an agent will bind the principal, there 
£di representations, declarations, and admis-
£8ons respecting the subject-matter will also 
g lnd him, if made at the same time, and con-
r*tltuting a part of the res gestae." 1 Story, 
S^g. 134. The agent Is the representative of 
ghe principal in the transaction of business 
Snibraeed within his agency. Whatever, 
gherefore, be lawfully does in the transac-
t ion of that business, is the act of his princi-
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. pal; and his declarations respecting the sub-
ject-matter, if made at the same time and 
forming a part of the transaction, will also 
bind him. But when the right of the agent 
to act In a particular matter has ceased, or 
the declarations do not accompany the a.cty 
or are concerning a matter not within the 
scope of the agent's authority, the principal 
cannot be affected by them in any way. 1 
Greenl. Bv. f 113; Mecbein, Ag. 115; Ander-
son v. Railroad Co., 64 N. Y. 334; La Rue v. 
Elevator Co. (S. D.) 54 N. W. 808. Within 
this principle the declarations of the receiv-
er offered In evidence were clearly incompe-
tent They were not only made more than 
a month after the alleged receipt of the 
draft, but were in reference to a matter of 
which the receiver did not claim to have 
any personal knowledge, and which evident-
ly happened prior to his appointment So it 
seems to ns that under no view of this case 
was the letter admissible in evidence to 
charge the defendant with negligence. 
It Is also claimed that the court erred l a 
charging the jury that negligence of the de-
fendant bank in not making due present-
ment ot the draft would not discharge the 
drawer from liability if he had no funds in 
the bank applicable to its payment The 
form of the draft in question nowhere ap-
pears in the record, and therefore it must be 
assumed, In favor ot the judgment of the 
court below, that it was an ordinary bank 
check drawn by Cowan upon the defendant 
bank, and, considering it as such, there was 
no error In the Instruction. , 
The holder's laches In presenting a check for 
payment constitutes no defense In an action 
against the drawer unless he is damaged by 
the delay, and then only to the extent of his 
loss. A check purports to be made upon a de-
posit to meet it, and presupposes funds of the 
drawer in the hands of the drawee. But, if 
the drawer has no such funds at the time 
of drawing his check, or subsequently with-
draws them, he commits a fraud upon the 
payee, and can suffer no loss or damage 
from the holder's delay in respect to present-
ment or notice. In such case he is liable, 
and cannot insist upon a formal demand or 
notice of nonpayment 3 Rand. Com. Paper, 
§§ 1106, 1347; 2 Daniel, Neg. I n s t §f 15S7, 
1596. 
And, finally, It is claimed that the court 
erred in overruling plaintiffs motion for a 
new trial. Its counsel frankly concedes, 
however, that the ruling of. the trial court 
on a motion for a new trial based on the In-
sufficiency of the evidence, or some other 
question of fact, is not assignable error on 
appeal, but he seeks to make a distinction 
between the case stated and one where the 
motion is based upon the ground that the 
verdict is against law. He contends that 
from the undisputed facts and the Instruc-
tions of the court in the case at bar the 
plaintiff was entitled to a verdict, and that 
I the only remedy for the correction of the er-
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In re MAUOIIAN. 
(Supreme (JourCof Utah. June 29, 18S9.) 
HABEAS COUPUS—FORMER CONVICTION. 
A former conviction for unlawful cohabitation 
with a certain woman cannot be considered, on an 
application for habeas corpus to be discharged 
from imprisonment on conviction of adultery with 
the same woman, wuere it was not pleaded as a 
defense. 
On application for habeas corpus, 
Richards cfe Moylet for the petitioner. 
Ogden Biles, contra. 
ANDERSON, J. The petitioner alleges that 
he is a prisoner in the custody of Frank H. 
Dyer, United States marshal for the terri-
tory of Utah, in the penitentiary of said ter-
ritory for a criminal offense against the laws 
of the United States, to-wit, adultery; that 
such confinement is by virtue of a judgment, 
warrant, and the proceedings of record, in-
cluding three indictments against him, hia 
arraignment thereon, and pleas thereto, re-
spectively, and convictions thereon upon his 
pleas of guilty thereto. A copy of the record 
is in each case attached to the petition. He 
alleges that under the judgment in two ot the 
cases he has been imprisoned in the peniten-
tiary for more than six months, and has paid 
the fines and costs adjudged against him 
therein; that he is now imprisoned under the 
other one of the judgments rendered against 
him, and that such imprisonment is illegal, 
for the reason that the court had no jurisdic-
tion to pass judgment against him in said 
case; that the two judgments which he has 
satisfied by suffering the imprisonment, and 
paying the Ones and costs adjudged against 
him therein, were both for the crime of un-
lawful cohabitation, and that he is now iru-l 
prisoned under the judgment of the court! 
rendered against him on the indictment tor! 
adultery; that the offense is the same offense I 
for which he has suffered punishment under I 
the other indictments, and that the Kachael 
Woodward mentioned in the indictment for 
adultery, and in one of the indictments for j 
unlawful cohabitation, is one and the same 
person, and that he is being punished twice 
for the same offense; that the court had no 
jurisdiction to render judgment against him 
on his plea of guilty to the indictment of 
adultery, and that the same is void; and he 
prays to be discharged from imprisonment 
thereunder. A writ of habeas corpus was 
heretofore issued in the case, and the peti-
tioner produced in court by the United States 
marshal. From the exhibits attached to the 
petition, it appears that on the 9th day of 
January, 18B6, the petitioner was indicted 
in the district court of the First judicial dis-
trict for the crime of unlawful cohabitation, 
alleged to have been committed between Au-
gust 1, 1884, and December 10, 1885, by liv-
ing and cohabiting during said period of 
tune with Barbara Maughan, Elizabeth Hull, 
Erdner Maughan, Maggie Nibley, Mary Hale 
Maughan, Kachael AVoodward Maughan. and 
Francis Nibley Maughan, as his wives. This I 
[indictment is designated as No. 781. The 
indictment was found upon the testimony of 
C. L. Lowe and Thomas Grant, November9, 
1888. Petitioner was arraigned, and pleaded 
not guilty. November 23. 1888, petitioner 
changed his plea of not guilty to that of 
! guilty. January 3, 1889, petitioner was sen-
tenced by the court to pay a fine of $100, and 
$34 costs, and to be imprisoned in the peni-
tentiary six months, the imprisonment to 
commence to run from said date. It el so ap-
pears that on the 23d day of November, 1888, 
the petitioner was indicted in said district 
court for the crime of unlawful cohabitation 
J with Barbara Maughan, Elizabeth Maughan, 
Margaret Maughan, Mary Maughan, Rachael 
Woodward, and Euphira Maughan, by living 
and cohabiting with said women as his wives 
from the 15th day of January, 1886. to the 
123d day of November, 1888. This indictment 
is designated as No. 1.890, and was found 
upon the testimony of the petitioner alone, | who voluntarily appeared before the grand 
jury at his own request, and gave testimony. 
On the same day he appeared in open court, 
was arraigned, and pleaded guilty to the in-
dictment. January 3, 1889, petitioner was 
sentenced by the court to pay a fine of $100, 
and $31 costs, and be imprisoned in the peni-
tentiary six months, the imprisonment to run 
f rom'said date, it further appears that peti-
tioner was also indicted in said court on the 
23d day of November, 1888, for the crime of 
adultery alleged to have been committed 
on the 1st day of October, 1887, with one 
Rachael Woodward; that the said indictment 
was designated as No. 1,891, and was found 
on the testimony of Joseph Howell; that on 
said November *23d petitioner was arraigned, 
and pleaded guilty to the indictment, and on 
the 3d day of January, 1889, was sentenced 
by the court to be imprisoned in the peniten-
tiary two years and six months, and pay the 
costs of prosecution, amounting to $29. 
From the foregoing it will be seen that the 
petitioner was regularly .ndicted, convicted, 
and sentenced for the crime of adultery, upon 
his plea of guilty made in open court. There 
is no illegality appearing anywhere in the 
record of the case. It does not appear in 
which of the three cases the plea of guilty 
was first entered, nor in which case judg-
ment was first rendered. Tt does not appear 
that the Rachael Woodward with whom peti-
tioner committed adultery on the 1st day ot 
October, 1887, was the same Rachael Wood-
ward with whom be unlawfully cohabited 
from the 15th day of January, 1886, to No-
vember 23d, 1888. If such was the fact, and 
it had been properly pleaded and proved on 
the trial, it would have constituted a good 
defense to the indictment for adultery; but 
this court cannot, on habeas corpus, hear 
evidence nor determine the questions from 
anything outside of the record in this case. 
Counsel for petitioner insists that the rec-
ords attached to his petition show that the 
adultery was committed with one of the same 
wouK-n, to-wit, Rachael Woodward, with. 
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whom he had unlawfully cohabited, because I 
of the identity of the name in the indictments 
numbered 1,890 and 1,891, and cites Whart. 
Crim. Ev. § 802, and State v. Kelsoe, 76 Mo. 
505. These authorities go no further than to 
lay down the doctrine that identity of name 
raises a presumption, more or less strong, 
according to circumstances, of identity of 
person. Wharton says: " Identity of name is 
not by itself, when the name is common, and 
when it is borne by several persons, in the 
same circle of society, sufficient to sustain a 
conclusion of identity of person. The infer-
ence, however, rises in strength, with cir-
cumstances indicating the improbability of 
there being two persons of the same name at 
the same place, at the same time, and when 
there was no proof that there is any other 
person bearing the name. Names, therefore, 
with other circumstances, are facts from' 
which identity can be presumed." . 
In the case of State v. Kelsoe, supra, the 
defendant was indicted for burglary under i 
the name of Charles Kelsoe, alias McCarty. 
At the trial he testified in his own behalf, 
and for the purposes of affecting his cred-
ibility the state introduced the record of the 
conviction of Charles Kelsoe, alias McCarty, 
of grand larceny, and this was claimed to be 
error; but the court held that identity of such 
a name was sufficient to raise a presumption 
of identity of person, and was therefore 
proper evidence to go to the jury. But in 
this case even the presumption of identity of 
person from identity of name does not appear 
from the indictment, nor any part of the rec-
ord in the adultery case, but only appears in | 
the record of another case, and hence cannot j 
be considered in determining the question 
now presented. In none of the cases cited 
by counsel for petitioner, nor in any we have ] 
been able to find, has it been held that on 
habeas corpus facts not appearing in some 
part of the record of the case could be con-
sidered. It was the duty of petitioner, if he 
relied for defense upon the fact of a former 
conviction, to have pleaded it in the district 
court, instead of pleading it for the first time 
on habeas corpus in this court. In the case 
of In re Barton, ante, 998, (decided at this 
term,) the same principle was involved. In 
that case Barton was indicted for unlawful 
cohabitation with one Mary Beesley, and also 
for adultery committed with Mary Beesley 
during the time covered by the first indict-
ment. Both indictmentB were found by the 
same grand jury, upon the same evidence, 
and both indictments were presented at the 
same time. Barton pleaded guilty to both 
indictments on the same day. The court 
suspended sentence in the case for unlawful 
cohabitation, and sentenced him to imprison-
ment on the charge of adultery, and he pre-
sented his petition to this court, asking to 
be discharged on habeas corpus from im-
prisonment, because the district court had! 
no jurisdiction to sentence him in the adul-! 
tery case, after his conviction on the plea of 
guilty to the charge of unlawful cohabitation. 
v.21p.no.!7—m 
In denying him the relief prayed for, HEX-
DERSON, J., speaking for the court, used the 
following language:,* "When a person is 
charged with a crime before a court having 
jurisdiction to determine his guilt or inno-
cence, and he claims immunity by reason of 
a former conviction or acquittal, the burden 
is upon him to plead it in answer to the 
charge and establish it by his evidence; and 
if he does not do so it is waived. 1 Bish. 
Crim. Proc. § 806; 1 Whart. Crim. Law, § 
538 et seq.; Ex parte Kaufman. 73 Mo. 588; 
In re Bogart, 2 Sawy. 396; State v. Webb, 
74 Mo. 333. The question of a former con-
viction was a matter of defense, and was a 
question for the determination of the court 
having jurisdiction to try the charge. It in-
volves an issue of fact, the identity of the of-
fenses charged, the existence and priority of 
[the record relied upon, and on habeas corpus 
this court cannot try such an issue." The 
j rule here laid down is decisive of this case. 
 and we see no reason to change or modify it. 
Whatever merit there may be in the peti-
tioner's case is a proper subject for executive 
consideration, but this court can afford him 
no relief. The prayer of the petitioner is 
denied, and an order will be entered accord-
j taglv-
ZANE, O. J., and HENDERSON, J., concur. 
WATSON V. COBEY. 
HAYS V. SAME. 
(Supreme Court of TJtalu Jan. 25,1889.)1 
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS—INCORPORATION A*I> 
GOVERNMENT1—STATUTES. 
1. Laws Utah 1888, c. 48. is entitled "An act pro-
viding for the incorporation of cities.w The first 
five sections of article 1 provide for the manner 
in which unincorporated territory may incorporate 
under the act. Sections 0-9 provide for the mode 
of incorporation of cities under the ac t Sections 
! 10—13 are general. Sections 14,15, classify exist-
ing municipalities into two classes. Sections 16-
19 relate to municipal government, and provide | for the mode of election of city officers. A subse-
quent section of another article provides that cer-
tain sections "are hereby made applicable to all 
incorporated cities now organized in this terri-
tory, ** and sections lft-19 of article 1 are not men-
tioned, though a section of another article, which 
re-enacts the same principle as those sections, 
i with a proviso that it shall not interfere with any 
I existing mode of elections, is included. Article 1, 
I S ft, provides that when the common council call | an election to determine whether the city shall bo 
reincorporated under the act, they shall give no-
tice of the class to which the city will belong if | reincorporated. Held\ that sections 16-19, art. 1, 
did not apply to an incorporated city, whose 
I charter provided for the manner of electing its of-
i fleers, existing at the taking effect of the act, until 
it became reincorporated under section 6, and it 
was immaterial that its common council had taken 
steps to ascertain its class, under section 14. 1
 2. In Utah territory the fact that a statute has 
no enacting clause does not per seinvalidate it. 
Appeals from district court. First district. 
The opinion of the lower court was as fol-
lows: 
"This is a hearing upon a motion to quash 
Publication delayed by failure to receive copy. 
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drove by the gas station, a clerk in the 
station pointed towards the Corsica. Thus, 
the dispatch call was irrefutably linked to a 
person who, by her non-verbal communica-
tions, emphatically gave further weight to 
the officer's suspicion that the driver of the 
white vehicle was driving in an intoxicated 
state. Based on that information and his 
perceptions, the arresting officer stopped 
plaintiffs vehicle, the white Corsica, short-
ly thereafter on suspicion of DUI, although 
he acknowledged that he did not observe 
any other driving violations. 
Even absent other driving violations, an 
investigatory stop of a motor vehicle is 
permissible when a police officer has a 
reasonable suspicion that the driver is com-
mitting or has committed a drunk driving 
offense. See § 42-4-1202.1, C.R.S. (1984 
Repl.Vol. 17) (expressly authorizing such 
investigatory stops). See also Johnson v. 
Motor Vehicle Division, 38 Colo.App. 230, 
556 P.2d 488 (1976) (rejecting argument 
that any traffic violation separate and dis-
tinct from drunk driving offense was nec-
essary to invoke the requirements of the 
former implied consent law). 
[3] In determining the validity of an 
investigatory stop, the first inquiry is 
whether there were specific and articulable 
facts known to the police officer which, 
taken together with rational inferences 
from these facts, created a reasonable sus-
picion of criminal activity so as to justify 
the intrusion into the individual's personal 
security. People v. Garcia, 789 P.2d 190 
(Colo.1990); People v. Mascarenas, 726 
P.2d 644 (Colo. 1986). 
We conclude that the investigatory stop 
in this case was justified under the reason-
able suspicion standard. Here, the arrest-
ing officer's observations, including the 
clerk's communications to him almost im-
mediately after the report must have been 
given, were sufficient to provide him with a 
reasonable suspicion that the driver of the 
white vehicle was driving under the influ-
ence, and the investigatory stop was there-
fore justified. See § 42-4-1202.1; People 
v. Contreras, 780 P.2d 552 (Colo.1989); 
People v. Melgosa, 753 P.2d 221 (Colo. 
1988). Thus, the hearing officer and the 
district court properly rejected plaintiffs 
challenges to the validity of the initial in-
vestigatory stop. 
Moreover, it is undisputed that, following 
the initial stop, the information obtained by 
the arresting officer provided him with 
probable cause for plaintiff's DUI arrest 
and that plaintiff thereafter submitted to a 
breath test, which showed an alcohol con-
centration of .257 grams of alcohol per 210 
liters of breath. Accordingly, the hearing 
officer properly revoked plaintiffs driver's 
license pursuant to § 42-2-122.1, and the 
district court properly upheld the revoca-
tion. 
The judgment is affirmed. 
METZGER and RULAND, JJ , concur. 
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The PEOPLE of the State of Colorado, 
Plaintiff-Appellee, 
v. 
Edgar Burton ROBINSON, 
Defendant-Appellant 
No. 90CA1566. 
Colorado Court of Appeals, 
Div. V. 
Feb. 27, 1992. 
As Modified on Denial of Rehearing 
March 26, 1992. 
Certiorari Granted Aug. 17, 1992. 
Cross-Petition for Certiorari 
Denied Aug. 17, 1992. 
Defendant appealed from order of the 
District Court, Larimer County, John-David 
Sullivan, J., which dismissed motion to va-
cate conviction. The Court of Appeals, 
Davidson, J., held that statute of limita-
tions on collateral attacks on convictions 
applied to Rule 35 motion to vacate. 
Affirmed. 
PEOPLE v. ROBINSON C ^
 fi«Q 
Clt . -M3F.2d .32 (ColcApp. 1992) ^ ^ » 3 3 
1. Criminal Law *>998(14)
 7. J u d g m e n t ^ n m ) 
Although appeal duplicating previously Successful attack on use of conviction 
d,sm.ssed appea may be dismissed, there is in one proceeding does not prevent r ^ 
S T Z T S S t h ,a t fde fendKan t a f f i™ a t**- * • * » of the issue of thva ' lSty of £ 
denied. Rules Crim.Proc., R u l e ^ * I Z T ^ ^ l ^ **"**' * * • 
2. Statutes e=>181(l), 188 
In interpreting statutory provisions, 
court must seek to discern intent of the 
General Assembly, looking first to lan-
guage of statute itself, then giving effect 
to statutory terms in accordance with their 
commonly accepted meaning. 
3. Criminal Law «=>998(14) 
Intent of the General Assembly in cre-
ating time limitations on collateral attacks 
on convictions is to avoid litigation of stale 
claims and to avoid frustration of statutory 
provisions directed at repeat, prior, and ha-
bitual offenders. West's C.R.S.A. § 16-5-
402(2). 
4. Criminal Law <*=*998(14) 
Term "collaterally attacked" as used in 
statute setting time limits on collateral at-
tacks on convictions includes Rule 35(c) mo-
tions to vacate. West's C.R.S.A. § 16-5-
402; Rules Crim.Proc., Rule 35(c). 
See publication Words and Phrases 
for other judicial constructions and 
definitions. 
5. Criminal Law «=>998(1, 21) 
Successful Rule 35 attack results in 
conviction at issue being vacated and the 
validity of that conviction may not be relit-
igated in any subsequent proceeding, al-
though in some circumstances the prosecu-
tion may refile the original charge and 
defendant may face reconviction. Rules 
Crim.Proc., Rule 35. 
5. Judgment *=»518, 713(1) 
Attack on use of conviction is an at-
tempt to avoid, defeat, or evade judgment 
>r to deny its force and effect in some 
ncidental proceeding; successful attack on 
ise bars only the use of the prior convic-
ion in that incidental proceeding, and the 
onviction itself remains. 
8. Habeas Corpus «=>203 
Writs of habeas corpus, of which Rule 
35 motion to vacate is a modern equivalent, 
were traditionally considered collateral pro-
ceedings. Rules Crim.Proc., Rule 35. 
9. Statutes <S»212.1 
General Assembly is presumed cogni-
zant of judicial precedent in a particular 
area when it enacts legislation in that area. 
10. Statutes *»181(1) 
Court must construe statute to effectu-
ate legislative intent. 
11. Criminal Law *=»998(14) 
Provision of Rule 35 that one who is 
aggrieved and claims a right to be released 
or to have judgment set aside may file a 
motion for that relief "at any time" does 
not take precedence over statute of limita-
tions on collateral attacks on convictions. 
West's C.R.S.A. § 16-5-402; Rules Crim. 
Proc., Rule 35(c). 
12. Constitutional Law «=»55 
If legislative act is based in public poli-
cy rather than an attempt to regulate day-
to-day procedural operations of court, it 
does not usurp Supreme Court's rule mak-
ing authority. 
13. Constitutional Law *=»48(3) 
Statute must be construed so as to 
avoid constitutional infirmities. 
14. Habeas Corpus «=>443, 503 
Only claims cognizable in constitution-
ally guaranteed state habeas corpus pro-
ceeding are that the sentence was beyond 
jurisdictional limits or that the conviction 
was invalid because the court lacked juris-
diction over the subject matter of the de-
fendant West's C.R.S.A. Const. Art. 2, 
§21. 
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15. Criminal Law e»998(14) 
Statute of limitations on collateral at-
tacks on convictions does not limit collat-
eral attacks on jurisdictional grounds. 
West's C.R.S.A. § 16-5-402; West's 
C.R.S.A. Const. Art. 2, § 21. 
16. Constitutional Law «»55 
Habeas Corpus <S=>912 
General Assembly may impose statu-
tory conditions on state applications for 
habeas corpus. West's C.R.S.A. Const 
Art. 2, § 21. 
17. Criminal Law «=»998(14) 
Defendant was not excused from fail-
ure to attack conviction within the statu-
tory time period on the grounds that he had 
no present need to attack the conviction 
until it was used in habitual offender pro-
ceeding, and defendant was nonetheless re-
quired to attack the conviction before the 
statutory deadline of July 1, 1989. West's 
C.R.S.A. § 16-5-402. 
18. Constitutional Law *»250.2(5) 
Criminal Law «=>998(14) 
Application to defendant of statute of 
limitations on collateral attacks on convic-
tions did not deny him equal protection of 
the law despite claim that he was barred by 
lack of present need from timely filing his 
postconviction challenge. U.S.C.A. Const. 
Amend. 14; West's C.R.S.A. § 16-5-402. 
Gale A. Norton, Atty. Gen., Raymond T. 
Slaughter, Chief Deputy Atty. Gen., Timo-
thy M. Tymkovich, Sol. Gen., Clement P. 
Engle, Asst. Atty. Gen., Denver, for plain-
tiff-appellee. 
David F. Vela, Colorado State Public De-
fender, Patrick J. Mulligan, Deputy State 
Public Defender, Denver, for defendant-
appellant. 
Opinion by Judge DAVIDSON. 
Defendant, Edgar Burton Robinson, ap-
peals from the order of the trial court 
dismissing his Crim. P. 35(c) motion as un-
timely. We affirm. 
In 1977, defendant entered a plea of 
guilty to first degree sexual assault. He 
received a two-year deferred sentence. In 
1990, defendant filed a Crim. P. 35(c) mo-
tion to vacate the conviction. 
In its opposition brief, the prosecution 
argued that the motion was untimely pur-
suant to § 16-5-402, C.R.S. (1986 Repl.Vol. 
8A). That statute provides that a person 
may not "collaterally attack the validity" of 
a conviction unless the attack is begun 
within various time spans ranging from six 
months for petty offenses to no limit for 
class 1 felonies. The period applicable to 
first degree assault is three years. 
The trial court agreed that the motion 
was untimely, and it was dismissed without 
a hearing. On appeal, defendant contends 
that the dismissal was in error because 
§ 16-5-402 does not apply to attacks on 
convictions filed pursuant to Crim. P. 35. 
We disagree. 
I. 
Ill As a threshold matter, we address 
the People's argument that defendant's ap-
peal should be dismissed because he may 
have litigated the merits of this Crim. P. 
35(c) claim in another proceeding and has 
failed to allege specifically that his claims 
are not duplicative. Although an appeal 
duplicating an appeal previously denied 
may be dismissed, People v. Holmes, 819 
P.2d 541 (Colo.App. 1991), there is no re-
quirement that a defendant affirmatively 
assert that the relief sought has not been 
previously denied, and we find no indication 
in this record that any such duplicative 
relief has been considered or denied on 
appeal. 
II. 
Whether motions filed under Crim. P. 35 
are included in the provisions of § 16-5-
402 is a matter of first impression in Colo-
rado. Our supreme court specifically de-
clined to reach this issue in People v. Ger-
many, 674 P.2d 345 (Colo. 1983), because it 
held that the then current version of the 
statute was unconstitutional. However, in 
Moland v. People, 757 P.2d 137 (Colo.1988), 
the court specifically stated in a footnote 
that a defendant's right to obtain post-
conviction review pursuant to Crim. P. 35 
PEOPLE v. ROBINSON 
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was subject to the requirements of § 16-5-
402. While this statement was dictum, we 
view it as highly instructive. 
Additionally, in People v. Fagerholm, 
768 P.2d 689 (Colo. 1989), the supreme court 
upheld the constitutionality of § 16-5-402 
in the context of a Crim. P. 35 motion. In 
People v. Brack, 796 P.2d 49 (Colo.App. 
1990), this court also upheld the denial of a 
Crim. P. 35 motion based upon § 16-5-402, 
although, in those cases, the applicability 
of § 16-5-402 to such proceedings was not 
challenged. 
A. 
12,3] In interpreting particular statu-
tory provisions, this court must seek to 
discern the intent of the General Assembly, 
looking first to the language of the statute 
itself, and giving effect to the statutory 
terms in accordance with their commonly 
accepted meaning. Tkiret v. Kautzky, 792 
P.2d 801 (Colo. 1990). The intent of the 
General Assembly in creating time limita-
tions on collateral attacks, as stated in 
§ 16-5-402(2), C.R.S. (1986 Repl.Vol. 8A), 
is to avoid litigation of stale claims and to 
avoid frustration of the statutory provi-
sions directed at repeat, prior, and habitual 
offenders. 
14] Defendant argues that "collateral 
attack" refers only to an attack on the use 
of the conviction, such as a motion to sup-
press an habitual offender count, but not to 
a "direct" attack on a conviction pursuant 
to Crim. P. 35. On the other hand, the 
People argue that, in the criminal context, 
there is no distinction between collateral 
attacks and other post-conviction relief and 
they urge this court to construe the term 
"collaterally attack" as used in § 16-5-402 
to include attacks under Crim. P. 35. Al-
though we find significant distinction be-
tween collateral attacks and other types of 
post-conviction relief, we nevertheless hold 
that "collaterally attack" as used in § 16-
5-402 necessarily includes relief sought 
pursuant to Crim. P. 35. 
15] A successful Crim. P. 35 attack re-
sults in the conviction at issue being vacat-
ed. Thereafter, the validity of that convic-
tion may not be relitigated in any subse-
quent proceeding, though in some circum-
stances the prosecution may refile the orig-
inal charge, and defendant could face re-
conviction. See People v. Keenan, 185 
Colo. 317, 524 P.2d 604 (1974). 
[6,7] In contrast, an attack on the use 
of the conviction is an attempt to avoid, 
defeat, or evade judgment or to deny its 
force and effect in some incidental proceed-
ing. Brennan v. Grover, 158 Colo. 66, 404 
P.2d 544 (1965), cert denied, 383 U.S. 926, 
86 S.Ct 929, 15 L.Ed.2d 845 (1966). A 
successful attack on use bars only the use 
of the prior conviction in that incidental 
proceeding; the conviction itself remains. 
Watkins v. People, 655 P.2d 834 (Colo. 
1982). The successful attack on use does 
not prevent relitigation of the issue of the 
validity of the subject conviction in a subse-
quent proceeding, or even in a Crim. P. 35 
attack of the same conviction. Wright v. 
People, 690 P.2d 1257 (Colo.1984). 
[8] However, although avenues for col-
lateral attacks do differ, an attack on the 
conviction itself has long been considered a 
collateral attack, whether through Crim. P. 
35 or its federal counterpart, 28 U.S.C. 
§ 2255 (1988). See Bales v. People, 713 
P.2d 1280 (Colo.1986) ("a defendant may 
collaterally attack a prior conviction by ei-
ther filing a Crim. P. 35(c) motion in the 
sentencing court or by filing a proper mo-
tion to prohibit the prosecution from using 
evidence of a prior conviction in a pending 
criminal prosecution"); U.S. v. Hayman, 
342 U.S. 205, 72 S.Ct. 263, 96 L.Ed. 232 
(1952); U.S. v. Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 102 
S.Ct. 1584, 71 L.Ed.2d 816 (1982); U.S. v. 
Addonizio, 442 U.S. 178, 99 S.Ct. 2235, 60 
L.Ed.2d 805 (1979). See also People v. 
Fagerholm, supra, (Vollack, J., dissenting) 
("[defendant] collaterally attacked both pri-
or convictions under Crim. P. 35"). Also, 
writs of habeas corpus, of which Crim. P. 
35 is a modern equivalent, were traditional-
ly considered collateral proceedings. See 
U.S. v. Hayman, supra. 
[9] The General Assembly is presumed 
cognizant of judicial precedent in a particu-
lar area when it enacts legislation in that 
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area. Rauachenberger v. Radetsky, 745 
P.2d 640 (Colo.1987). We therefore may 
assume that it was fully aware of the ac-
cepted uses of the term "collaterally at-
tack" as used in the lexicon of criminal law. 
[10] Moreover, a common sense reading 
of the plain language of the statute dic-
tates the conclusion that the General As-
sembly intended not a technical definition 
of "collateral," but its commonly accepted 
meaning within a criminal law context. 
"Statutes must be construed so as to effec-
tuate their intent and beneficial purposes, 
not to defeat them." Colorado State 
Board of Medical Examiners v. Saddoris, 
825 P.2d 39 (Colo.1992). The purpose of 
the statute is explicit—to prevent defen-
dants from thwarting the effect of repeat 
offender statutes and to end rampant relit-
igation of stale claims. The scope of the 
statute is sweeping ("no person shall collat-
erally attack the validity of a [prior convic-
tion] unless — "), and reading the statute 
as defendant urges would limit it drastical-
ly. To the contrary, we must construe a 
statute to effectuate the legislative intent, 
Martinez v. Continental Enterprises, 730 
P.2d 308 (Colo.1986), and the intent here is 
unmistakable. Cf. People v. Fagerholm, 
supra; Moland v. People, supra. 
B. 
[11] Defendant argues, however, that 
even if § 16-5-402 applies to Crim. P. 35 
motions, Crim. P. 35(c)(3) provides that one 
who is aggrieved and claims a right to be 
released or to have a judgment set aside 
may file a motion for such relief at any 
time, and, citing People v. McKenna, 196 
Colo. 367, 585 P.2d 275 (1978), he contends 
that such procedural rule takes precedence 
over a procedural statute. We disagree. 
[12] If a legislative act is based in pub-
lic policy rather than as an attempt to 
regulate the day-to-day procedural opera-
tion of the court, it does not usurp the 
supreme court's rule making authority. 
People v. McKenna, supra. 
Here, the statute's stated goals include 
preventing difficulties in litigating stale 
claims and also preventing frustration of 
statutes aimed at repeat, prior, and habit-
ual offenders. Section 16-5-402 had such 
a severe impact upon the ability of prior 
offenders to attack a conviction that an 
inclusion of a grace period after its effec-
tive date was necessary to render it consti-
tutional. People v. Fagerholm, supra. 
Thus, while it also had an incidental effect 
upon procedure, the statute is primarily an 
expression of public policy. See ABA, 
Standards for Criminal Justice, Standard 
22-2.4 (2d ed. 1982). See also Chase Secu-
rities Corp. v. Donaldson, 325 U.S. 304, 65 
S.Ct. 1137, 89 L.Ed. 1628 (1945) (statutes of 
limitation "represent a public policy about 
the privilege to litigate"). Accordingly, 
here, the statute controls over the rule. 
See People v. Hollis, 670 P.2d 441 (Colo. 
App.1983). 
C. 
[13] A statute must be construed so as 
to avoid constitutional infirmities. People 
v. Washburn, 197 Colo. 419, 593 P.2d 962 
(1979). Defendant argues that the applica-
tion of Crim. P. 35 motions to § 16-5-402 
will render the statute unconstitutional be-
cause the statute will conflict with Colo. 
Const, art. II, § 21, which prohibits any 
suspension of the writ of habeas corpus. 
First, we note that although our supreme 
court did not specifically address the state 
suspension clause, the court upheld the 
constitutionality of § 16-5-402 in the con-
text of a Crim. P. 35 motion in People v. 
Fagerholm, supra. 
[14,15] Secondly, we do not necessarily 
agree that the collateral attacks foreclosed 
by § 16-5-402 are those guaranteed by the 
state suspension clause. The only claims 
cognizable in a constitutionally guaranteed 
state habeas corpus proceeding are these: 
(1) the sentence was beyond jurisdictional 
limits, or (2) the conviction was invalid be-
cause the court lacked jurisdiction over the 
subject matter or the defendant. See Stil-
ley v. Tinsley, 153 Colo. 66, 385 P.2d 677 
(1963). The statute does not limit collateral 
attacks made on those grounds. See 
§§ 16-5-402(2) (a) and (b), C.R.S. (1986 
Repl.Vol. 8B). Instead, the statute limits 
MARTINEZ v. 
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only those collateral attacks previously 
made available by legislative and judicial 
expansion of the scope of postconviction 
relief beyond that which is constitutionally 
mandated. 
[16] Third, the General Assembly may 
impose statutory conditions on state appli-
cations for habeas corpus. See People ex 
rel. Wyse v. District Court, 180 Colo. 88, 
503 P.2d 154 (1972); Stilley v. Tinsley, 
supra; see also § 13-45-101, C.R.S. (1987 
Repl.Vol. 6A) and § 18-1-410, C.R.S. (1986 
Repl.Vol. 8B). And, similar state statutes 
of limitations on collateral attacks have 
been upheld as constitutional. See Davis v. 
State, 443 N.W.2d 707 (Iowa 1989) (state 
legislature may attach reasonable time 
limitations to the exercise of state constitu-
tional rights). See also United States v. 
Randolph, 262 F.2d 10 (7th Cir.1958), cert 
denied, 359 U.S. 1004, 79 S.Ct 1143, 3 
L.Ed.2d 1032 (1959) (upholds Illinois' five-
year statute of limitations for post-convic-
tion relief). 
Having considered this jurisprudence, we 
determine that § lfr-5-402 must be con-
strued to include Crim. P. 35 motions with-
in its terms. However, insofar as defen-
dant's argument raises a claim of facial 
unconstitutionality, we do not have jurisdic-
tion to decide that issue. Section 13-4-
102(l)(b), C.R.S. (1987 RepLVol. 6A). 
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tory deadlines be filed by July 1, 1989. 
People v. Stephens is dispositive. Accord-
ingly, defendant here has failed to estab-
lish a lack of present need. 
IV. 
[18] For the same reason, we reject de-
fendant's contention that he has been de-
nied equal protection of the law. Defen-
dant's argument is premised on the as-
sumption that he was barred by a lack of 
present need from timely filing his postcon-
viction challenge. Specifically, he contends 
that habitual criminal charges filed against 
a defendant in June 1989 could be attacked, 
but not those filed after the July 1 dead-
line. Since we have determined that defen-
dant was not barred by lack of present 
need, we also reject his equal protection 
argument. 
To the extent that we have jurisdiction of 
the issues raised, the order is affirmed. 




[17] Defendant also contends that the 
trial court erred in finding that he was not 
excused for his failure to attack the convic-
tion within the statutory time period. We 
disagree. 
Citing Moland v. People, supra, defen-
dant argues that he had no "present need" 
to attack the conviction until its use in 
habitual offender proceedings and that, 
therefore, his neglect was excusable. 
However, in People v. Stephens (Colo.App. 
No. 90CA1641, February 27, 1992), we held 
that notwithstanding any present need re-
quirements as set forth in Moland v. Peo-
ple, § 16-5-402, as construed in People v. 
Fagerholm, supra, requires that all collat-
eral attacks otherwise barred by the statu-
Christine C. MARTINEZ, 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
v. 
Paillette Ann SHAPLAND, 
Defendant-Appellee. 
No. 90CA2142. 
Colorado Court of Appeals, 
Div. III. 
Feb. 27, 1992. 
Rehearing Denied April 2, 1992. 
Certiorari Denied Aug. 10, 1992. 
In negligence action, plaintiff sought 
damages for injuries arising from automo-
bile accident. The District Court of the 
60 Tenn. 833 SOUTH WESTERN REPORTER, 2d SERIES 
APPENDIX—Continued 
(If your answer is "No," do not answer 
any further questions. Sign this form 
and return it to the court.) 
3. Did the plaintiffs own negligence ac-
count for 60 percent or more of the 
total negligence that proximately 
caused his/her injuries or damages? 
Answer: (Yes or No) 
(If your answer is "Yes," do not an-
swer any any further questions. Sign 
this form and return it to the court.) 
4. What is the total amount of plain-
tiffs damages, determined without ref-
erence to the amount of plaintiffs neg-
ligence? 
Amount in dollars: $ 
5. Using 100 percent as the total com-
bined negligence which proximately 
caused the injuries or damages to the 
plaintiff, what are the percentages of 
such negligence to be allocated to the 
plaintiff and defendant? 
Plaintiff % 
Defendant % 
(Total must equal 100%) 
Signature of Foreman 
OPINION ON PETITION TO REHEAR 
Plaintiff has filed a respectful and 
thoughtful Petition for Rehearing request-
ing argument on (1) the advisability of re-
taining joint and several liability in certain 
limited circumstances, and (2) the Opinion's 
treatment of nonparty tort-feasors. Be-
cause such further guidance should await 
an appropriate controversy, the petition is 
accordingly denied. 
REID, C.J., and O'BRIEN, 
DAUGHTREY and ANDERSON, JJ., 
concur. 
Francis W. POTTS, Petitioner-Appellant, 
v. 
STATE of Tennessee, Respondent-
Appellee. 
Supreme Court of Tennessee, 
at Jackson. 
June 8, 1992. 
Petitioner appealed from dismissal of 
his petition for habeas corpus relief in the 
Criminal Court, Shelby County, Joseph B. 
Dailey, J. The Supreme Court, Daughtrey, 
J., held that three-year statute of limita-
tions on filing of post-conviction petitions is 
not unconstitutional suspension of writ of 
habeas corpus. 
Affirmed. 
1. Criminal Law *=>998(14) 
Routine challenge to pre-1986 convic-
tion has to have been lodged no later than 
June 30, 1989. T.C.A. § 40-30-102. 
2. Criminal Law e»978 
Habeas Corpus «=>912 
Statute imposing three-year limitations 
period on filing of post-conviction petitions 
is not unconstitutional suspension of habe-
as corpus; the statute of limitations is inap-
plicable to habeas corpus proceedings, be-
cause the two avenues of collateral attack 
are theoretically and statutorily distinct. 
Const. Art. 1, § 15; T.C.A. §§ 29-21-101 et 
seq., 40-30-101 et seq., 40-30-105. 
3. Habeas Corpus *=»224, 445 
Writ of habeas corpus will issue only 
in case of void judgment or to free prisoner 
held in custody after his term of imprison-
ment has expired. Const. Art. 1, § 15; 
T.C.A. §§ 29-21-101 et seq., 40-30-101 et 
seq., 40-30-105. 
4. Habeas Corpus «=»203, 206 
Unlike post-conviction petition, purpose 
of habeas corpus petition is to contest void 
and not merely voidable judgments; peti-
tioner cannot collaterally attack facially 




5. Criminal Law <*»998(14) 
Trial Courts should not treat true ha-
beas petitions filed outside post-conviction 
statute of limitations as post-conviction pe-
titions. T.C.A. § 40-30-102. 
6. Habeas Corpus *=>603 
Challenges to void convictions and ex-
pired terms of imprisonment survive be-
yond time prescribed in post-conviction 
statute of limitations, and Great Writ can-
not be defeated by conversion to post-con-
viction proceedings and subsequent dismis-
sal due to statutory time bar. T.C.A. § 40-
30-102. 
7. Habeas Corpus «=>285, 603 
Habeas corpus has no statutory time 
limitations; even after post-conviction peti-
tion is dismissed as untimely, prisoner may 
assert in petition for writ of habeas corpus 
that his conviction is void or that he is 
being wrongfully confined beyond his term 
of imprisonment. 
Brett Stein, Memphis, for petitioner-ap-
pellant. 
Charles W. Burson, Atty. Gen. and Re-
porter, Kathy Principe, Asst. Atty. Gen., 
Nashville, for respondent-appellee. 
OPINION 
DAUGHTREY, Justice. 
The appellant, Francis W. Potts, appeals 
directly to this Court from the dismissal of 
his petition for post-conviction relief. Potts 
asks us to declare that the three-year stat-
ute of limitations on the filing of post-
conviction petitions constitutes an unconsti-
tutional suspension of the writ of habeas 
corpus, in violation of the provisions of 
Article I, § 15 of the Tennessee Constitu-
tion. For the reasons set out below, we 
find no merit to this contention and affirm 
the judgment of the trial court. 
On August 24, 1990, Potts was indicted 
for a third offense DUI. On the date set 
for trial, he entered a guilty plea to the 
basic DUI charge but took issue with the 
charge that he was a third-time offender. 
Potts filed a "Motion in the Nature of a 
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief," chal-
833 S W 2d -3 
STATE Tenn. 61 
60 (Tenn. 1992) 
lenging the validity of prior guilty pleas 
that he had entered in 1982 and 1983 to 
charges of DUI. The motion also request-
ed a consolidation of the petition with the 
pending DUI case. The state agreed to 
consolidate the post-conviction action with 
the guilty plea submission, but argued that 
the post-conviction challenge to the prior 
guilty pleas was time-barred by the provi-
sions of T.C.A. § 40-30-102. The trial 
judge agreed with the state and dismissed 
the post-conviction petition. The court 
then adjudged Potts guilty of a third-of-
fense DUI and sentenced him accordingly. 
This appeal followed, pursuant to the juris-
dictional provision in T.C.A. § 16-4-108. 
In 1986, the General Assembly enacted 
T.C.A. § 40-30-102. Pursuant to that pro-
vision: 
A prisoner in custody under sentence 
of a court of this state must petition for 
post-conviction relief under this chapter 
within three (3) years of the date of the 
final action of the highest state appellate 
court to which an appeal is taken or 
consideration of such petition shall be 
barred. 
By its terms, the new provision was to take 
effect on July 1, 1986. 
[1] However, prior to the enactment of 
§ 40-30-102, there had been no limitation 
on the filing of post-conviction petitions in 
Tennessee. Consequently, in order to 
avoid due process problems, the courts of 
this state ruled that the new statute of 
limitations would be given prospective ap-
plication only. See, e.g., State v. Masucci, 
764 S.W.2d 90, 91 (Tenn.Crim.App.1988); 
State v. St. John, 751 S.W.2d 453, 454 
(Tenn.Crim.App. 1988); Abston v. State, 
749 S.W.2d 487, 488 (Tenn.Crim.App.1988). 
Thus, a routine challenge to a pre-1986 
conviction has to have been lodged no later 
than June 30, 1989. Masucci, 754 S.W.2d 
at 91. 
[2] The appellant's petition challenging 
his pre-1986 DUI convictions was filed af-
ter June 30, 1989, and, on the basis of case 
authority set out above, the trial court held 
that the post-conviction petition was barred 
by the statute of limitations. On appeal, 
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Potts contests the constitutionality of 
T.C.A. § 40-30-102. He argues that in im-
posing a statute of limitations on post-con-
viction proceedings, the legislature has un-
constitutionally suspended the writ of habe-
as corpus. Potts relies in this regard on 
Article I, § 15 of the Tennessee Constitu-
tion, which provides that "the privilege of 
the writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be 
suspended, unless when in case of rebellion 
or invasion, the General Assembly shall 
declare the public safety requires it." 
We find the appellant's contention mis-
placed. The statute of limitations on the 
filing of post-conviction petitions is inappli-
cable to habeas corpus proceedings, be-
cause the two avenues of collateral attack 
are theoretically and statutorily distinct. 
[3,4] The post-conviction process, set 
out in T.C.A. §§ 40-30-101 et seq., provides 
for challenges to convictions that are al-
leged to be either void or voidable because 
of the abridgement of constitutional rights. 
T.C.A. § 40-30-105. In contrast, it is well 
settled in this state that the writ of habeas 
corpus, codified at T.C.A. §§ 29-21-101 et 
8eq., will issue only in the case of a void 
judgment or to free a prisoner held in 
custody after his term of imprisonment has 
expired. State ex rel. Hall v. Meadows, 
215 Tenn. 668, 389 S.W.2d 256, 259 (1965). 
Unlike the post-conviction petition, the pur-
pose of a habeas corpus petition is to con-
test void and not merely voidable judg-
ments. See State ex rel. Newsom v. 
Henderson, 221 Tenn. 24, 424 S.W.2d 186, 
189 (1968). A petitioner cannot collaterally 
attack a facially valid conviction in a habe-
as corpus proceeding. State ex rel. Hoi-
brook v. Bomar, 211 Tenn. 243, 364 S.W.2d 
887, 888 (1963). 
15-7] The three-year statute of limita-
tions on the filing of post-conviction peti-
tions in no way affects the writ of habeas 
corpus. The provisions of § 40-30-102 are 
inapplicable to petitions for the writ of 
I. T.C.A. § 40-30-108 instructs trial courts to 
treat habeas petitions as post-conviction peti-
tions "when the relief and procedure authorized 
by [the Post-Conviction Procedure Act] appear 
adequate and appropriate." Trial courts should 
not, however, treat true habeas petitions filed 
outside the § 40-30-102 statute of limitations as 
habeas corpus, except to the extent that 
habeas petitions are properly treated by 
courts as post-conviction petitions.1 Habe-
as corpus has no statutory time limitation. 
Even after a post-conviction petition is dis-
missed as untimely, a prisoner may assert 
in a petition for a writ of habeas corpus 
that his conviction is void or that he is 
being wrongfully confined beyond his term 
of imprisonment. 
We hold that the provisions of T.C.A. 
§ 40-30-102 do not unconstitutionally sus-
pend the writ of habeas corpus in Tennes-
see. Because the appellant's constitutional 
challenge is without merit, we affirm the 
judgment of the trial court. 
REID, C.J., and DROWOTA, O'BRIEN 
and ANDERSON, JJ., concur. 
(O iKirNUMMtSYSTEM> 
J.T. JONES, Jr., Appellant, 
v. 
HELENA TRUCK LINES, INC., and 
Liberty Mutual Insurance 
Company, Appellees. 
Supreme Court of Tennessee, 
at Jackson. 
June 8, 1992. 
Employee appealed from an order of 
the Shelby County Court, Kay S. Robilio, 
J., which rendered judgment for employer 
in workers' compensation suit. The Su-
preme Court, Daughtrey, J., held that: (1) 
employee gave employer adequate notice 
that he had suffered work-related injury, 
post-conviction petitions. Challenges to void 
convictions and expired terms of imprisonment 
survive beyond the time prescribed in § 40-30-
102, and the Great Writ cannot be defeated by 
conversion to post-convictions proceedings pur-
suant to § 40-30-108 and subsequent dismissal 
because of the § 40-30-102 time bar. 
and (2) causation was adequately estab-
lished. 
Reversed and remanded. 
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testimony of treating physician, which cor-
roborated employee's testimony. 
1. Workers' Compensation «=»1217 
Employee must give required notice to 
employer that he has sustained work-relat-
ed injury before workers' compensation 
benefits can be collected. T.C.A. § 50-6-
201. 
2. Workers* Compensation <*=>1221 
Employee's notice of injury to employ-
er for workers' compensation purposes 
must be calculated reasonably to convey 
message that employee has suffered injury 
arising out of and in course of his employ-
ment. T.C.A. § 50-6-201. 
3. Workers' Compensation *=>1221, 1676 
Employee reasonably conveyed to his 
employer that he had been involved in 
work-related accident and thereby suffered 
injury arising out of and in course of his 
employment, as was required for receipt of 
workers' compensation benefits; testimony 
by employee's supervisor that employee 
never told him of work-related injury was 
as easily attributable to supervisor's over-
sight as it was to employee's failure to 
communicate both nature and cause of his 
injury. T.C.A. § 50-6-201. 
4. Workers' Compensation *»1245 
Court could not impute co-worker's 
knowledge of employee's work-related inju-
ry to employer for purposes of determining 
whether employer was given proper notice 
of employee's work-related injury for work-
ers' compensation purposes. T.C.A. § 50-
6-201. 
5. Workers' Compensation <S=>1252 
Although lack of prejudice, by itself, is 
insufficient to excuse employee's failure to 
give employer notice of work-related inju-
ry, such matter is germane to determina-
tion of whether employer was given ade-
quate notice for workers' compensation 
purposes. T.C.A. § 50-6-201. 
6. Workers' Compensation *»1492 
Causation was adequately established 
in workers' compensation proceeding by 
7. Workers' Compensation *=»861 
When determining on remand proper 
amount of workers' compensation benefits 
to award employee for permanent partial 
disability to body as a whole, court should 
consider that employee possessed few 
transferable skills and that at time of trial, 
employee, who was formerly a truck driv-
er, was working as a security guard and 
earning approximately 35% of his salary 
before being injured. 
8. Workers' Compensation «=>1733 
When trial court in workers' compensa-
tion suit has heard all proof and intends to 
rule in employer's favor on some ground 
authorized by statute or by case law, court 
should also make contingent findings con-
cerning extent to which employee would 
otherwise be entitled to recover. 
Ira M. Thomas, Memphis, for appellant 
Richard D. Click, Memphis, for appellees. 
OPINION 
DAUGHTREY, Justice. 
This workers' compensation appeal re-
quires us to review the sufficiency of the 
employee's notice that he was injured on 
the job. The trial court dismissed the ac-
tion, ruling that the employee knew that he 
had sustained a work-related injury but 
failed fully to communicate this knowledge 
to his employer. For reasons set forth 
below, we disagree with the trial court's 
conclusion and find that the employee is 
entitled to recovery. Because the trial 
court made no findings beyond the ruling 
on notice, it is necessary to remand the 
case for a determination of the award to 
the employee. 
We begin with a brief summation of the 
facts pertinent to the issue of notice. The 
employee, J.T. Jones, was a long-haul truck 
driver for the employer, Helena Truck 
Lines, Inc. On two separate occasions in 
May and June of 1989, Jones slipped and 
fell while disembarking from his truck. 
